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




PUBLISHERS' NOTE

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The chief aim of this book is to show the doctrine of Science does not ly come into collision with the ed of Christendom—that Science, if s no help to belief in personal survival or bodily death, is at the same time hindrance. Usually the question of future life is argued from either the one side or the other, the religious or the scientific. Here the author, being both a parish priest and a University teacher of Science, treats it in both aspects. His endeavour has been to instruct the unlearned, who, by omitting the more technical parts, which can readily be recognised in the analytical contents, will be able to get the pith of the argument, which is expressed in the language of every day. The difficulties created by the moral revolt against crude statements of the doctrine of Eternal Punishment are also dealt with, and, as far as possible, removed.





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Asco

Y





## The Future Life



Quoniam Deus creavit hominem inextiminabilem, et  
ad imaginem similitudinis Suse fecit illum. Invidia  
autem Diaboli mors introivit in orbem Terrarum.—  
*Liber Sapientiae ii, 23.*


THE FUTURE LIFE

& modern Difficulties

BY F. Claude Kempson



London  
PITMAN



PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY  
SIR ISAAC PITMAN & SONS, LTD.  
LONDON AND BATH - - - 1907

(2415)

## Preface

WHEN a man has something to say and writes a book to say it, his say should be said in the body of the book. Where, however, a complicated subject is dealt with, as is always the case with Apologetics, opportunity may be taken in the preface to explain the arrangement of the matter in the book.

The difficulties which stand in the way of belief in a future life are of two kinds: first, difficulties raised in the name of Science to any such belief, and secondly, difficulties raised on ethical, or even sentimental grounds against some particular system of Eschatology, that is, some definite assertion as to what the future life may have in store for us. This book is therefore divided into two parts dealing with these two several sets of difficulties.

Part I falls naturally into three sections. The first is introductory and reviews the general principles of relationship which must always obtain between a religious explanation of the universe and a description of so much of that universe as comes within the range of our vision. In this is included a discussion of the relationship of knowledge to belief based on Mr. Herbert Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable and Bishop Pearson's, which is really Aristotle's, doctrine of the Credible. This occupies five chapters and brings us to the second stage, in which a descriptive account of the Christian Creed is presented as it is given in the ordinary text-books of Christian doctrine, and a corresponding account is given of the teaching of Science as it is presented in reviews of the present phase of scientific and especially of biological doctrine: of course in a very condensed form. This covers four chapters and leads up to the last section, in which difficulties raised over special points are discussed, such for example as the doctrine of Original Sin and those of heredity and evolution, the seeming collision between scientific teaching and Scripture narrative, and between the doctrine of free will and mechanical theories of animal life. I conclude by maintaining the validity and permanence of the position called by the late Mr. G. J. Romanes "pure agnosticism."

The second part is mainly occupied with the moral revolt against the doctrine of eternal punishment, especially as presented in Dean Farrar's "Eternal Hope." The justice of his revolt is admitted, but it is maintained that that against which he revolted was only a crude caricature of the true doctrine. The importance of the doctrine of Purgatory to a sane scheme of Eschatology as admitted by Dean Farrar is urged, and his reluctance to accept it is maintained to have been unnecessary.

As it is maintained that positive knowledge of the invisible world in which the future life will have its place must rest on testimony, and as our witness is Our Lord Jesus Christ, a digression which forms the second chapter of the second part has seemed necessary on the defence of the Gospels as documents preserving a record of what He actually said.

It has been suggested to me that parts of Chapter VI are irrelevant and draw needless attention to the divisions of Christendom. To this I answer that these divisions are a fact and must be faced : and if anything said in this book incidentally leads any reader to realize the evil of these divisions, and to do anything short of the sacrifice of truth towards healing them, I shall not be sorry. And I would add this. The Nineteenth Century has been an age of Biblical criticism, and whatever else may or may not come out of that criticism, it is now seen that the Bible cannot stand alone as a self authenticated authority, that is, apart from the continuous social tradition of a living Christian organization. This work is no place for discussing the rights of Episcopacy or the Primacy of a particular Bishop. I merely take the fact that the continuous organization has so far happened to have been episcopal as I find it. The Biblical testimony to the future life cannot stand apart from the Church's testimony to the Bible, be the constitution of the Church what it may.

A special word to readers who are of the Roman Communion, as to points on which we agree, and points upon which we must agree to differ. We agree that the Catholic Church is a visible organization, and that allegiance to Christ and His scheme of salvation require us to submit ourselves to the Apostolic Authority: this is a question of principle. On the question through which of the two rival Hierarchies which unhappily coexist in this island our allegiance is to be given, which is a question of fact, we differ. But this is a difference which has nothing to do with the line of argument

of this book. As to this irrelevant question of fact, let each of us, therefore, for the nonce, be fully persuaded in his own mind.

Another friend has questioned the necessity of some of the detailed description of the animal cell in Chapter IX. It has no bearing on the subject. I agree! My principal object in giving an outline of scientific doctrine has been to exhibit its irrelevancy. Also Apologetics bring under discussion much heterogeneous matter, and it seems to me that controversial work often fails by assuming complete information on the reader's part of all the departments of knowledge which come under discussion.

In controversial work one has to discuss various opinions, and when one disagrees with them one has to say so, and one ought to be able to say so plainly without lack of charity. Is it necessary for me to say that where I have done so I have done so without *animus*, and without intending any disrespect to those from whose opinions I dissent? It is, I believe, a tradition of the House of Commons for members not merely to disagree but to hold each others' opinions up to ridicule without personal *animus*; in private they may even be close friends. I ask my readers to receive anything with which they disagree, and they are sure to disagree with something, in the same admirable spirit.

In the matter of acknowledgments. Most of one's knowledge and of one's habits and methods of thought is derived either from books or lectures, and it is impossible to trace or to acknowledge the great part of one's indebtedness to others, although to them is due almost the whole of one's mental outfit, but I wish specially to acknowledge my indebtedness to the following :

For the principle of "pure agnosticism," which I maintain to be the essential and permanent basis of all relationship between Science and Religion, one moreover which avoids the necessity of either party having to ask or offer "concessions," I am in the main indebted to the late Mr. G. J. Romanes' "Thoughts on Religion" : but also to the late Mr. Charles Darwin, whose letter to Mr. Romanes, which is given in the text of this book, takes up the same position and is of the greatest importance: and also to an American Roman Catholic Apologist, of whose book I can remember neither the name nor the title.

For the arrangement of my synopsis of the contemporary teachings of Science, and the selection of matter contained in it, I have been guided by Professor Ray Lankester's Presidential Address to the British Association delivered at York in 1906 and published in his volume "The Kingdom of Man," and also to Mr. R. H. Locke's "Recent Progress in the Study of Variation, Heredity and Evolution."

I have to thank Mrs. Romanes for permission to use Mr. Charles Darwin's letter which appears in "The Life and Letters of George John Romanes;" Professor Ray Lankester for leave to make two quotations from "The Kingdom of Man"; the Rev. F. J. Foakes Jackson, for permission to make a quotation of some length from his "Biblical History of the Hebrews;" Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton for a short quotation from "Peter Pan." If in any case I have in my quotations inadvertently gone beyond what is customary, and I may add necessary, in a controversial work, I crave indulgence.

As regards "apparatus," a Synopsis giving in brief outline the line of argument is placed at the head of each chapter, and also in the Table of Contents, with page references. There are also a bibliography, with a short description of books recommended; a few simple diagrams; and an Index.

Finally, whatever I have said is said in submission to all that is formally declared and taught as *de fide* by the living keeper of Christ's testimony, the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church.

F. CLAUDE KEMPSON.

Dean Vicarage,  
Kimbolton.

*St. Michael and All Angels, 1907.*

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# THE FUTURE LIFE

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## PART I

### SCIENTIFIC OR *A PRIORI* DIFFICULTIES

#### CHAPTER I

##### THE RELIGIOUS EXPLANATION OF THE UNIVERSE

**INTRODUCTORY**—Belief in Personal Identity—Will it survive bodily death?—Conduct will depend on our answer to this question—Unbelievers of high moral character are better than their creed—An analysis of the essential factors in the Religious Explanation of the Universe—It involves a sense of duty and of allegiance to God, Who is the cause of its existence—True service of God has not for its motive mere "enlightened self interest"—God's attributes of infinite power, wisdom and goodness—God's foreknowledge and man's freewill—All the factors of the religious explanation are interdependent and stand or fall together, they are implicitly if not explicitly held by all who practise religion—Has "Science" discredited this explanation?

"Of the hope of the Resurrection of the Dead am I called in question!" As I am not writing this book of my own motion but by request, and as I was asked whether I would write a book to discuss and to answer the objections raised in the name of science and reason to that hope in a future life, which is the hope and consolation of the greater part of mankind, the above quotation from the Acts exactly explains my position.

The blessed hope of everlasting life is not an abstract question which may serve as a whetstone on which learned idlers may sharpen their wits, and

which, when it has served the purpose of providing an exercise in controversial debate, ceases to be of any further interest : it is a question, the truth or falsehood of which must seriously affect the conduct and the happiness of the proverbial " man in the street." I am therefore not merely called upon to defend the hope of the Resurrection of the dead, but to make that defence clear to the thoughtful but practical " wayfaring man," that is, to those who are not specially learned in theology, philosophy or natural science. To such, therefore, I address myself ; to those, that is, who want to live their lives rather than to dissect them, who realize that life without a hereafter is life without hope, and who feel that life without hope is not worth living, a dismal bore disguised by the distraction of passing excitements ; who yet have heard the echoes, at least, of modern scientific teaching and discussion, and fear lest the foundations of hope are seriously shaken, if not altogether undermined.

I am afraid that it will be impossible so to discuss this complicated subject that it can be followed without close thinking, but I will use my best endeavour to do without technical words, and where they must be used I will explain their meaning. I will also allude to no doctrine or opinion bearing on this question without stating what that doctrine or opinion is. For example, were it necessary to any part of my argument to say that " The Mendelian laws of variation have necessitated considerable modifications of the Darwinian hypothesis," or that " Pelagianism, if true, would render the

greater part of Christian practice meaningless," I should feel bound to explain what the Mendelian "law" is and to give an adequate statement of the Darwinian hypothesis: and the same with the doctrine of Pelagius. I must crave the indulgence of those of my readers who are learned in any or all of these subjects of special knowledge on behalf of such as are not.

Let us begin by analysing the hope of everlasting life. We each of us have a working belief in our own personal identity. I have a certain outward bodily form which leads others to regard me as a man, and that bodily form has certain peculiarities by which I am identified and distinguished from other men: and the actions of this man, who is myself, seem to them to be guided by some inward unity. That inward unity I *know*, it is I myself, and I am no less real to myself because I cannot *explain* what I myself am. Further I know that I am the same "I" that I was when I was a child. I am not interested in the same things that interested me then, for then a box of tin soldiers, especially mounted ones which would "take on and off," was a matter of absorbing interest, but I know that it was I who was interested in those soldiers, and that it is the same I who am now occupied with the really important (?) affairs which claim the time of a grown-up man. Again, I have a friend whose active life is passed, and who says that in his old age the only things that he cares about are eating sweet puddings and going to bed early! Now I myself may grow old and may some day have

no wants beyond these two very simple pleasures ; but I know that it will be the same I that is now so much interested in the " vital realities " which occupy men in their prime and whose attention was once concentrated on a box of tin soldiers. But there is yet another phase for me to face : my body must some day fail altogether to keep me in touch with this the only world I know. I shall no longer have any cognizance of tin soldiers, or of books and papers, of woods and fields, of home and household gods, or even of sweet puddings and bed, even the window of the room in which I die will become a patch of dim grey light and that will at last go out : and then where shall I be, shall I survive and be still the same I, or shall I vanish into nothingness ? Will my personal identity survive bodily death ?

This is the primary question, though not the only one : and it is not an idle one, for if I believe that after " death " I shall still be I, my conduct will be different from what it would be were I to believe that I should then be I no longer. A man has always good ground for cheerful endurance of present ills, annoyances and wants so long as he has a future to look forward to, but if he has none, if he believes " that he is born at all adventure and that he will be hereafter as though he had never been ; that the breath in his nostrils is as smoke and a little spark in the moving of his heart, which being extinguished not only will ' his body be turned into ashes ' but that ' his spirit (also) will vanish as the soft air, ' " such an one will say, " Come on therefore, let us

enjoy the good things that are present, and let us speedily use the creatures like as in youth. Let us fill ourselves with costly wine and ointments and let no flower of the spring pass by us, let us crown ourselves with rosebuds before they be withered, let none of us go without our part of his voluptuousness." But this is not all; not only must he seize all delights, but he will trample on others to reach them. "Let us," he will say, "oppress the poor righteous man, let us not spare the widow, nor reverence the ancient gray hairs of the aged. Let our strength be the law of justice: for that which is feeble is found to be nothing worth."<sup>1</sup>

But if it be true that "God created man to be immortal and made him in the image of His own Eternity"<sup>2</sup> then man must feel that what he will be hereafter will be conditioned by what he is here and now, and he will then see the need of "doing justice and loving mercy and walking humbly with his God."<sup>3</sup> He may carry out his belief very imperfectly, he may feel acutely the need of reparation which he cannot make, even vainly trying to fill up what is wanting with "the blood of bulls and goats;"<sup>4</sup> but the fact that man believes in a hereafter and acknowledges a debt to God must make the life of man less of a hideous and bloodthirsty scramble than it would be on the hypothesis that at death our spirits shall vanish as the soft air. This does nothing to *prove* that personal identity

<sup>1</sup> Wisdom ii.

<sup>2</sup> Wisdom ii, 23.

<sup>3</sup> Micah vi, 8.

<sup>4</sup> Hebrews x, 4.

will survive death, but it does show that the world would be a very different place if the generality of men did not *believe* in personal immortality.

I do not, of course, mean to imply that every unbeliever in a future life is a selfish villain, for that is not the case. But I do maintain that those unbelievers who are not selfish villains are better than their creed, because they have become habituated to ideas of honour and duty which spring from the faith which they themselves reject ; and that if such could persuade the rest of the world to agree with them, then honour and duty would disappear, and mankind in general would fall into " the wretchedness of most unclean living." <sup>1</sup> But to return to our subject.

I have associated the idea of God with the idea of human immortality, in saying that belief in a future state will bring a man to acknowledge the need of " doing justice, loving mercy, and walking humbly with his God." It would be conceivable for a man to believe that his personal identity would survive bodily death and for him yet to disbelieve in the existence of God ; but such a belief is of no practical interest, for we are concerned with belief in God and in human immortality taken jointly as what has well been called " the religious explanation of the world."

" The world " here means the cosmos or ordered system in which we live and move and have our being. When we begin to think about the world and about ourselves, we think of the whole as that

<sup>1</sup> No. xvii of the XXXIX Articles.

which exists. I exist and my surroundings exist, but while I class myself with my surroundings, both being existences, I instinctively divide or classify existence into self and not self. I exist and the things that are not I exist, and I and that which is not I make up together the sum or totality of existence, "myself and all the world." But having found that the universe is thus constituted, I am not satisfied ; I see that it is so, but I want to know *why*. Now in asking why things exist I am not asking one question but two. I am asking both the cause and the purpose of their existence, and the explanation given is that the cause of things, including myself, is an uncaused self-existent Being, "of infinite power, wisdom and goodness,"<sup>1</sup> and that it is for His pleasure that I myself and all the world are and were created."<sup>2</sup> In the words of the Church Catechism I learn to believe in "God . . . who hath made me and all the world." These three, therefore, God, self and the world, constitute the entire and complete universe. This is the religious explanation of the world. It is an answer to the question, "Why do I find a universe existing which is divided into self and not-self" ? I do not want, for the moment, to consider where this answer came from or whether it is true. I only ask you to notice that wherever it came from and whether it be true or false, it is an answer, and that it is an answer which affects conduct, for it is an answer which gives ground for religious practice.

<sup>1</sup> Rev. iv, 11.<sup>2</sup> Article i.

Religion is not belief. The word is a Latin word, *religio*, and it means an oath in the first place, and from that it easily passes on to mean the obligations which result from the taking of an oath ; and so simply to mean duty, and then specially to mean duty to God. To be religious, then, involves an inward sense of duty or allegiance to God, and such action or conduct as is consistent with that sense of duty or allegiance. The resulting outward conduct will consist in doing that which God's law, or what is supposed to be God's law, requires ; and in abstaining from that which God's law forbids, or from that which it is supposed to forbid. This obedience we call Morality.

The sense of duty to God need not, in theory at least, lead to any conduct other than moral, were it not that man has an innate instinct to testify. Man cannot feel allegiance to God without from time to time formally and publicly saying so, and being gregarious, or rather social, he is naturally inclined to meet with other like-minded men at set times in order that they may jointly or corporately testify their allegiance to God just as they would witness to any other object in which they were interested. This we may call ceremonial conduct. Religious worship is therefore ceremonial conduct whereby expression is given to the sense of allegiance to God, and where also pardon and assistance are asked, and reparation offered, for breaches of the Divine Law, or what the worshippers believe to be the Divine Law. This worship is the essence of sacrifice which is always offered

either for praise and thanksgiving or to have remission of pain or guilt or for both purposes together.

The sense of duty to God, which is the inward motive of all religious practice, springs, as we have said, from belief in a Universe consisting of God, self, and all the world. If we examine this religious conception of the world more closely, we shall find that the sense of duty is always connected with some idea that it will ultimately be good for the individual or self who does his duty, and ultimately to the detriment of him who does not do it, that is to say, with a system of rewards and punishments. Now it is evident that final good does not, in this life, accrue with any regularity or system to the virtuous, nor evil to the vicious, all seems to be a matter of mere chance,<sup>1</sup> so that if there be no hereafter there is no system of reward and punishment, and the only prudent thing to do will be to snatch the passing delights of life while they are within reach,<sup>2</sup> and the most successful man will be he who gets the utmost out of life for himself.

There is another connexion between this, the religious, explanation of the world and belief in a future life. I find myself in a Universe which consists of self and not-self; and, as we have said, I want to know why. And the answer to this question which gives the religious explanation of the world, is “Because there is a God behind the mysterious moving pageant in which I find myself.” He is the

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* Psalms xxxvii and lxxiii.

<sup>2</sup> *Vide* the Second Chapter of Wisdom.

cause of me and of my surroundings. I must therefore think of God as being greater than the creatures of whose existence He is the cause. I see in my surroundings vast and terrible forces, God must be stronger therefore than any conceivable force : He must therefore be of infinite power. I find in myself a certain degree of wisdom. I say this without conceit because I acknowledge that there is wisdom, wherever there is a love of knowledge for its own sake and a desire to find a reason for the mysterious fact that things exist. I feel therefore that God, the cause of all things, is of infinite wisdom. I find in myself also, in spite of an innate weakness and perversity, a certain goodness, or love of goodness, and that there is some goodness in me is shown by the fact that I am at war with my own weakness and perversity and that my defects deprive me of inward peace : I feel therefore that God is of infinite goodness. Yet further, I feel that, if the moving pageant of visible things is real, God, who is behind this pageant, is more real and more permanent than the pageant : indeed, when I begin to realize the reality and permanence of God, the moving pageant of the world begins to look, by contrast, like a slippery shadow. But—and this is a most important “but”—I rebel instinctively against the idea of being but an item of a transitory moving shadow. I am I, and I therefore feel that I am nearer to the permanence of God, than to the transitoriness of things which move through time and space. I believe that my personal identity will survive bodily death.

We must, however, return to the question of rewards and punishment. What must be the nature of reward and of punishment if there be a living and true God, everlasting, not tied down within the limits of body, parts or passions, but of infinite power, wisdom and goodness, the Maker and Preserver of all things both visible and invisible; and if I, and every other man, belong as persons to the real and permanent, rather than to the relatively shadowy and transitory, order of things?

It is evident that if the Universe is from God it must have a plan or scheme in which all the parts are co-ordinated or work together to a common end, and therefore that I must have my place and destiny in the scheme of things. If therefore I play my part in the scheme of things I shall please God; if, on the other hand, I refuse to play that part I shall displease Him. If God be benevolent (and benevolence is certainly contained in infinite goodness), then I shall find my happiness in playing my part and filling my place in the scheme of things. If I refuse to play my part I must forfeit my place and find my misery in that forfeiture, for the outer darkness must be a place or state of "weeping and of gnashing of teeth." In this paragraph I am taking for granted the free-will of man, but, please remember, I am only analysing the religious explanation of the world, not attempting to prove the truth of that explanation; and the very fact, that I must assume human free-will shows that free-will is as necessary a part of that explanation as is the existence of God and the belief that our

personal identity will survive bodily death. It is obviously in accord with what we have already said that, if goodness consists in being willing to fulfil our part in a Universe in which all the parts work together to a common end, then it is only in the end that we can find the happiness of achievement in having played that part and secured our place in the final consummation, or suffer the pain of forfeiture and loss.

There is one thing more which is necessary to make this religious explanation of the world complete and sane and reasonable. We must show that doing good and abstaining from evil on religious grounds is not simply enlightened self interest or "other-worldliness." Such "devil-dodging," to use a slang phrase, is rightly held to be contemptible. It is instinctively felt that virtue, to be indeed virtue, must be its own reward; but how is this reconcilable with a system of final reward for virtue and punishment for vice? We may perhaps best show the solution of this difficulty by taking an illustration from ordinary life. A gentleman engages a servant; the servant undertakes, as a means of livelihood, the work which his employer sets him to do. If the servant perform his duties adequately, and be paid the stipulated wage, neither party is under any obligation to the other, nor has either party any grievance: if the servant tire of the work or the master be no longer prepared to pay for it the two can go their separate ways. The servant has done his work and has his reward and so there is an end. But if the

master begin to find that the servant does his work for its own sake, and has become personally devoted to his master's interests, that he is even ready and willing to continue his service when his master becomes poor, or if he show other signs that he serves for love, then the situation is very different ; the measured wage for work done becomes then a very secondary consideration. The willing gladness of the servant is a thing which looks for no material reward and one for which the offer of any such reward would be an insult. The desire of the master in such a case is to make his servant a permanent family retainer whose widow he will house and keep and in whose children's upbringing and careers he will take a personal interest. So it may be in our relations with God, we may imagine ourselves as doing exactly the things that we are set to do, and being exactly remunerated for what we have done, but we cannot imagine that reward to include a reception into everlasting habitations ; this can only be if God sees in us a love of Himself and of His service which, of its very nature, must have in it no thought of reward, except in so far as such willing service earnestly desires permanent domicile with a beloved master. In such service there is an essential willingness to forfeit life itself in the rendering of it, as when Paul was willing even to be accursed in Christ, if Israel, his brethren after the flesh, might thereby be saved.<sup>1</sup>

To sum up, therefore, the religious explanation of the world or Universe is :—

<sup>1</sup> Romans ix, 3.

I. That it consists of God, self and all the world.

II. That God is the cause of self and of all the world in a double sense : for :—

(a) God is " Alpha " the " efficient cause " or creator of all existence, that is of Self and all the world.

(b) God is " Omega " the " final cause," end or object of all existence, that is of Self and all the world.

III. That Self is a free-will personality able to choose whether it will or will not fulfil its part in the scheme of things.

IV. That Self is a personal identity which will survive bodily death.

V. That Self will find its reward in gaining its destined place in the sphere of ultimate and final reality, and will find its final misery in refusing to do its work and bear its burden, for, by so doing, it must forfeit its place, and find itself adrift in placeless outer darkness, where must be weeping and gnashing of teeth.

The reward cannot be won in a mercenary spirit of enlightened self-interest, but only in the self-sacrificing spirit of Quixotic love. He only who is willing to lose his life for God's sake can save it.

I have made no attempt to prove the truth or falsehood of this explanation : I only maintain that it is an explanation of the problem which I am to myself in finding myself a self-conscious personality in intimate relationship with a universe which is not

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me : and that this explanation is sane and reasonable and just : and that it is consistent and would lose its consistency and justice were any of the propositions in my final summary deleted as untrue.

I maintain further that this explanation of the Universe is the doctrine underlying all religious practice whatsoever, so that wherever any article of this creed is definitely and really denied there can be no religious practice. Take, for instance, the article of Free-will. It is denied by fatalists, who say that our every action is exactly predestined, and that when we feel ourselves to be choosing this or that we have only an illusion of free-will. I know that many Calvinists and many Moslems, who are or are supposed to be fatalists, have been good religious men, but where they have been so I am sure that whatever fatalistic doctrine they have formally professed they have practically denied by assuming the reality of free-will in all the affairs of daily life including the saying of their prayers. While those whose imaginations have been really possessed by fatalism have fallen " either into desperation or into wretchedness of most unclean living."

In the matter of free-will and predestination we are, of course, confronted with a "difficulty." God, if He be Infinite Wisdom, must have absolute foreknowledge ; and if He have absolute foreknowledge then free-will would seem to be an illusion : yet our own free-will is to each of us a certain fact, and if God be Infinite Goodness it is inconceivable that God should set us to live a life in which we should be compelled to assume the truth of a lie, which we should have to do

if free-will were an illusion ; therefore if there be a true God free-will must be a reality. We arrive, therefore, at the conclusion that the foreknowledge of God and the free-will of man must both be true, if there be a God. The reconciliation of these two factors is, however, altogether beyond us : the religious explanation of the mystery of existence is a sufficient working explanation : but we see through a glass darkly. Our position is analogous to that of a skipper, who knows how to use a table of logarithms in calculating his position at sea, but who knows little or nothing of the mathematical principles on which logarithms are based. It is most important for us to realize our limitations, and to be ready to confess that, in trying to reach the ultimate meaning of things we must often arrive at some insoluble paradox, that is, be confronted with two truths which we cannot reconcile, in which case we must be content to own ourselves beaten and must not insist on rejecting one of the factors as false on the assumption that all things in heaven and earth must be comprehended in the finite logic of human understanding. In the matter of free-will and foreknowledge, though we cannot reconcile the two, we can see dimly that a reconciliation is conceivable, if we remember that time is but a condition of moving visible things, and that God is in Eternity which is above time, and that a condition of things in which there is no time is outside the limits of our imagination. But the fact that we cannot imagine Eternity, is a reason why Divine foreknowledge and human free-will are to us an insoluble paradox.

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I must add that, though all the above factors of the religious explanation are interdependent and essential to that explanation, yet they need not be *explicitly* recognized by all who practise religion. Indeed man may be, and many men have been, deeply religious, without any clear idea either of God or of their own personality and future life. They may have only a vague idea of Power behind the visible world, an ill-defined "Them Above," with whom it is desirable to be on good terms ; but such do not *deny* the future life or personal identity or the existence of God, on the contrary, these articles are potentially or implicitly contained in their primitive and formless creed, or explanation of the Universe. In fact it is only with the advent of Christianity that this, the universal primary creed, has attained its full development. Of this more hereafter. It must be added here that Christianity is something besides being the fullest and clearest development of the primary creed on which primary and universal religious practice is based. Much of Christianity is concerned with a secondary, that is a remedial, creed and with secondary, that is with propitiatory and remedial, religious practice ; for in the Christian creed we are not taught only to believe in God (the Father) who hath made self and all the world, but also in God (the Son) who hath redeemed Self and all mankind, and in God (the Holy Ghost) who sanctifieth self and all the elect people of God.<sup>1</sup> All this is "secondary" not

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* the brief but pregnant commentary on the Apostles' Creed which is given in the English Church Catechism.

because it is of minor importance, but because sin is no part of the original scheme of the Universe, but rather an interference with that scheme. It is secondary because where there is no sin there can be no reparation for wrong done and no restitution for the sinner, for in that case there is neither damage to be repaired nor sinner to be restored. Of this also more hereafter, as it is, under existing conditions, of the utmost practical importance to our own hope of everlasting life.

Our present question, however, is whether the world-old explanation of the Universe, of which the promise of a future life is an indispensable part, has been so discredited and rendered obsolete by the recent great increase of knowledge, which has been acquired by scientific investigation, that it is no longer possible to believe it.

## CHAPTER II

### THE RELATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIVERSE TO ITS EXPLANATION

"SCIENCE" means knowledge—Is essentially descriptive even in the formulation of laws—The most minute and exact knowledge of the Universe no help to the solution of the question why a universe should exist—The fundamental difference between description and explanation illustrated—And a consideration of the literature of past ages—The theory of evolution does not solve the problem of origins—Science cannot solve the problem—The conceivable answers to the question as given by Mr. Herbert Spencer—The answer which denies or doubts the reality of the external world—The fundamental Agnosticism of Science—Agnosticism distinct from Atheism—Science therefore leaves room for an explanation of the Universe which must be based on testimony—This does not necessarily exclude Science from teaching a doctrine of human nature inconsistent with a hope of everlasting life.

IN the last chapter I have given an account of and to some extent have analysed the explanation of the Universe which underlies all religious practice. I must repeat, in order that there may be no misunderstanding, that I have made *no attempt to prove the truth of that explanation*, though I have endeavoured to show what its factors must be without prejudice to the question whether it be true or false as a whole. We must now proceed to inquire into the relationship which this explanation must bear to what is called scientific knowledge.

Science means simply "knowledge," the collection of information concerning the structures and motions of the bodies around us. As knowledge

accumulates it is tabulated and classified, and when we find that the same things always happen under given circumstances, we attempt to find the essential cause of such happenings, and call it an "explanation," and we say that we expect that when the same circumstances occur in the future the same things will happen, and when we find our expectation repeatedly verified we call the event which we observe a "law." For instance, we see apples growing on trees, and observe that when the stalk breaks they fall to the ground; we find that the essential cause of this falling is that apples are drawn to the earth by a force called attraction, and that apples will therefore move towards the ground, unless restrained by a stalk which is a force acting in the opposite direction. We then find that all other objects are drawn to the earth in the same way. Next we discover that there is no special attractive force in the earth, but that the earth is simply a very large object, and that every two objects exert attraction on each other, and that the force of attraction has a definite relation to the "mass" or amount of matter in each of the two objects and to the distance that the two objects are from each other. That is to say that we have shown how apples fall by having discovered the law of attraction. All this, however, is not, properly speaking, an explanation of why things fall, but only a description of how they fall. All natural science is descriptive.

Let us suppose everything that is and that happens in the visible Universe to have been exactly

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described, and that all these happenings are classified, and all the causes of all the happenings have been stated as "laws." For example, suppose that the motions of every "ion" or "electron" in every element be fully known, also exactly how different numbers and motions of electrons constitute the "atoms" of different "elements," also the mode in which the germ of every living being has wrapped up in it all that makes it grow into the same form as its parents: let us also suppose it to be known exactly how life arises from inanimate matter; and that the connexion between my personal indivisible self and the particles of my body and divisible brain has ceased to be an unsolved mystery, all this is but a description of *how* the universe is put together, we are no nearer an explanation of *why there is a universe* than we were in the days when our fathers supposed that wild geese grew out of goose barnacles, that swallows spent the winter at the bottom of the village pond, and that the sun went round the earth, neither are we any further off. The description of the universe seems to have nothing to do with the question whether it comes from God and exists for God's "pleasure" or not.

This difference between description and explanation can be well illustrated from the common pump. The description of the common pump is a question often set to candidates for examination in elementary science. The candidate is required to show how the piston draws water up from below by suction and to explain where the valves

must be placed to prevent it running back again, and to know from what depth a common pump can bring water to the surface. In a practical description he might have to state the best materials for the different parts of the pump and to give directions for putting them together. He would not, however, be expected to go into the reason *why* there are pumps, as that would be a matter connected with the needs and constitution of human society, and, where the pump is for common use, would be a question, not of suction and of valves, but of the duties of parish councils and their power of levying rates.

I have a tale to tell. I read it in some book or pamphlet which discoursed upon the intelligence of animals in general and of monkeys in particular. The case of a monkey was there put on record who studied a cupboard with such patient investigation that he was at last able to lock and unlock it at will. We may, in imagination, carry this tale a step farther, and suppose that the monkey learned to distinguish the key of that cupboard from other keys in the bunch, and that he took the lock off and pulled it to pieces, and found out how it was made, and put it together again. Such a monkey would have a good working knowledge of how cupboards were locked and unlocked, but it would bring him no nearer to any *explanation* of locks: that is to say, that it would not help him to any knowledge of the reason *why* cupboards have to be kept locked: and no increase in his knowledge of the "how" would ever bring him any nearer to a solution of the "why." For the explanation of locks

is to be found, not in the proportion of copper and zinc in the brass lock plate, or the methods of tempering steel springs, but in the mysteries of human nature, such as the perversity of inquisitive minds and of hands addicted to picking and stealing, problems of psychology and ethics wholly beyond the limits of a monkey's comprehension.

My two tales may perhaps be foolish tales, but they help to illustrate the difference between description and explanation—that is, between “how” and “why.” And, ridiculous though they be, we can generalize from them, for from them we learn that :—

(1) However detailed and exhaustive our knowledge of the mechanism of anything may be we are not necessarily any nearer to a solution of the question why it exists.

(2) That the explanation of the reason why anything exists may be given quite fully and correctly by some one who knows nothing of the construction of the thing.<sup>1</sup> This will be best seen if we consider whether by describing a thing we can show the truth or falsehood of any reason offered to explain its existence.

Let us return to our village pump, and let us suppose some village ancient who remembers its

<sup>1</sup> Of course the analogy between the description and explanation of the Universe, and the description and explanation of such things as pumps and cupboards is not complete, for the reasons for the existence of pumps and cupboards are numerous and complicated, but obvious and commonplace, while the reason for the existence of the Universe which is given in the religious explanation of the Universe is simple, but most profound and mysterious.

erection, telling the younger generation why it was put there. We will suppose the essential reason to be because the villagers wanted a new and improved water supply. Next let us imagine some smart young County Council lecturer to pass by, and let us suppose him to take the pump to pieces (of course neatly replacing them afterwards), and to demonstrate from it and from diagrams made on the blackboard in the schoolroom that the pump could not draw water, and that *therefore* it could not have been set up with the object alleged by the village ancient ; how could the ancient answer the lecturer ?

He might lose his temper and become abusive, as his betters have often done, but he would not help his case thereby. He might lead the whole *posse* back to the pump on the green and work the handle up and down and let them see the water come out of the spout. By so doing he would, though wholly ignorant of mechanics, utterly rout his more scientific opponent. Even if the water did not come out when the handle was moved up and down, he could still say that the pump was erected to obtain a water supply, but that it had either got out of order or that it was made by an incompetent workman.

Supposing, on the other hand, that the County Council lecturer were to show how pumps drew water from a well or cistern, he would not *prove* that the ancient's explanation of its erection was the right one, he would only show *that there was nothing in the construction of the pump inconsistent with that explanation*, which would be a different matter.

We see then that observation can result only in description, so that when the whole universe is exactly described down to the movements of the very last "electron," we should, as we have said, be no nearer to an explanation which will tell us why there is a universe; while, on the other hand, the problem why there is a universe may have already been solved by men who had the most childish ideas about its mechanism. I would like, at this point, to draw attention to a fact. The explanation of the universe—that which gives an account of its purpose and destiny—must profoundly affect human action, as the writer of *Wisdom* has most plainly shown; but scientific discovery has no effect whatever on the springs of human action:<sup>1</sup> it affects only the methods of human life and the conventions of society. Can anyone read Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice* and say that the tale has become untrue to human nature by reason of the introduction of railways instead of coaches, and of bridge instead of whist? And, in so far as we judge Mr. Collins and Mrs. Bennet to be something of caricatures, do we not assume the identity of human nature then and now? Take again an older tale, the story of Joseph in the house of Potiphar, is it not now as

<sup>1</sup> Except *perhaps* indirectly. For example, the caste system among the Hindus is a religious usage, which the exigencies of travel by train are said to be breaking down: it is impossible to provide for the observance of elaborate caste ceremony in railway carriages. But this is only an apparent exception, for caste, as a convention, belongs to the methods rather than to the springs of human action.

fresh and as true as on the day when it was first committed to parchment or perhaps clay tablets, and would it be rendered any more true by being brought up to date with modern details? No, the Immortal freshness of Shakespeare and of the Odyssey and of Jane Austen and of the tales of the Hebrew Patriarchs is due to the permanent identity of human nature which survives all diversities of times and of men's mere manners. Take again the Psalms: among other functions, they reveal us to ourselves. They are a flawless mirror of the human heart. Their use for this purpose has not been affected by the contributions to knowledge made by an Archimedes or a Galileo, a Newton or an Edison, because these men have added only to our descriptive knowledge of the Universe. But the Psalter *has* been more deeply appreciated since the coming of Christ, and it is a significant fact that Christianity has done much to clarify the traditional religious explanation of the Universe, to the description of which it has contributed nothing.

I must again repeat that I have as yet said no word for or against this religious explanation; all that I have yet attempted to do is to show that it is explanation, and that, as such, it is at least as highly improbable that it can come into collision with a descriptive statement, as that electric light can be antagonistic to the Nonconformist conscience, and to maintain that human motive is affected by the explanation, but not by the description of man's surroundings.

## EVOLUTION AND "ORIGINS" 27

But it is time for us to proceed. If science or descriptive knowledge can have little or nothing to say against a religious explanation of the universe, it can also have little or nothing to say in its favour : it is essentially agnostic. If it cannot say " Because things are as they are therefore there is no God," neither can it say " Because things are as they are therefore there is a God." Let me attempt to show briefly why this is so. We are all familiar in these days with the word " evolution," and there is an idea abroad that it is a formula for the solution of all difficulties, but I doubt if we are all quite clear as to what the word means. It means the unfolding or display of structures or qualities previously folded together or involved. Thus all the forms of plant and animal life which we see around us are said to be evolved from one simple primary form of life. This means the same thing as saying that the individual bird is evolved out of its egg. When we say this we mean that all that we see displayed in the adult bird was wrapped together and hidden from view, or that the qualities which are actual in the bird were potential in the egg.

Evolution is therefore the display of that which already exists in an involved state, and the various forms of animal and vegetable life are the display of complicated and various permutations of certain elementary properties which already existed in the primordial globule of living jelly or "protoplasm," so that in that globule all the various properties of the modern and complicated forms of life already existed. We are told also that the various elements of which the

earth and the stars are made have probably been formed out of one kind of matter, and that every particle or atom of that matter already existed before its differentiation into earth and air and water began, as did also the energy or "fire," which gave the atoms the motions that have resulted in the complicated arrangement of them which makes the visible universe as we know it. If this be so, we have got back to a primeval matter and initial energy, but in this "*prima materia*" and "*primum movens*" there was all the matter and energy that exists now.

Finally, we are now told that when the atoms are resolved into the electrons of which all are made, the distinction between matter and energy is lost. If this be so, then all that we see, earth, ocean, sky and stars, must have been evolved out of primal movement; and however difficult it may be to imagine primal movement as a single uniform existence, all that we now see in the manifold elements of the world and their almost infinite complexity of combination existed then in that primal movement. But we have not accounted for the *origin* of one single electron in the whole marvellous panorama.

How then did this primary motion which has been differentiated into matter and energy and which has then been further differentiated into mineral, vegetable and animal bodies, and into such forces as heat, light, electricity, mechanical motion, etc., etc., come to exist? This question Science can never answer, it is in the same difficulty as the ancient Eastern philosophers, who when confronted

with the question as to how the earth remained in its place said that it rested on the back of a large and strong elephant. A questioner more acute than the rest then asked on what the elephant might stand. The elephant, it was said, stood on an even larger and firmer tortoise. But on what did the tortoise stand? This makes an unending chain of questions and answers *in which the questioner must have the last word*, or at least is entitled to go on questioning until he gets the answer, "I don't know." So when Science has told us that all that we see rests on primary motion, and we ask what the primary motion rests on, Science must ultimately answer "I don't know."

The following three answers have been given as the three possible answers by the late Mr. Herbert Spencer. This primary something must, according to him, either :—

- (1) Have been created.
- (2) Have created itself.
- (3) Be self existent.

Personally I see no real difference between answers 2 and 3, for they both mean that the primary something has no cause for existence outside itself, while the first means that its existence is caused by some agent outside itself by which it has been brought into being out of nothing or not being. We have then two answers to the question of the origin of the primary "substance" out of which things are made. Which of these two answers is the right one it is impossible for Science to say.

Besides these two answers there is, I think, a third, which is that the things around us are not really existent at all, and that therefore the primary something of which they are made is not really existent ! This may sound very startling, but the meaning of it is this. I have certain feelings in myself which I attribute to things outside me, but I have no means of proving the reality of outside objects as the cause of my feelings, for I *know* nothing outside myself by which I can *verify* my assumption that my sensations are due to external causes.<sup>1</sup> This is a very difficult subject, but I feel bound to allude to it here, in order to give all conceivable answers to the question "What is the ultimate cause of the existence of things ?" I would ask those who are not interested in metaphysics to accept from me these statements.

(1) We cannot *logically prove* that our sensations (of shape, colour, sound, warmth, for example) are caused by real existences external to ourselves.

(2) For the practical affairs of life we cannot help assuming that they do exist.

(3) We have practically sufficient reason, in my opinion, for resting satisfied that our instinctive judgment that there really are things outside ourselves is correct.

I hope, by drawing attention to this as a conceivable answer to the ultimate question of Science,

<sup>1</sup> Tweedledee maintained the truth of this answer when he told Alice that she was "only a sort of a thing in the Red King's Dream." The delightful passage is a charming *reductio ad absurdum* of the extremer forms of "Idealism."

—*Alice Through the Looking Glass.*

that my readers may be helped to feel the mysteriousness and difficulty of this last simple question, "What is the cause of the existence of the primary something out of which things are said to be formed by the increasing complexity of the motions of that something?" to which question there seem to be three conceivable answers, as aforesaid, viz. that that something is:—

- (1) Brought into existence out of non-existence.
- (2) Self-existent.
- (3) Non-existent except as an idea in the mind.

Science can never tell which is the right answer. Science is therefore agnostic. The astronomer who said that he had searched all space with his telescope and had seen no God is an exact illustration of the agnosticism of all natural science. But should such an one go a step further and say *therefore* there is no God, he would be going beyond what the facts warrant. His statement would be a fallacy in logic, of the kind known as a "*non-sequitur*"; it does not follow, because we have no positive evidence of the existence of God, that therefore He does not exist. Let us go back to our friend the monkey and his lock and key. Let us suppose the monkey to understand human speech and that some one tells him that locks are put on cupboards, because there are dishonest people who steal jam and tea and such like things which do not belong to them, and busybodies who pry into other people's papers. Now let us suppose that the monkey turns back to his lock, and submits it to a closer and more

exhaustive analysis, going this time even into the chemistry of the brass and steel of which it is made and says that he finds in them neither dishonesty nor curiosity nor any evidence that such qualities exist, he will be obviously right : but if he went on from that truth to say that therefore there were no such qualities as curiosity and dishonesty, he would be obviously wrong ; as right as the man who said " I have searched the heavens with my telescope and have seen no God " and as wrong as that man if he added " There is, therefore, no God." Science can say nothing against the religious explanation of the world in so far as that explanation asserts that God hath created all things and that for His pleasure they are and were created, that He is the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end, so that the world has an intelligible cause, purpose and destiny. Supposing, however, that anyone were to follow the example of the lecturer who maintained that the village pump could not have been erected for the purpose for which the village ancient said that it had been erected, and say that the Universe could not have been created for God as it was not so constructed as to be of any service to Him. We could answer that it is absurd to say that the world cannot serve God's purposes before we know exhaustively what all the purposes of God are. But we do not know the purposes of God.

The religious explanation of the world does not however stop short at this point ; it offers an explanation to us men—an explanation which must interest us, specially when it explains to us what is our own

## WHERE CONFLICT IS POSSIBLE 33

place in the scheme of the Universe. We want to know our own prospects, religious dogma is interesting only as it has a practical bearing on our own lives, and here Science might make an attack. We might be told that "God may be as you say He is, and the Universe may be from Him and for Him as you say. But man is not what you say that he is, he is not immortal and master of his fate. We are but the puppets of our surroundings; let us make haste, therefore, and eat and drink for to-morrow we die."

Another attack which may be made is the attack on our authorities. I have said nothing yet in support of the religious explanation of the Universe and of our place in it. I will now anticipate what I have to say in the next chapter by saying that the authority is partly that of testimony, and Science may contend that the evidence is tainted. Even, however, if some of the witnesses be discredited the explanation will not be disproved, it will only be robbed of support.

and can be the object of belief which cannot be known by what we nowadays call scientific methods of observation and inference from observation, for such matters "are not credible but evident." "And so those things which are apparent are not said properly to be believed but to be known . . . And . . . proceeding from principles evidently known by consequences certainly concluding (*i.e.* resulting from the principles) we come to the knowledge of propositions in mathematics, and conclusions in other sciences ; which propositions and conclusions are not said to be *credible*, but *scientific*, and the comprehension of them is not *faith* but *science*."

For example, as I sit writing this, I see that my fire is gone out. That it is out is not to me a matter of belief but of knowledge. I also collect from the fact that my fire is gone out, that it has not been attended to : I know this from seeing the effects of neglect, and that my room will soon be too cold to sit in. These things are not credible to me, but they are credible to my readers, as they do not see that my fire is gone out, but can only believe it on my testimony. But to proceed.

Bishop Pearson further distinguishes between credibility and probability. That is probable which would be certainly known if the facts connected with it were ascertained. For example, the frost is now over, and a thaw is in progress. I know this, and therefore I am certain that the thermometer has risen, but I only suppose that the barometer has gone down, for I am not so exactly informed about the relation of a thaw to the pressure

of the atmosphere as I am to the temperature. This supposing is not *belief* but *opinion*. "But," says the Bishop, "when anything propounded to us is neither apparent to our sense, nor evident to our understanding, in and of itself, neither certainly to be collected from any clear and necessary connexion with the cause from which it proceedeth, or the effects which it naturally produceth, nor is taken upon any real arguments, or reference to other acknowledged truths, and yet notwithstanding appeareth to us true, not by manifestation but by attestation of truth, and so moveth us to assent not of itself but by virtue of the testimony given to it; this is said properly to be *credible* . . . and the assent unto this is the proper notion of *faith* or *belief*."<sup>1</sup>

He then goes on to show that we have no motive for assent to the truth of that which is outside the range of our knowledge other than testimony: for instance, my readers have no motive for assent to the proposition that my fire has gone out other than my testimony that it has. He further says that the assent to what is propounded will vary with the authority of the witness: and that this authority depends on two things, on (1) the *ability* and (2) the *integrity* of the testifier. "For in two several ways he which relateth or testifieth anything may deceive us: one by being ignorant of the truth, and so upon that ignorance of mistaking he may think that to be true which is not so . . . and so deceive himself and us: or

<sup>1</sup> This definition of credibility is not new and original in Bishop Pearson, but is derived from Aristotle.

if he be not ignorant, yet if he be dishonest or unfaithful, that which he knows to be false he may propound and assent to be a truth and so, though himself be not deceived, he may deceive us. And by each of these ways, for want either of *ability* or *integrity* in the *testifier*, whoso grounds his *assent* unto anything as a truth, upon the testimony of another, may equally be deceived."

There is one aspect of credibility which Bishop Pearson seems to pass over. We commonly speak of that as "incredible," to which even on testimony we feel it impossible to give our assent: but it is really included in his, or rather in Aristotle's, doctrine that that which is known or evident is incapable of being believed, for Science includes knowledge both positive and negative. If I say that two and two make five I say what is incredible, because I *know* that two and two do not make five, and when I say that two and two make four, I then also say what is incredible because I *know* that two and two make four. But it is well to remember that our knowledge of that which is is far more extensive than our knowledge of that which is not, for the old saying that it is very hard to prove a negative is and always will be true. But still we have this from Bishop Pearson, and from Aristotle before him, that that which is knowable is not credible and therefore that that only is credible which is unknowable: but that on sufficiently authoritative testimony it can be believed: and that testimony is authoritative when the ability and integrity of the witness are to be relied on.

Now the Religious Explanation of the Universe, that there is One living and true God from Whom and for Whom are all things and that man is created to be immortal and made in the image of God's Eternity, but that through envy of the Devil death came into the world, and that they who hold of his side do find it, belongs to the category of the Unknowable according to Mr. Herbert Spencer, and *therefore* to the category of the credible according to Aristotle and Bishop Pearson, and can therefore be apprehended and assented to only on the authority of testimony. What is the testimony to this Religious Explanation of the Universe?

The ultimate witness must be God Himself: for if there be an almighty God, and if He be unknowable, it is evident that it is only by His making the fact known to us that we can be made aware of His existence, and that He can make us aware of His existence is evident because He is, by hypothesis, Almighty. That we are capable of receiving the information is clear from the fact that we are capable of asking, and have actually asked whether there is or is not a God. Our illustration of the monkey and the locked cupboard will help us again here. The monkey by investigating the mechanism of the lock could find in it no evidence of the existence of human dishonesty; dishonesty for the monkey belongs to the category of the unknowable. But supposing that we were possessed of some speech which could be understood of the monkey, we could tell him about human dishonesty and show it to be the reason why there are locks on cupboards.

This explanation would be credible to the monkey and our testimony would have great authority for him ; it is we men who make locks and cupboards, and we must therefore know what they are for ; and as the ultimate witness to the monkey of the reason of cupboards must be man who makes them, so the authority of the reason of the Universe must come ultimately from the God who, by hypothesis, is its Creator. But as in the case of the monkey there had to be some means of communication between us and him, so if God is to explain His Universe to us He must adopt some method of communicating with us.

The opening words of the Epistle to the Hebrews are an assertion that God "in times past and in divers manners spake unto the fathers by the prophets," and that in these last days, "He has spoken unto us by His Son, Whom He has made heir of all things by Whom also He made the Universe (*τοὺς αἰῶνας*)."<sup>1</sup>

Such prophets as the author of the Hebrews would have acknowledged were men who bore testimony to the meaning of the Universe and of human life as placed therein : they were accustomed to open their prophecies with the formula "Thus saith the Lord" ; clearly therefore they claimed to be the mouthpiece of God. Thus, the great bulk of their message was moral. The law came by Moses ; but it is God who "spake these words and said, etc." The message of the later prophets was largely not only moral but critical, it commented

<sup>1</sup> Hebrews i, 1.

on the actual conduct of the people, as judged by the received code and pointed out the consequences of that conduct ; but even here the prophets claim to speak for God, they are the mouthpiece of God's Criticisms, " Thus saith the Lord, if ye will not hear *My* voice, etc. etc." But the message of the prophets which were of old was not wholly ethical, for it would have been meaningless had there been no " LORD " whose prophets they claimed to be, and about Whose nature they had something definite to say. He is the Almighty, or rather the Almighty Ones (*Elohim*), and He is the personal Self-Existent I AM (*Jehovah*), and their delivery of the law and their criticisms of human conduct have the practical aim of promoting man's obedience to the law, because conformity to God is good for man, and insubordination is bad for him. Yet further, vague though their teaching may have been about the survival of bodily death, there was clearly some idea of survival, or the story of the calling up of the Spirit of Samuel by the Witch of Endor would not have gained acceptance, and the author of Job (who was a prophet, for his story purports to give instruction on the relationship of man to God) puts into Job's mouth the words, " I know that my Redeemer liveth and that He shall stand in the latter day upon the earth, and though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God, whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another." <sup>1</sup>

We do not, however, limit prophecy to the Hebrew

<sup>1</sup> Job xix, 25-27.

people, we acknowledge "prophecy" to be the origin of all acceptance of the religious explanation of the Universe among all peoples, whether that explanation be to them clear and well-developed or vague and rudimentary. And if the Hebrew idea of a future life was so vague that for the average Israelite it had little practical meaning, at least in the days before the exile, yet other peoples possessed a more defined belief. The American Indians, for example, if good went to happy hunting grounds. Again, the Homeric Greeks, and the Ancient Egyptians, not only believed very definitely in a future life, but had filled in the details of procedure in the Underworld with circumstance and much embroidery, and that not altogether fond and vainly invented.

It is clearly a historic fact that our fathers were in past times spoken to by "prophets," and that they were possessed of a "message" which *professed* to come from the unseen Power behind the world, but how did they really come by it? Clearly not by scientific observation, for that, as we have seen, cannot lead to a solution of the ultimate meaning of things. There seem left to us therefore only two alternatives, either God did make known to the prophets what man could not find out for himself, or the prophets must have become convinced of the truth of their own guesses. Which?

According to the Hebrew books<sup>1</sup> the genuineness of a prophet is to be judged by results: if the thing come to pass, if, that is to say, his doctrine is

<sup>1</sup> Deut. xviii, 22.

confirmed by experience, well and good, if not, then that prophet has spoken presumptuously ; but this does not help us much, for a mere impudent guess might quite possibly be a good guess. Moreover, we cannot call many of the prophets impudent quacks, for they were clearly honest men, who really believed in the reality of their mission. Let us ask ourselves another question : What do we mean by an "intuition" ? It seems to me to mean a vision of the truth. The "Seer" sees as in a flash an explanation of the mystery that he has striven to penetrate, and a certain critical faculty within him as promptly assents to the truth of his vision. We all know and possess this critical faculty, for we must all of us at some time or other have said, "Well, I never could have seen or guessed that for myself, but when it was put before me I saw at once that it was true." The prophet has this same faculty of intuitive criticism, by which he sees at once the truth of his own vision or intuition, the intuition which comes to him from within. Is the inward tutor, the suggestion of the Spirit of God, a spark of the Divine Fire, or a spark of the man's own kindling, a brilliant guess perhaps, but only a guess? Is it from heaven or of men?

Does the thing come to pass? Is it confirmed? The prophecy by the very terms of the prophetic scriptures is declared to need corroboration. Taking the subject matter of prophecy to be the religious explanation of the world, we respond to it and corroborate it from self-knowledge. For, looking inwards upon self, we find in our self a personality,

with which a God-created universe which has a destiny is in accord, and with which a self-existent aimless universe is not in accord, and so we intuitively accept the former and reject the latter as an absurdity. This assent we may call corroboration by introspection. It is only an analysis of the intuitive assent spoken of above, but is of some real corroborative value, for it shows that the prophetic doctrine is not random and ridiculous.

The testimony of the "prophets" is not, however, fully satisfying, nor is the general assent of mankind a sufficient and conclusive corroboration of that testimony, which is piecemeal and disjointed, and has come to us "at sundry times and in divers manners," "here a little, and there a little, line upon line, precept upon precept." Moreover, in saying "Thus saith the Lord" the prophet is bearing witness to himself as a mouthpiece of God; we may not be able to doubt his integrity, for the prophets were sincere and disinterested men who have manifestly believed in themselves; but can we be sure of their ability? Is man able with certainty to distinguish between a vision and a brilliant guess? I doubt it. The prophet is but human and so may deceive himself and us. "In the mouth of two or three witnesses shall every word be established." The Prophets with their message are one witness, the generality of mankind, by their consensus of assent, may be a second, but we feel that we yet need a third and final Witness.

Supposing therefore that the author of the Hebrews speaks truth when he says that "God has

at sundry times and in divers manners spoken unto the fathers by the prophets," it is wholly reasonable that God should at some time confirm this testimony: for it is inconceivable that God (if there be a God) should give only disjointed and incomplete information, for if the universe is to be explained to us, it must be explained sufficiently finally and definitely, for it to be a reliable guide to life and conduct. "The Son Whom He hath made Heir of All things, by Whom also He made the Universe" would absolutely and completely fulfil the requirements of such a witness, for if all things are made by Him, and for Him (as they must be if He be "the Heir"), then He must be competent, would He but enter into our life and speak our tongue, to give as full and complete an explanation of the Universe as we are capable of receiving: such testimony from such an Authority would be final. It would seem, also, that the coming of such a witness would of necessity inaugurate the "last days": the work of prophets, that is of seers revealing hidden mysteries, would be at an end, there would be no need after the Son had "told us plainly of the Father" for such to stammer parables; moreover it is only reasonable that the possibilities of prophetic revelation should be exhausted before the Lord come from Heaven to set His Seal upon the work of the prophets. Now the assertion of the writer to the Hebrews is that this thing has come to pass, that God *has*, in these the last days, spoken unto us by His Son, Who is the Jesus Christ of the New Testament Scriptures. Is this testimony to be received?

If we examine the testimony, we find that it is not one testimony with which we have to deal but two. There is :—

(1) The great Salvation, which first began to be published by the Lord,<sup>1</sup> Who took upon Him the seed of Abraham. And :—

(2) The testimony of them that heard Him as to what that Lord said and did.

And therefore, before we consider the ability and integrity of Jesus Christ as a witness to that great Salvation, we have to scrutinize the portrait which has been handed down to us in the records. This latter is a question of human testimony. If we are, upon scrutiny, satisfied of the truth of the portrait, we have next to ask ourselves whether we can regard the Christ, Who is there truly portrayed, as a reliable authority in the matters to which He bears witness.

The Gospels are a documentary record of alleged events. As such they are a proper object of criticism,<sup>2</sup> whose purpose is to pass judgment on their testimony, just as we should do in the case of any other testimony. And first of all we have to consider the integrity of the documents.

This consideration is literary criticism. Is the document criticised written in a style suitable to the age in which it is said to have been written, or does it betray itself by allusion to events of a later date? If it profess to be the work of some

<sup>1</sup> Hebrews ii, v.

<sup>2</sup> Though it be legitimate to subject the Gospel records to the *process* of criticism, it does not necessarily follow that the *conclusions* of present day critics are correct.

author of whom other acknowledged writings are extant, does it agree sufficiently with those writings for it to be possible for them to have been written by the same man? This is of vital importance where the record claims to be the work of an eye-witness, or of one who had access to eye-witnesses in collecting the matter of his narrative. For a record written at a time when intercourse with eye-witnesses was possible has a far higher value as testimony than it would have if written, say, twenty years after such witnesses were dead. The narrative of an eye-witness may compel assent to the almost incredible, that is to say, to that which it is *very* difficult to believe.

Then, again, the subject matter is open to criticism. Is it credible? According to Bishop Pearson it is credible if it be not knowable. For example, the Virgin Birth, the Miracles, and the Resurrection are supernatural events, and as such are difficult to believe, but they are not strictly incredible, for they are not certainly inconsistent with any knowledge, and the testimony in favour of such events having happened may be strong enough to compel assent in the face of all difficulty. I maintain, therefore, that the literary critic must stick to literature, and must not be biassed in his literary estimate by any difficulty in believing the subject matter.

Again, the narrative may be of such a quality, that refusal to believe its record may be most difficult, and thus difficulty of believing matters narrated is counterbalanced. It is by moral qualities in the subject matter and the general tone of the

narrative that this power of compelling assent is principally obtained. For example, the narrative in the first two chapters of St. Luke contains supernatural matter difficult to believe, but the dignity and restraint of the narrative and the total absence of vulgarity and bombast, at least largely counteract the difficulty. Again, narratives of miracle are difficult to believe, but as I hope to show they are not impossible. On the other hand, I hope to demonstrate that the possibilities of miracle are limited, and strictly limited, on moral and theological grounds, and when I find the narratives of miracle keeping consistently within those limits, much has been done to overcome my difficulty in believing them on the ground that they are miracles. Also, when in a series of records by different hands, the characteristics of the persons concerned (St. Peter, for example) are kept consistent with themselves and distinct from each other, our assent is demanded in a manner very difficult to resist.

Professor Sir W. M. Ramsay of Aberdeen University illustrates these principles remarkably well in his criticism of the Acts.<sup>1</sup> He shows how accurate the author is in all geographical details, how careful he is about the status of cities, and shows that the only possible explanation of the fact that the narrative exists is that it is true. In answer to the objection that the narrative includes miracles, he shows that the miracles cannot be disentangled from the rest of the narrative, and there he leaves the objector with an almost visible shrug of the

<sup>1</sup> *Vide Paul the Traveller and Roman Citizen.*

shoulders, as if he should say, "The narrative must be taken or left as a whole. I have shown from the accuracy of his historical, geographical and political allusions, that the author must have been speaking truth. That you are thereby compelled to believe the 'incredible,' or, more strictly speaking, that which it is very difficult to believe, is no business of mine."

The Gospel Narrative, therefore, of the Birth, the acts and teaching, the Passion and Resurrection of Jesus Christ may constitute an irresistible body of testimony. (Whether this body of testimony is of sufficient weight to claim our assent is a matter which we shall have to consider in due course.) If it do so, we then have to consider the testimony of Jesus Christ. A testimony of which we will now give the outline.

By asserting His Oneness with the Father, and yet His personal distinctness from the Father, and also speaking of the Spirit as a person with divine prerogatives, He reveals more fully the nature of the Infinite Power, Wisdom and Goodness, which, according to the religious explanation of the Universe, is the Cause of that Universe. For in so doing, we learn that the Almighty ones or "Them Above" Whom (*Elohim*) we have also been taught to regard as the self-existent I AM (*Jehovah*) is Three Persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. As examples of this testimony, we may give the following, "I and my Father are One,"<sup>1</sup> "Before Abraham was I AM,"<sup>2</sup> "The Holy Ghost

<sup>1</sup> S. John v, 30.      <sup>2</sup> S. John viii, 58.

Whom the Father shall send in My name He shall teach you,"<sup>1</sup> etc.

Again, by foretelling the Resurrection of the dead and the final judgment, He confirms the existing belief in the survival of bodily death. Examples of this testimony are "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living,"<sup>2</sup> "In the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage but are as the Angels in heaven,"<sup>3</sup> "The hour cometh when all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and shall come forth, they that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation."<sup>4</sup>

Yet again He confirms the moral teaching of the prophets, and shows the importance of motives as well as of deeds, and in impressing upon us our responsibility He confirms our belief in the freedom of our wills.

He thus confirms that body of doctrine which we had already possessed, viz. the religious explanation of the universe, and which we may now perhaps call primary theology, which had in past times and divers manners been proclaimed unto the fathers by the prophets.

In what I have said so far, I have carefully stuck to the matter of primary theology, and primary religion: because I want the ideas of the essential explanation of the universe kept distinct from the

<sup>1</sup> S. John xiv, 26.

<sup>2</sup> S. Matthew xxii, 32. S. Mark xii, 27. S. Luke xx, 38.

<sup>3</sup> S. Mark xii, 25. S. Luke xx, 35.

<sup>4</sup> John v, 28-29.



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secondary work of Redemption. But the latter must not be lost sight of, for it vitally concerns our subject.

This completes our statement of the testimony to the religious explanation of the world in which is included the hope of human immortality: what we now have to face is the fact that this testimony is gainsayed.

## CHAPTER IV

### ON THE CREDIBILITY OF MIRACLES AND ON THEIR EVIDENTIAL VALUE

**RECAPITULATION** of the difference between Explanation and Description—and of Testimony as the basis of Belief—Jesus Christ, the witness of the work of God—The Gospels as witness of the facts of Christ's life—This narrative includes Miracle—Definition of Miracle—Miracles cannot be said in strict logic to be impossible, and therefore incredible—Their credibility a corollary of the credibility of God as the Author of the Universe—The possibility of Miracles limited on Theological Grounds—God can have no need to intervene in the course of nature to keep the World going—but only to save free-will creatures, such as men, who have fallen—and must therefore inevitably fall short of their destiny if left to themselves—It is just this one Miracle which the Gospels present—and of which the Miracles are details—Witnessing to Christ's Power to Save—Futility of trying to "Explain" Miracles.

I HOPE that my readers have now got a firm grasp of the necessary relationship between :—

(1) The explanation of the Universe which is Religious, and :—

(2) The description of the Universe which is Scientific :—

the difference being the difference between the words "Why" and "How," and see that it is improbable that these two accounts can come into collision, so improbable that, where there is apparent collision, the appearance must be regarded with the greatest suspicion, and, where there seems to be no solution of the difficulty, that a solution may be

confidently expected from further knowledge or keener criticism.

Further, I hope that it is clearly understood that Scientific description is based on observation, and results in knowledge, while the religious explanation depends on testimony, and results in belief. This is so because the things observed are observable and therefore knowable, whereas God, Who is the Explanation, is not observable and therefore not knowable: but because God is unknowable He is *therefore* credible, that is to say, that it is possible to believe that the universe is from Him and for Him, and if sufficient testimony be borne to this explanation it can be assented to as true. Further that the only sure witness to the existence and nature of God and to the purpose and destiny of His Universe must be God Himself, Who is said to have "spoken to the fathers in times past by the prophets, and to have spoken to us in these last days by His Son, Whom He hath made Heir of All Things by Whom also He made the Universe." Now His Son is declared to have been Jesus Christ, who took upon Him our flesh in order that in our human speech testimony might be borne to us of the wonderful work of God, as well as for other purposes connected with the salvation of a fallen race. That the Son should so bear witness we have seen to be wholly reasonable and consonant with the nature of things; but is Jesus Christ that Son?

This question has shown us the need of a second testimony: the testimony to what He, Jesus, said

and did. But what He said and did is unknowable *to us* just as the Battle of Waterloo is unknowable *to us* because we were not as a fact witnesses of it, and therefore we have to depend on the testimony of others as to what did happen at those times. We have further seen that as testimony depends on the ability and integrity of the witness, we may, when that ability and integrity are proved to be above suspicion, be compelled to assent to the truth of things, colloquially called "incredible," which, strictly speaking, are only very difficult to believe. But no witness, however able and however honest, could constrain us to believe the impossible, for that which is *known* is not *credible*, whether it be known to be or known not to be. Now the Gospel narratives assert that Jesus Christ worked miracles, and present these miracles to us as testimony that He was the Son of God. Supposing, therefore, that literary, historical and geographical criticism of the Gospels and other records contained in the New Testament show them to be authorities of the greatest weight as to the events of the life of Christ, we may be constrained to admit that miracles did happen if it be only *very difficult* to believe that miracles have happened, but nothing could induce anyone to believe the truth of the narrative of miracles contained in the Gospel were miracles in the strict sense of the word impossible. It seems to be, therefore, well worth our while to devote a chapter to the consideration of miracles.

Our first step will be to try and arrive at an exact idea of what we mean by a "miracle," and

I suggest that we should begin with a definition, and I will define a miracle as:—

An anomalous phenomenon.

I confess that "anomalous" and "phenomenon" are rather technical words, but then definition is a rather technical business, so technical that the nature of the process is most briefly and graphically described in Latin, when it is said that everything is defined *per genus et differentiam*. This means that everything is defined by stating the *genus* or class to which it belongs, and the specific characters by which it is distinguished from the other members of the same class. Now a phenomenon is an event or object evident to the senses: for example, a colt feeding from a portable manger in the park outside my window is a phenomenon, because I can *see* him doing it: a motor going through the village is a phenomenon, because I can *hear* the horn. The miracles recorded in the New Testament are described as phenomena, people *saw*<sup>1</sup> them happen: people saw, for example, the wind and the waves to cease at Christ's command, they saw the five loaves on which the five thousand were fed and themselves gathered twelve basketsful of remaining fragments, they saw Lazarus come out of the tomb and they saw and ate with Jesus Christ after He was risen from the dead: these things were heard and seen just as motors on roads and colts in fields are heard and seen. All are "phenomena." But colts in fields and motors on roads are normal

<sup>1</sup> If the Gospel narrative be trustworthy. A question discussed in Part ii, Cap. ii.

phenomena, we know or could find out on inquiry how they came to be where we see them and we should say that these phenomena are the result of perfectly natural causes. But miracles are abnormal or anomalous, they have no natural antecedent cause; for example, in the feeding of the five thousand a considerable quantity of bread must have been eaten which came into existence without any natural antecedent cause, the existence of that bread was a breach of the "law" of the conservation of matter,<sup>1</sup> which is that there is a certain quantity of matter in the universe neither more nor less, and that that quantity remains constant whatever changes of condition it may undergo. The phenomenon of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ was also clearly anomalous, for from the piercing of Christ's side with a spear it is evident that He really died, and was not merely in a trance; yet death would not hold Him, He came back to life. He was seen and was handled, and was not a spirit, for a spirit has not flesh and bones as He was seen to have,<sup>2</sup> and yet He was free from the limitations of other bodies, He could vanish out of sight and the grave could not detain Him. Such events are clearly phenomena which are not normal, they occur without natural cause; they are therefore outside natural laws, they are anomalous phenomena, that is, "miracles."

So much for our definition. We have next to

<sup>1</sup> Vide Chapter ix, p. 131.

<sup>2</sup> S. Luke xxiv, 39.

consider the possibility of such phenomena. We all know the difficulty of *proving* a negative, and this fact is generally admitted, for when we have told anything which our hearer regards as a glaring improbability, he will, if on familiar terms with us, retort with the common and very rude formula, "pigs *might* fly" which is an assertion that that which cannot be *logically* proved impossible can yet in practice be so regarded. Matthew Arnold took up the same position in more courteous mode, when he asserted that "miracles do not happen," and advanced this as a ground for being practically satisfied that they never happened, and that therefore narrative containing the miraculous must be rejected. This saying is, moreover, of importance, because it gives expression to a great deal of modern thought and feeling on the subject. For not only is the statement "miracles do not happen" true so far as our own personal experience is concerned," but it is the general experience of mankind that they do not, and so much is now known about the orderly working of cause and effect in Nature that we see more than ever how anomalous miracles must be when such phenomena happen, if they ever do. But still those who reject miracle can only say that miracles do not happen, they *cannot* say that they cannot happen, and that therefore they never have happened. There is a real difference in logic between "do not happen," and "cannot happen." Is this difference of any practical importance?

The statement "miracles do not happen" as made by Mr. Matthew Arnold expresses the

conviction that, though the logical difference is real, the difference is not of any practical importance. This implication must be denied. To the statement "miracles do not happen," we would answer that of course they do not or they would not be called "miracles"! A miracle is something to wonder at, and if a good percentage of miracles were to occur in every-day life they would not be called miracles. But to consider their theoretical possibility. God is, as we have seen, unknowable, that He exists and is the Creator of the Universe is therefore credible. We learnt this by tracing back in our imagination all the forms and motions of the world as we see it, to primary matter and energy, of which there exists a fixed quantity which is not added to or diminished. The candle when it burns disappears, but the matter of which it consists is not lost, for its form is changed and it passes into the atmosphere; the energy which was stored in the candle and which shows itself as light and heat in the flame when it burns, is also not destroyed, for it spreads itself through space till it is set to some new work. We are further being told, since something has begun to be known about *Radium*, that perhaps matter itself is only a form of energy and that all that we see is made up out of an originally existing primary something. But still we are confronted with the problem how this something came into existence, and one of the answers is that it was "created," that it came out of nothing into existence by the act of God's Will. Now supposing that

everything which is and moves around us is derived from this primary something, then God is as much the Creator of everything that now is and moves, as if He had brought each item into existence ready made and by a "separate act of creation." The colt, therefore, that I see out of my window and the motor that I heard in the road, neither of which sprang ready made out of nothing into existence, for the one was begotten by natural generation from its parents and the other is made up of diverse parts fashioned and put together by the hand of man, are the creatures of God, because they are derived from the primary something which He willed, or rather wills, to exist, for God is above Time and Space, which are but the properties of His creature the Universe.

Now if it be, as it demonstrably is, credible that the will of God is the reason why the Universe exists, it is quite clear that the same God could, if He would, cause additional matter or energy to exist at His will. He could, for example, cause sufficient bread to exist at His will to feed five thousand people. Again, He could cause any measure of matter or of energy to cease to exist at His will: He could, therefore, delete from the Universe just that energy which had given rise to those atmospheric disturbances which constituted a particular storm, and by so doing would make that storm to cease. If therefore it be credible that God should have created the Heavens and the Earth, as both Mr. Herbert Spencer and Mr. Charles Darwin<sup>1</sup> have

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* Darwin's letter to Romanes, Cap. xiii, page 190.

said that it is credible, *it follows of necessity that miracles are credible.*

We have not yet dealt with the statement of Mr. Matthew Arnold that they do not happen beyond saying that from the very fact that they are called miracles it is the admitted experience of all that, speaking broadly, they do not. I now propose to bring forward some reasons why they should not happen; nay, more, some reasons why they should be regarded as *impossible*, except under certain special circumstances; *but the reasons which I am going to bring come from the side of Theology and not that of Natural Science!*

We have seen that, if there be a God, He must be a God to Whom "all things are possible,"<sup>1</sup> and religious believers are convinced that there is such a God, of infinite power, wisdom and goodness. But it is impossible that God should deny Himself.<sup>2</sup> He cannot do anything that is inconsistent with His own infinite perfection: "it is impossible that God should lie."<sup>3</sup> If therefore, God have created the Universe, He must have done His work efficiently; and if He have created it by bringing into existence a sufficiency of *prima materia* or original matter, and has set this matter going by a *primum movens*, or initial impetus, so that by the resulting motion the distinction and order and beauty of diverse things as we now see them should arise, then every detail of the increasing complexity of arrangement must have been foreseen by Him with unerring certainty, so that it is *impossible* that God should

<sup>1</sup> Luke xviii. 27.    <sup>2</sup> II Tim. ii, 12.    <sup>3</sup> Hebrews ii, 18.

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have to intervene in the workings of His own Universe, (that is, that He should have to work miracles) in order to help to keep it going : the idea of such miracles is a denial of the infinite power and wisdom of God. However unreservedly, therefore, the man of science and the natural philosopher may have to confess that such miracles *might* happen, it is the duty of the theologian to deny their possibility !

This has not been always seen to be so, for when in bygone generations men have been arguing for the existence of God, they have maintained that there must be a God to give rise to the many phenomena for which there was no known cause. But many such unknown causes have since been discovered, and if " room " must be found for God in the unexplained gaps in His creation, then less and less " room " is being left for Him as knowledge increases until we begin to foresee that a time will some day come when God will have to disappear altogether. But I think that most men now see that it is contrary to the very nature of God for Him to occupy what are supposed to be gaps of imperfection in His own work. In case, however, anyone should not see my meaning, I think it can be made clear from a consideration of some machine made by man.

Let us take for our example a motor-car, or self propelled carriage. It is so made that once the machinery is started it will continue to drive the car of itself ; so that the man in it has only to steer it to go where he will. Sometimes, however, we may see a car standing at the door of some shop or inn,

the man has forgotten to take enough petrol and has to buy more ; or we may even see a car laid up at the side of the road, and the man not in the car but lying underneath it trying to put something right with a spanner. Now it is very clever of men to make carriages which will go of themselves, but the fact that men always carry spanners and other repairing tools with them in case something should go wrong, and that they should sometimes have to lie down under their cars when they ought to be getting on with their journeys, is evidence not of the cleverness of men but of its limitations. To say, therefore, that gaps in the scheme of the visible Universe are evidences for the existence of God is to find proof of His existence in the supposed imperfections of His work. Which is absurd. Our difficulty is not so much that Natural Science leaves no room for God as that Theology limits the possibility of miracles ! Where will this "Queen of Sciences" leave room for them ?

There is but one thing in Nature which we know to be free, and that is "mind." This is a vital factor in the religious explanation of the Universe, apart from which theology ceases to afford ground for the exercise of religion ; for a doctrine of the origin and destiny of the Universe can have no practical interest to beings whose future is predetermined as are the courses of the stars. But our future is not so determined ; on the contrary, we stand "in jeopardy every hour,"<sup>1</sup> for though man is, according to the doctrine, predestined to eternal life, it is a

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. xv, 30.

destiny of which he can make shipwreck. If the reign of law be universal, it must apply to the free-will acts of man as much as to the inevitable motions of inanimate and brute nature, so that, if man fail to play the part which he is called upon to play, willingly with a glad and loyal mind, he must thwart the plan of God, and must fail to reach his predestined goal, and God and man both suffer loss. Further, if the law of consequences be left to work itself out, that loss must be inevitable, irreparable and eternal, and man can never "inherit the Kingdom prepared for him from the foundation of the World."<sup>1</sup> We have now arrived at a point at which it is theologically possible for God to intervene and do something to repair the damage done by man's disobedience. Such an intervention being an interference with the ordinary course of law would be essentially miraculous.

It is just this, the one possible and one necessary miracle, which the Gospels present to us. They show us One who claims to be the Son of God, Who as such confirms the testimony of the prophets and also proclaims His mission "to seek and to save that which is lost," to impart new vitality (His own) to men, declaring that by "partaking of His Flesh and Blood" they can be "raised up at the last day" and that without this partaking "they have no life in them,"<sup>2</sup> and claiming to add to the stock of moral energy in the world, and by so doing to put eternal life within the reach of man: the Bread that He gives is His flesh which He gives

<sup>1</sup> S. Matthew xxv, 34.

<sup>2</sup> *Vide* S. John vi,

for the life of the world. That His gift of new moral and vital energy was no empty boast He showed by His own visible triumph over Death. He is the Resurrection and the Life.

But beside this great miracle the Gospels record subsidiary<sup>1</sup> miracles which are presented as bearing witness to Him. By such miracles He is said to have "Manifested forth His Glory,"<sup>2</sup> for men asked "what *manner of man* this could be that even the winds and the sea should obey Him,"<sup>3</sup> and we are told again and again that people were moved to believe on Him by reason of the miracles which they saw Him do. Such miracles are a wholly reasonable and natural manner of testifying to divine power, and it seems to me that the more we know of the orderly and uniform working of law, and the more fully we realize what is meant by the conservation of matter and energy, the more definitely do they (*i.e.* miracles) witness to divine power, for the more we know the more clearly must the difference between phenomena which are the result of natural causes be separated from phenomena which are without such causes. We see, far more clearly than bygone and more childish generations could see, that the latter can spring only from the all causing fiat to which the natural causes of normal everyday phenomena may be traced back ; and should one come amongst us possessing this power and exhibiting it and declaring that He

<sup>1</sup> These miracles are of course in this view components of the one miracle of Salvation.

<sup>2</sup> John ii, 11.

<sup>3</sup> S. Matthew viii, 27. S. Mark iv, 41. S. Luke viii, 25.

does in fact come from the God, the unknowable Creator—Who, says Mr. Herbert Spencer, *may* be the cause of all things—then miracles are the strongest and most obvious corroboration of the truth of the testimony of such an one.

But if such mighty works are to be a witness to God, they must witness to His Wisdom and Goodness as well as to His Power. They must, therefore, be free from all vulgar bombast. Had Christ publicly exhibited His power by casting Himself down from a pinnacle of the Temple, He would have been guilty of just that fault.

God, moreover, being wise, must have set this world agoing just as it should go. Even if we think of it as but a transitory thing, an environment for man in his stage of probation, we must see that God being wise it must be quite adequately adapted to its purpose ; He could need, as we have seen, no miracles to keep it going. All miracles whatsoever must therefore contribute, directly or indirectly, to the one object which could be obtained only by the intervention of God in His Universe, that is the salvation of fallen free-will beings.

Let us examine the miracles of Christ by these standards. He is said to have healed the sick, and especially to have opened the eyes of the blind, to have cleansed lepers, to have cast out devils, and to have raised the dead. He also guided disappointed fishermen to great draughts of fishes, fed hungry multitudes with a few loaves, turned water into wine, stilled the raging of the sea, and once came walking on the water to His disciples. This last

differs from the miracle of casting Himself down from a pinnacle of the Temple in that it is truly congruous with His saving mission.

And the same is true of the miracles which testified to the mission of prophets before and of apostles after Christ. All recorded Old Testament miracles are miracles which testify of deliverance, except a few which testify to the punishment of impenitent wickedness. But most even of the destructive miracles testify indirectly to deliverance, for, like the plagues of Egypt and the blindness of Elymas the Sorcerer, they bear witness to the victory of God over the enemies of salvation.

To sum up. Those anomalous phenomena which we call miracles are credible within certain limits. Miracles to help on the world's mechanism must be impossible if there be a God, because God can be no bungler : if *He* set the world agoing it will go without the attentions which are given to human machinery. God can intervene without self-contradiction *only* to make good the losses of His free-will creatures and to give them renewed hope of attaining their destiny ; and this intervention is essentially miraculous. The person and work of the Saviour may therefore be reasonably attested by what I have ventured to call subsidiary miracles, which must be congruous in character with the central Miracle of Salvation. These conditions are satisfied by the Miracles of Christ, of the prophets who spoke of deliverance to come and of His Apostles whose mission was to bring that deliverance into the reach of individuals.

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Please remember that not one word has yet been said in defence of the records in which so many miraculous narratives are recorded, that is a matter for scholars, for literary, historical, and geographical critics to discuss. All that I have done is to deduce from the agnostic doctrine of "The Unknowable" that such miracles are credible, and that therefore the Gospels, the Acts, and the Old Testament narratives, need not be dismissed without a hearing because they narrate the miraculous.

I have reserved to the end of this chapter the attempts to get rid of the miracles in the Gospel narrative, when the genuineness and truthfulness of the narrative cannot be impugned, by explaining them away : that is, by showing that they may after all have been due to natural causes.

It is quite true that some of the miracles, especially some of the miracles of healing, will bear such an explanation. It seems, however, impossible to explain away (e.g.) cases of recovery from leprosy.

There are others, such as the miraculous draughts of fishes, the marvel of which lay in the circumstances under which they occurred. There is nothing in itself supernatural in a sudden lull in the wind on a land-locked lake, or in a net including a closely-packed shoal of fish when none have been found elsewhere : but the *knowledge* of Him Who knew where the fish lay and when the storm would cease would still call for "explanation," which could not easily be supplied.

There would still remain, among others, the feedings of the multitude and the Resurrection itself, which cannot be explained away. If the testimony that these events happened is true they are in the strictest sense of the word miracles, and if so then there is no great point in reducing the remainder to the level of natural phenomena by means of explanations.

## CHAPTER V

### RETROSPECTIVE, WITH SOME NOTES ON CONTROVERSIAL METHOD

A BRIEF *résumé* of the argument of the previous Chapters—Explanation—Description—The Difficulty of Imagining any real collision between them—Yet collision there has seemed to be—And the credit of the explanation on which religion rests has been shaken—We imagine a *mode* of (e.g.) creation and confuse it with creation itself—New knowledge may, in upsetting our idea of the *mode* seem to controvert "Creation" itself—The denial of God evidently does not follow the doctrine of Evolution—But an animal descent for man may seem to upset traditional belief as to human nature—and discredit Scripture as a testimony to that about which Science must always be Agnostic—Two ways of meeting adverse propositions.

THE preceding chapters are intended to afford a general review of the situation. In them we have seen that the explanation of the Universe is that behind the phenomena, or things which appear, there is an unseen mysterious Power, and that man owes allegiance to that power, in which allegiance lies the basis of conduct: that this fundamental explanation is one and common to all religions, whether it be vague and rudimentary in form, or developed into a systematic body of doctrine of varying degrees of profundity—or absurdity: that in this explanation must always be included—whether the inclusion be realized or no—the belief that the things which are seen are temporal, while the things which are not seen are eternal, and that

that indivisible unity which every man finds in himself and which we call personal identity belongs to the eternal order : also that man has free-will, so that he is master of his fate, the attainment of his destiny or failure to attain to it being the result of his own choosings at the crises of his life. It is true, of course, that there might be an explanation of the world, which did not include the doctrines of human freedom, and human immortality, but in that case the explanation would be of no interest to mankind ; such an explanation might be theological, but could afford no basis for religion.

We have also seen that Science is essentially descriptive, it systematizes the knowledge which comes from seeing the things which are to be seen, and endeavours to arrange them in orderly series of cause and effect. Thus it tells us that the pipes burst after a frost *because* water swells as it freezes and ruptures the pipe, and that afterwards, when it melts, it escapes through the hole that has been made : it also tells us that birds and beasts and fishes are alike in having backbones, and that they may perhaps all be descended from some primitive creature with a backbone. But we have also seen that however far back Science can trace the chain of causes and effects, it must arrive at some primary material whose existence it has to assume. To speak allegorically, if we account for the stability of the earth by saying that it rests on an elephant, and for the stability of the elephant by saying that it rests on a

tortoise, we have either to assume that the stability of the tortoise is in itself or that there is something for the tortoise to stand on, which something must be either self-supporting or must in its turn rest on another something. Whatever definite answer, therefore, Science may give to any such question, it always necessitates the asking of a further question : and the only answer which can bring such catechizing to a close is the agnostic answer, "I don't know." The scientific process can never demonstrate the First Cause, whether it be God or no : and the man who will assent to the truth of that only which can be demonstrated by the methods of Science, can be neither a theist nor an atheist : he is bound to maintain that, for all Science can tell him, there may be a God or there may not : he must be an agnostic.

Next we saw that what cannot be known can be believed, it is credible, and, if sufficient testimony can be borne to it, it must be assented to as true : so that if there be a God, God can bear witness to His own existence. It is said that He has so spoken :—

- (1) In times past to the fathers by the Prophets ;
- (2) In these last days to us by His Son, Whom He hath made heir of All things, by Whom also He made the world ; Who, being God manifest in the flesh, must be a final and sure witness to the explanation of the Universe of which He Himself is Author and Heir.

We have also seen that the Man Jesus of Nazareth

is said to be this final and sure Witness : to accept Him as such we must be able to rely on His having been and done what the Gospels record Him to have been and to have done. In judging of the historical value of these records, we have seen that they cannot be rejected on the ground that they narrate miracles, because, if there be a God, miracles are credible and are proper credentials of such as are in truth His Prophets, of His Son and of the Apostles of His Son. The genuineness of the Gospel documents of record must therefore be judged by the same literary, historical and geographical standards as are other such documents : to reject them because they contain narrative of the miraculous would be—besides a refusal to hear testimony to that which is in itself credible, which could not justly be done—a begging of the question at issue.

Having got thus far and having seen how inherently difficult it is for description to come into collision with explanation, it might seem to practical men that the whole of the "conflict" between Science and Religion might be ignored as futile, and that the first part of our subject might now be concluded with an examination of the criticism of the Gospel and other Biblical records, with the object of seeing whether we can rely on Jesus Christ having been as these records represent Him to have been. If so, we could the sooner proceed to the second part of our subject, that is, to seeing what we can learn from His testimony concerning the future life. Those who think so may,

if they see fit, pass over the next four chapters if they like.

No one can, however, doubt the fact that the feeling is abroad in the world that the believableness of the general body of religious doctrine, of which the hope of everlasting life is an integral part, has been diminished by that increase and more perfect classification of knowledge which we call the progress of science. The causes of this fact are many and complex. From this multitude and complexity I think we may, however, certainly disentangle the following :—

(1) The feeling that that which has been questioned must be questionable. If it have heretofore been regarded as unquestionable, the bare fact that it is questioned shakes its credit, especially as that which is unquestioned is usually accepted somewhat carelessly and without due grasp of its meaning, and those who carelessly and thoughtlessly believe are not prepared for resisting an attack on their faith. The application of this principle to the conflict between Science and Religion is, I think obvious.

(2) Though description and explanation are different things, the description and explanation with which we are concerned deal with *the same Universe* : further, a man's belief is his assent to explanation, his knowledge is his assent to description. But no man naturally keeps his belief and knowledge apart ; he rather makes a synthesis of the two, which constitutes one comprehensive conception of himself and his surroundings.

Now what a man believes about the cause of things ought not to be and probably is not affected by his knowledge of the form and order of things, but his *mode* of believing may be so affected, and he may come to regard his mode of believing a thing as part of the thing believed. Let us take as an example belief in creation. Let us suppose a man who believes God to have been the creator of all things. What he believes is that all things exist because God wills them to exist, but he does not leave this belief in the region of dry theory, he applies it to the surroundings of his everyday life. Let us take from among the surroundings of his daily life the birds for whom he puts out crumbs in the frosty weather. He watches them feed, and he loves to see them fed, because he regards each one of them as a creature of God. By this he means that each individual bird which lives on his bounty owes the fact of its existence to God's will, but he does not suppose that each individual bird sprang ready made into being out of nothing, for he knows that each bird grew out of an egg, and that the egg owed its being to the bird's parents.

We will next suppose him thinking his way, back to a first pair for each species, e.g. a first pair of starlings, a first pair of robins, and a first pair of sparrows. It has never occurred to him or to anyone to think of the original pair of robins as derived from birds which were not robins, so he comes to regard the first pair of each species as a new beginning, and so to think of the first pair of each species as springing ready made

into existence. His *mode*, therefore, of believing the individual robin to have been created is that it derives its being from its parents, while the mode in which the species robin came into existence was, to his imagination, by an original pair springing ready made into existence. It is easy to see that such a man may come to think that to be "created" means to "spring ready made into existence," and that, therefore, anyone who suggests that the first pair of robins, of sparrows, and of starlings are derived from some archetypal bird which was the ancestor of all three, must deny the Creator, and the Scriptures which assert "creation," and be an infidel! It escapes his notice that, if creation really means what he has come to think that it means, he is inconsistent in regarding the individual robin which has sprung from its parents by natural generation as the creature of God.

(3) Take the proposition "Man is descended from monkeys, therefore there is no God." This is a crude presentment, nay a caricature of the scientific teaching popularly known as "Darwinism," and of the discredit of all religious belief which has been supposed, nay, by many asserted, to flow from it. In many ways it is the same as saying that robins, sparrows, and starlings are descended from a common stock, for the root principle of Darwinism is as much expressed by asserting a common descent for birds as for "primates."<sup>1</sup> But there is a deep difference, for the former collides

<sup>1</sup> The name for the class in which men, apes, and lemurs are grouped, by reason of their similarity of bodily structure.

with belief only by differing from the mode in which the bulk of mankind had come to think of the work of Creation ; once let men realize that they had imagined that mode from defective knowledge and that it is quite possible to believe in the creation of species in the same way as they had always believed in the creation of individuals, and the question of the ancestry of robins and sparrows becomes a matter of interest to naturalists, no doubt, but one which need in no way collide with his hope in God.

But the descent of man from monkeys is a personal matter. Man may perhaps be able to continue to believe in a God, for to say that there is no God because man is descended from monkeys is a glaringly false inference ; but can man continue to believe in himself ? That is a question which hits him very hard, for we have seen that an explanation of the world which does not include certain doctrines about human nature, cuts at the very root of religion. If man be not immortal and master of his fate, he is robbed of his hope. There may still be a God, and if there be a God there must be a theology, but if man is not capable of *giving* his allegiance to God and "finding himself " by so doing there can be no religion, for the giving of that allegiance *is* religion.

What we really have to face therefore is the statement " Man is descended from monkeys, therefore he is of the number of the beasts that perish." Also the contention that as Man is descended from monkeys, therefore the Scriptures which give another account of man's origin full of childish myths, and especially a story of a general deluge, of which there

is definite evidence that it did not happen, are discredited ; and that the testimony of all, including Jesus Christ, who acknowledge these mythical tales to be the word of God is involved in the discredit, so that their testimony to the being of God, and to His dealings with men is robbed of any authoritative character.


If this judgment, namely that the witness of the Scriptures and of those who acknowledge the Scriptures is discredited, be true, it does not follow that the explanation of the universe propounded in Scripture is false. The conclusions of Science still leave the matter open, and the proper method of learning the truth about matters which Science must always leave open is still testimony. The only result of this judgment, *if true*, is that the testimony of Scripture is not good testimony.<sup>1</sup>

But to return to statements of scientific teaching which are said to conflict with the religious explanation of the universe or some factor of that explanation. There are two ways of meeting such statements. We may either attempt to show that the premises are not true, that is, that what they state for facts are not facts, or we may endeavour to show that the conclusions are not legitimate inferences from the premises. Which course is the best to adopt depends on the nature of each particular case, but where it

<sup>1</sup> If A declare that he has from his window seen B go down the street, and it is proved that A was not in a position to see the street from his window, it does not follow that B did not go down the street, but only that A's testimony on the point is worthless.

can be done it is best to show that the reasoning is fallacious, because if the conclusion does not follow from the premise, then it does not matter whether the premise be true or no. Let us take two examples. Supposing that, when out for a walk, I say to my companion of a passer-by, "That man has a black coat on, therefore he is a clergyman." Should my friend wish to disagree with me he could not deny my premise, for it would be evident that the man had on a black coat, he would therefore have to show, which would be quite easy, that a man who was not a clergyman might wear a black coat. But supposing my companion to say to me "That field is a square and therefore the railings which divide it from the garden are the same length as the hedge on the left-hand side," I should have to admit that his conclusion was a necessary inference from his premise, for the very idea of a square is that it is as broad as it is long : if, therefore, I wished to disagree with him, I could maintain the contrary opinion only by showing by measurement that the field was not square, i.e. that his premise was false.

Having finished our preliminary review and considered the methods in which objections may be met, I propose to make statements, for comparison, of the systematized doctrine of the Christian Creed, and the received tenets of modern Natural Science giving the authority on which each of them rests.



## CHAPTER VI

### THE CREED OF CHRISTENDOM—(i) ITS AUTHORITY

WHAT is the Christian Creed?—The divisions of Christendom have to be faced—Christendom an organised Kingdom of Christ's foundation—Keeper of her own records—Guardian of her Founder's honour and status—Promulgator of her own Creed—The Constitution of the Church in the Acts—Under Apostolic Authority—which determines controversies in Council—and is ultimately represented in every city or diocese, by a Bishop—who, being the continuance of the Apostles, continue to determine controversy, as at Nicæa—The Faith of the Church in matters not controverted can be sufficiently gathered from the liturgies—and from the works of accredited doctors—The rival theory that the Christian Creed is the Highest Common Factor of the creeds of the Churches—Popular connotations of "Catholic" and "Protestant" true to facts—The latter inimical to the idea of any definite Creed—The only Creed producible is therefore that of traditional organized Christendom.

In the Babel of many sects among which we live, with "New Theologies" published from time to time by distinguished preachers, and criticized in the halfpenny press, and with radical amendinents of the old proposed from month to month in graver manner in the more serious reviews, What is the Christian Creed?

In answering this question I am compelled to face the fact that Christianity is divided, and I cannot face it without introducing something of the controversies and disagreements by which we Christians are separated from one another. Why can I not be content with stating only those doctrines which all "orthodox" Christians accept, and which may

therefore be regarded as the fundamentals of The Faith, that so we may exhibit an united front to those who, in the name of Science, would take from us the Christian hope of everlasting life ? I cannot do this, because, if Christianity is to stand in the evil day, it must be *Christ's* Christianity, and can we say that only those matters in which all " orthodox " Christians are agreed are fundamental ? May not some of the points on which they disagree be points of vital importance ?

Having propounded a question, the answer to which, as I have already indicated, is the subject of controversy, I might, after the manner of St. Thomas Aquinas, have begun by giving all conceivable answers and then the objections to them, and then in a judicial summing up give what I believe to be the correct solution. For many purposes and in many cases this is a most useful method ; but in this case I will not save my answer up till the end of a long discussion, but will give it at once. I contend that :—

(1) The Christian Creed is what Christendom says that it is. And :—

(2) That Christendom has spoken its mind in the Creed of Constantinople (commonly called the Nicene Creed) and in such other formal pronouncements as have been made when the traditional teaching of The Church has been publicly gainsayed. It was, for example, the gainsaying of Arius which led to the drawing up and promulgation of the Constantinopolitan Creed.

In making the above statements I have deliberately chosen the term "Christendom" because it is a word which represents Christianity as a Kingdom or Polity rather than as a system of philosophy, a social organization rather than a body of doctrine. Christ is a King and His business on earth was to found a Kingdom.<sup>1</sup> It suffices now to say that, according to the Gospel record, Christ's work was largely the secondary<sup>2</sup> work of reclaiming a lost race, and the reconstruction of mankind, and that His organized Kingdom is this reconstruction. I so express myself because it makes the Kingdom not merely the means to an end but the end in itself, the reunion of divided and disorganized humanity in union with, and in subjection, to Christ the King. The end is not yet attained, for the Kingdom is still in process of construction, but already it is the Kingdom.

Now to every kingdom or social organization whatsoever it belongs to proclaim its own constitution and the intentions of its founder, and to make and to keep its own documentary records and other archives. To this general principle Christendom

<sup>1</sup> I shall not argue nor enlarge upon this point here, it is sufficiently demonstrated by the late Sir J. R. Seeley in *Eccles Homo*.

<sup>2</sup> I do not mean by the word "secondary" of less importance. The *primary* work of God was to make man for eternity, and to reveal to man his destiny. Man's redemption is *secondary* in that it is the result of his fall, for the fall was not man's destiny. Just as the building and sailing of ships is a *primary* business, while salvage is *secondary*, being demonstrated only when a ship is wrecked. Wreckage is not a primary object in shipbuilding.

need be no exception : it is for Christendom to declare the authority and dignity of its own Founder and King, to maintain and explain its own polity or organization, and to be the censor and keeper of its own Holy Writ. It belongs, therefore, to Christendom to formulate and promulgate its Creed.

To proceed, therefore, to consider the actual formulation and promulgation of a creed. We find in the records of Christendom that the Church in the beginning was under the Government and oversight of the Apostles : the Acts record the relationship of the Apostles to the Church and the Epistles are themselves acts of oversight. It is also recorded<sup>1</sup> that authority and commandment to exercise such oversight was committed to them by Christ Himself. Also, that, when controversies arose, they met in Council, with the assistance of elders, heard evidence and settled the matter by delivering decrees which were to be kept,<sup>2</sup> and that the decrees were promulgated.<sup>3</sup> We find also that the local Christian organization, that is the Church in each city, was under apostolic oversight : the Church of Corinth and those of Ephesus, Thessalonica, and Galatia respectively were manifestly under the oversight of the author of the Epistles addressed to them. We find this authority delegated to others, e.g. to Timothy who is to exercise apostolic oversight in Ephesus and to Titus who is to exercise it in Crete. Finally we find that since then the same oversight has been exercised by

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xviii, 18 and xxviii, 19. S. John xx, 21-23.

<sup>2</sup> Acts xv, 1-29.

<sup>3</sup> Acts xvi, 4.

Bishops or overseers,<sup>1</sup> who—however their order arose—carried on this same apostolic business of oversight and therefore succeeded to the apostolic function and oversight which was never called in question for fifteen hundred years. These Bishops were much more numerous than the original Apostles, and the sphere within which each carried on administrative functions was much more exactly defined, each Bishop being settled in the city which, with its surrounding district, constituted his "diocese." Settled residence after the manner of St. James at Jerusalem and a well-defined diocese are, however, merely the common-sense expedient of the division of labour, applied to what is the essentially apostolic business of episcopacy or supervision.

Bishops being then a continuance of the Apostolic Order, it belongs to them not only to do the work of administration in their several spheres, but also to assemble together to determine controversies of faith: that is to formulate the traditional teaching in terms which exclude error and to deliver such formularies as decrees to be kept in their respective dioceses. What therefore has been promulgated in fixed dogmatic formularies drawn up by general councils and generally accepted, that is of the Christian Creed, as for example, the Creed of Nicæ and Constantinople drawn up to exclude the errors of Arius.

<sup>1</sup> The Greek word for Bishop, of which indeed "Bishop" is a corruption, *ἐπίσκοπος*, or in Latin *episcopus*, means an overseer.

We cannot limit the creed, however, to the matter contained in such formularies, for the Church does not dogmatize till grave controversy has arisen. Her traditional teaching in matters about which there has been no acute controversy cannot be so exactly stated, but it is none the less part of her Creed. It can be learnt, however, sufficiently by collecting the less formal teaching which is given under episcopal sanction throughout the Church generally. For example, the forms of prayer used in the liturgies imply certain beliefs<sup>1</sup> and liturgies are used only under Episcopal sanction. The teaching of the Church can also be gathered by the learned from the writings of those who are accredited Doctors in Christendom, as, for example, St. Augustine, St. John Chrysostom or St. Cyprian.

Let us, for the sake of argument, however, abandon the idea of a *Christendom*. Let us assume that Christianity rightly consists of various denominations, and indeed also of many undenominational or

<sup>1</sup> For example, the Commendatory Prayer for a sick person at the point of departure in the Office for Visitation of the Sick in the English Book of Common Prayer assumes the truth of a certain doctrine of Purgatory, in praying that the soul, on passing into the hands of a faithful creator, may have the defilements contracted in the midst of this miserable and naughty world purged and done away: for if, when the soul returns to God who gave it, defilements contracted in this life are not purged and done away, then the prayer is sheer nonsense. That such defilements are so purged is the essence of the doctrine of purgatory, and it is obvious that the Bishops under whose authority and sanction that prayer is used officially acknowledge and maintain that doctrine of purgatory.

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unattached Christians, and that a Christian Creed is to be obtained by collecting the beliefs common to all the orthodox denominations and segregating this common body of belief from distinctive or denominational features. This is the assumption that the Creed of "the Church" is the highest common factor of the Creeds of "The Churches." Our problem is to find that highest common factor.

As in arithmetic, we should begin by setting out in a row the numbers of which the "H.C.F." has to be found, so we must now set out in order the Creeds of the Churches which are to be submitted to an analogous process. These creeds are, by hypothesis, those of the "orthodox" denominations; but which denominations are "orthodox"? Those it may be said which accept certain fundamental articles of belief, that is to say, those which stand the test of conformity to an assumed creed. Now if we assume such a creed and select the denominations which adhere to it, and then extract from their creed the highest common factor of their respective creeds, we must extract from them the creed which we originally assumed. We are arguing in a fatally vicious circle, from which we cannot escape.

It is, of course, evident that the bulk of such as profess and call themselves Christians do acknowledge the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement and the Resurrection, and with the exception of the Apocrypha are at one as to the Canon of Holy Scripture, but it does not follow that this and this only is the Creed of *Christ's* Christianity, the Catholic or universal faith, neither more nor less.

But it may be, and I think will be, instructive to see how it has come about that such a body of formulated belief is common to so many denominations.

Consider the bodies of Christians who have so much of belief in common with an eye to that which divides them. They fall quite naturally into the two groups popularly denoted by the terms "Catholic" and "Protestant." To the minds of some, "Catholic" has exactly the same meaning as "Roman Catholic," the whole remainder of Christianity being regarded as "Protestant." This classification is not, however, correct: to begin with it leaves Oriental Christianity altogether out of sight. Now the Eastern Christians, such as the Greek and Russians are clearly not Roman, they reject the claim of the Roman Bishop to supreme dominion in Christendom, but in the modern popular sense of the term they are anything but "Protestants."

The assumption that the Church of England is Protestant in the popular sense cannot be successfully maintained, now that the sacerdotalism of her government and formularies has come to be better known; in spite of the fact that many Protestant-minded persons are included in the Anglican Communion. Moreover, the protest of Protestants is at least as loud against Anglican as against Roman Sacerdotalism, and also against that of the Greek, Russian and Armenian Churches when they happen to come in contact with it.

If we go deeper we find that this broad popular distinction is true to the facts. On the one side Christianity is a Christendom, a Kingdom of people



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with a hierarchical senate of ordained ministers of various grades which claims to be of apostolic descent and of Divine foundation. Among these Catholics is found an agreement in doctrine and procedure which extends even to uniformity of detail: all acknowledge, for example, the Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, and that it is a sacrificial function, and all use liturgies for its celebration framed on the same plan.

The divisions of Catholic Christendom are, moreover, largely geographical, as the names for the various bodies, e.g. Greek, Armenian, Roman, Anglican, sufficiently show, or relate to questions of procedure or of fact, such as the claim of the Bishop of Rome to an autocratic primacy or the question whether Parker was or was not truly consecrated to the Episcopate in 1559. Such doctrinal differences as there seem to have been can be often shown to be mere "logomachies," due to the misunderstanding by the Church in one locality of the terms used in another that employs a different language: and, in spite of all estrangements and disputes, all agree in assenting to the decrees of the great general councils which took place before these (largely racial) estrangements and jealousies became acute, which decrees all alike regard as the final judgment on the controversies of faith of the one universal Church. All, moreover, regard the Church as a single polity or kingdom of Divine foundation and deny that that Church can rightly be represented by two separate and rival bodies in the same place.

Let us turn from this divided, perhaps, but still generically uniform and organically connecte

Christendom to the Protestant denominations. The most essential difference, to my mind, between these bodies and the former party is that none of the latter is exclusive, none claims to be the sole holder of Christ's mission and jurisdiction in any given nation or region of the earth; the whole idea of jurisdiction is foreign to the cycle of ideas now connoted by the term "Protestant." Protestants regard what they call "The Churches" as essentially voluntary associations. Such an idea can only rest on a fundamental conception of Christianity which is individualistic, one in which the salvation of every individual is a separate concern. According to this conception there is no reason why the saved individual should not continue to be unattached, that is, belong to no particular denomination, and I believe that there are many English-speaking Christians who remain unattached. The individual Christian, however, likes to associate with those who are like-minded with himself, and from this natural tendency there spring up voluntary associations which they designate "Churches." I do not mean that all "the Churches" originated in this way, some of them are known to have arisen otherwise, in other days, with other ideals, but I do think that this is the modern Protestant theory by which the coexistence of many Churches is accounted for and justified.<sup>1</sup> For

<sup>1</sup> The Wesleyans were, I think, a private society or Guild which separated from the Church with a view to doing as they liked, and contributed much to the development of this idea. The idea was fully fledged and had become a tacitly assumed axiom by the time that such bodies as the Salvation Army and the Young Men's Christian Association were founded.

it is only if the relation of every soul to Christ is essentially individualistic that the societies to which they belong can coexist on friendly terms, co-operating in good works and yet content to remain separate.

It is on the ground of this fundamental individualism that the modern Protestant so instinctively dislikes the idea of any ministration coming "between the soul and God," and that one *individual* should possess "keys" which should give him control over the entrance of another into the Kingdom of Heaven is of course monstrous: the socialistic feeling of family unity, of belonging to a system organized in feudal interdependence under a Sovereign Lord with which a Catholic makes his confession "to God Almighty, to Blessed Mary, Ever Virgin, to all the saints and to you, my father," is one which is outside his whole habitual system of thinking. The Protestant also protests strongly, and from his individualist standpoint rightly, in favour of "the right of private judgment." For if the salvation of every individual be his own private and separate concern, then the articles of his faith must be his own interpretation of the Word of God, and Œcumenical Councils and Westminster Assemblies must be equally guilty of impertinence in demanding his assent to their formulated doctrines. Even the question "What is the Word of God?" is one which every individual *ought*, on Protestant principles, to be free to decide for himself, for it is quite as impertinent to present an authoritative catalogue of the books of Scripture for the acceptance of

such an one as to ask his assent to a formulated creed. Why, if he is to exercise private judgment in one matter should he not exercise it in the other ?

Consistent Protestantism cannot lay claim to special loyalty to the "Bible" without acknowledging the authority by whose censorship the books which compose it were brought together, the authority which (e.g.) admits to the Canon the Second Epistle of Peter and rejects the Epistle of Barnabas.

Protestants, however, have, as a fact, got a Creed, and have got a Bible. Their belief concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation is that formulated at the Councils of Nicæa (A.D. 325) and Constantinople (A.D. 381) and their scriptures are those sanctioned by the ancient Apostolic and prelatical Church : in this, as we have seen, Protestantism is inconsistent. It is also inconsistent in maintaining a ministry of preachers, for the preacher comes "between the Soul and God," at least as much as does the confessor and the Mass-priest. But Protestantism may some day come, if it be not already coming, to realize the inconsistency and be true to itself, and will both throw away its creed and tear up its scriptures. At present, in retaining creed and scriptures and yet repudiating the authority on which they rest, Protestantism is like a man who saws off the branch of the tree on which he is himself sitting. When the inevitable crash comes it may save itself by grasping at some other branch of the tree, which it is doing its best to mutilate. If it do so, however, it will cease to be Protestant.

This brings us back to the point from which we started, namely, that it is not Christianity but *Christendom* only which *can* promulgate a creed. That, therefore, being the only producible creed, our next business will be to produce it.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE CREED OF CHRISTENDOM—(ii) ITS CONTENT

**THE** Creed of Christendom expressed in Creeds—The Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed—Manuals and Catechisms which expound the Creed—God, the Trinity in Unity—The Work of Creation—The nature and "end" of man—The Origin of Evil—The Moral Law—The Work of Redemption—The Fall and its Consequences—The Incarnation—The Atonement—Sanctification the Work of the Holy Ghost—This restoration the Work of Grace—Which is of two kinds, "actual" and "habitual"—Is carried on in an Organised Kingdom called The Catholic Church—By the instrumentality of Sacraments—The restoration of mankind a methodical work—Which tends to a final consummation or "end"—In the Resurrection and final judgment.

**THE** Creed of Christendom is expressed in "Creeds." A Creed is a form of words by the recitation of which the individual professes his assent to the Faith of Christendom. We of the West, that is, the Latins or Roman Catholics and the English or Anglicans, use two Creeds, the "Apostles'" and the "Nicene." The Greeks or Easterns use only the Nicene. All, both Easterns and Westerns are accustomed to recite what is commonly called the Creed of St. Athanasius; but that is not, properly speaking, a "Creed," for it is not cast in the form of a Creed but of a Psalm. The two Creeds proper are moreover brief summaries, while the Athanasian is a prolonged meditation on the Mysteries of the Trinity and The Incarnation, so rhythmically expressed as to be fitted for singing in choir to the same chants as the Psalms of David and the Canticles:

we will say no more about it now, but will confine ourselves to the other two Creeds.

These two Creeds are cast in the same form. They begin by professing belief in God the Father and in His Work of Creation. Next in His Son Jesus Christ, and of Him it is asserted that He was of Virgin Birth, that He suffered, died, and rose again and ascended into Heaven, and that He will come again to judgment. Thirdly belief is expressed in the Holy Ghost, in connection with Whom the Catholic Church and the remission of sins are associated, and finally hope is expressed in a Resurrection to eternal life. In primitive times, as now, the profession of faith was always after this manner, and its recitation was required by those to be baptized. The exact form of words varied.

When Arius in his teaching denied the Divinity of the Son, the Councils of Nicæa and Constantinople were called, and clauses were inserted in the traditional form of the Creed professing Jesus Christ to be "God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made, being of one substance with the Father, by Whom all things were made, Who for us men and for our Salvation came down from Heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made Man:" thus effectually shutting out the Arian teaching which declared Christ to have had a beginning. This Creed was accepted by the whole of Christendom, and in the East took the place of the older and briefer baptismal forms. In the West, however, which was not greatly troubled with

Arianism, the old short baptismal creeds were still used, and the one of these forms which has survived and is used as the Baptismal Creed by Romans and Anglicans is what we call "The Apostles' Creed." In case I have any readers who are not familiar with these Creeds I give them here in parallel columns. The titles are those in common use.

**THE APOSTLES' CREED.**

I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth :

And in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, Born of the Virgin Mary, Suffered under Pontius Pilate, Was crucified, dead, and buried, He descended into hell ; The third day he rose again from the dead, He ascended into heaven, And sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty ; From thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead.

**THE NICENE CREED.**

I believe in one God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, And of all things visible and invisible.

And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, Begotten of his Father before all worlds, God of God, Light of Light, Very God of Very God, Begotten, not made, Being of one substance with the Father ; By whom all things were made : Who for us men, and for our salvation came down from heaven, And was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, And was made Man, And was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate. He suffered and was buried, And the third day he rose again according to the Scriptures, And ascended into heaven, And sitteth on the right hand of the Father. And he shall come again with glory to judge both the quick and the dead : Whose kingdom shall have no end.

I believe in the Holy Ghost; The holy Catholick Church; The Communion of Saints; The Forgiveness of sins; The Resurrection of the body, And the life everlasting. Amen.

And I believe in the Holy Ghost, The Lord and Giver of life, Who proceedeth from the Father (and the Son), Who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, Who spake by the Prophets. And I believe one (Holy) Catholick and Apostolick Church. I acknowledge one Baptism for the remission of sins, And I look for the Resurrection of the dead, And the life of the world to come. Amen.

N.B.—This English version of the Nicene Creed follows the Latin. In the original Greek Text the Creed begins "We believe." The words "and the Son," are the famous *Filioque* clause which is not in the original text. It was inserted first in Spain as a fence against local heresies. The Greeks protest against the insertion not because it alters teaching, they have been satisfied on that point, but because they say that a mere part of the Church has no right to touch the text of any creed or decree of an Universal Council, such as was the Council of Constantinople. But the Bishops of any locality must deal with local controversy.

The word (Holy) is in brackets because it does not appear in the version used in England, I believe through some doubt about the correct text.

A more detailed account of the Christian Faith takes often the form of an exposition of the Creed such as that of Bishop Pearson and *videlicet* exposition of the Creed is part of the pastoral work of a parish priest, who is required to catechise the children of his parish. Manuals have been published for their use such as the Catechism of the Council of Trent for the Latin Clergy and the "King's Book,"

between right and wrong, and free-will or power to choose which they will do. All things have an "end" or purpose for which they exist, but to men and angels it pertains to know that they have an end, and either to deliberately set themselves to its attainment or to refrain from so doing. Their end is the state of "Beatitude," for not only do men and angels satisfy God when they fulfil their destiny, but they also *know* that they do so, so that Beatitude is a state of mutual satisfaction of God in his free-will creature and the creature in God.

A difficulty in connection with the Creation is the origin of evil, there is an apparent dilemma. It seems that either God is the author of evil, or that He is not the author of all things. The answer given is that all *things* are good, that things are never evil—their misuse is evil; evil can come, therefore, only through the rebellion of free agents. Even the power of rebellion which such possess is good, for it is only out of this power of refusal to serve that service can be freely rendered to God.

The next step, if we take the Christian Creed in scientific order, is the distinction between right and wrong; what man should do is that which man is created to do, and what he should not do is that which thwarts the purpose for which he was created. This Moral Law is proclaimed in the Ten Commandments, so that we have here, in practice, to make a digression from the Creed. But the digression will be short as we need not discuss why this or that is right or wrong, for rightness or wrongness is largely a matter of motive. Now the one right

motive of every act whatsoever is "charity" or the love of God, "Love is the fulfilling of the Law"<sup>1</sup> Thus to have charity is to love God for His perfections. This love must be "sovereign," that is to say that we must prefer God to all other things, ourselves included. As, however, all other things are God's things, we must love and respect them as His, including ourselves in this love. So that out of charity springs our duty to God, and out of our love to God springs a right love of self and neighbour. Charity is no mere sentimental feeling, it is the deliberate choice of the will. It is by this motive of charity that the good or evil of any particular action is tested.

We consider next the work of redemption. Redemption is a contingent and secondary work in that it is a work of salvage. Now salvage operations can only be undertaken towards that which is injured and in danger of being lost. I have chosen this word salvage which is used specially in relation to the recovery of a wrecked ship because the salvage of a ship gives a complete illustration of the nature of redemption. It is obvious that salvage operations are not and *cannot* be undertaken on a ship which is in perfect order and in no difficulties; also they are not undertaken when a ship is a total wreck, for then the labour would be entirely fruitless, and the work of salvage is expensive. Salvage operations are undertaken only in the case of wrecks which are not total, that is, on ships which may be floated or got off the rocks and thereafter repaired and made seaworthy.

<sup>1</sup> Rom. xiii, 10.

Redemption, then, being a work which can be undertaken only towards that portion of created beings which has made shipwreck of its destiny, but not total shipwreck, man alone is redeemable. The angels that have left their first estate are held to have made total and final shipwreck of their destiny: they are like some great aeroplane capable of flying across the ocean, but which, once it goes wrong and falls, must sink to the very bed of the Atlantic, a total irreclaimable loss. The things which surround us, on the other hand, having no free-will, cannot rebel against their lot or refuse to fulfil their destiny, they are incapable of being wrecked: they are like cans corked and sealed and cast loose upon the waves, the waves can never hurt them as they can hurt a yacht or steamer. Man is like a ship or boat which stands midway between the humble unsinkable can and the soaring ambitious aeroplane, it may be sunk but if so it may be raised and refitted for sea.

The fall of man is not however regarded as a separate matter for every several individual, a catastrophe is asserted to have occurred which has involved the whole race: this catastrophe is called The Fall. The consequence of the fall is said to be that every several man inherits a taint, a fault or corruption which is naturally engendered in him as a child of Adam: this taint is called "Original Sin." The meaning of this doctrine is that every man inherits an incapacity to fulfil his destiny. It is a pity that this state has been called "sin" because it is not truly and properly sin, for that

only is properly sin in a man for which he is personally responsible and therefore blameworthy. Original sin comes to the individual from the sins of his ancestors and it tends in the individual to the commission of actual sins, on which ground alone it is said to "have the nature of sin." But it is not in itself a fault to bring the wrath of God upon the individual, but rather a misfortune appealing to His pity. The work of redemption, which is referred specially to God the Son, is the fruit of this pity.

The Creed tells us that it was "for us men and for our salvation" that the only-begotten Son came down from heaven and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary and made man, and that He was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate, suffering and being buried, rising again the third day from the dead to sit on the right hand of the Father. We have here both historical and doctrinal matter for consideration. The historical events are accepted for facts on the testimony of witnesses; we are not concerned here with their attestation, but only with their interpretation.

As regards the Incarnation, the Creed asserts that Jesus Christ is both God and Man, God of the substance of His Father, begotten before the worlds, and Man of the substance of His Mother born in the world. Yet the Creed speaks of Christ as "He" not "They." He is one Person. The Church has later to defend this unity by asserting that Mary is rightly called *ΘΕΟΤΟΚΟΣ* or *Deipara*, roughly rendered in English as "Mother of God," for *He* is God and she

is *His* Mother. One result of the Incarnation is that God Himself thus comes to speak to us with human voice, so that He is the final and confirmatory witness to the doctrine of the prophets who had in former times spoken to the fathers of God and His relation to the Universe. He might have come thus to speak to us even had there been no fall.

His special work, however, was the salvage of mankind. He was crucified *for us*. The meaning of His sufferings and death is that the natural consequence of our fall has been bought off. No part of the Christian Creed is so impenetrably mysterious as this ; we cannot get beyond the childlike belief that He has, in the words of a children's hymn, "paid the price of sin."

In this we assume the truth of the belief that men are not isolated units, but are united by some bond, not at all understood but felt to be real and to have something to do with the fact that bodily life is a common property transmitted from one to another by natural generation ; it is a belief which regards the solidarity of humanity not as a mere idea but as a reality. Christ is therefore regarded as the representative man in whom all men undergo the penalty of sin. He is also the representative man fulfilling all righteousness and thus making up what has been lost from the universe by man's failure ; and so lost to God, for Whom all things exist. He thus, as man the debtor, pays the debts of an otherwise bankrupt humanity.<sup>1</sup> But as every creature owes

<sup>1</sup> Not as a substitute but in the real though mysterious fact of human solidarity.

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his all to God, he has nothing wherewith to pay damages of any kind, only the Creator Himself can do this ; but Christ is God the Creator and He, as God, has the power to do this work of miraculous intervention in the chain of cause and effect, standing between sin and its naturally inevitable consequence, death. The Resurrection is the visible testimony to the efficacy of the Passion ; the penalty is seen to have been paid and the power of death is at an end. Christ as the representative man has passed through death and all mankind was in Him, and so all mankind hope to rise triumphant from the valley of shadow—to meet their judge. Such is the redemption or salvage of mankind.

The sequel to the salvage of a wreck is that it should be repaired and refitted for sea ; without this the whole cost of salvage is wasted. The work of sanctification, which is especially ascribed to the Holy Ghost, the Third Person in the Trinity, is just such a work of restoration. It would be contrary to all truth and all justice were God to regard man as righteous if he be not so : the sequel to redemption must therefore be an actual restoration of men to the state of righteousness. This restoration or regeneration is said to be the work of grace, and grace is described as “the power of God working in the soul of man.”

Grace is said to be of two kinds, called “actual” and “habitual.” Before explaining these technical terms it will be well to remember one or two simple but important principles. And first as regards actions. Any given action can only be regarded as

possible to be performed by any given person, when that person has both the will and the power to perform it. Take the extremely simple instance of the act of catching a train. It is possible for John Doe to catch his morning train only if he have both the power to walk and the will to go to business. Suppose that he is paralyzed in his legs, or that the rate at which he can walk or run will not allow him to cover the distance between his house and the station in time, no amount of will can enable him to catch the train. If, on the other hand, he have no will to catch it, his ability to do so will not get him one inch nearer to the station. So no man can fulfil his destiny who has not both the desire and the power so to do : and this no man is in himself able to do because of those inherited deficiencies which we call original sin. Grace is the work of the Holy Ghost, whereby these deficiencies are overcome, and its two kinds correspond to the two attributes of man in which he is deficient, namely will and power.

“Actual” grace is that which moves a man to desire to fulfil his destiny ; the Latin word *actualis* would have better been rendered “actuating,” because we now use the word “actual” in the sense of “real” rather than as a cause of motion. Habitual grace is that which gives man *habilitas* or ability to fulfil his destiny. The Latin word would better have been rendered “enabling” as we now use the word “habitual” in the sense of that which is usual or customary. Let us return to our illustration of John Doe and his train and amplify it. We have said that he will not catch his train unless he

wills to go to business. He may have other desires, such as to stay by the fire and read the paper, or to go and play golf on the common : these desires of immediate pleasure will compete with his will to do his work : it is by his free-will that he will determine which he will do ; but if his will to do his work is feeble, if he feels no interest in it and no need to do it, he will decide in favour of his immediate pleasures. *Anything* that would actuate or set in motion his will to do his business, so as to incline him to determine to go in spite of his desire to read the paper or to play golf would be of a nature corresponding to actual grace, which is *any* agency which the Holy Spirit may send to stir up in man desire to fulfil his destiny or to give him "thirst for the living God."<sup>1</sup>

John Doe also will not catch his train unless he has the power of locomotion or bodily ability to get to the station. This bodily ability is the result not of casual influences but of known definite and regular means of renewing bodily strength, such as food, warmth and sleep. These definite means to the attainment of bodily strength, correspond to the known and definite means of acquiring mental abilities of various kinds, each of which is attained by some definite course of education and training, and both correspond to habitual grace, which, by known and definite means confers on man spiritual ability to fulfil his destiny, that is, to believe in God, to fear Him and to love Him absolutely and unreservedly, and to love his neighbour as he loves himself, that is to say in God and for God and not otherwise. It

<sup>1</sup> Psalm lxii, 2.

is this habitual or sanctifying grace which makes it possible for good desires to bear fruit. It is by this that humanity is regenerated and reconstructed.

This grace is, as we have said, an ordered and well-defined support quite unlike the providential influences of actual grace in which the Spirit is as the wind which "bloweth where it listeth." It may be remembered that the Creed couples the natural phenomena of the visible creation with the person of the Father as Creator, and it couples with the Son as Redeemer equally visible historical or human events, namely the Crucifixion and the Resurrection. With the Holy Ghost the Sanctifier are coupled a special visible society, the one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, and its ceremonial observances, such as the one Baptism for, or rather into, the remission of sins. The special sphere of the Holy Ghost is in the Church and her Sacraments.

We have already seen that the solidarity of humanity is essential to the idea of original sin and of the redemption of man by the sufferings of Christ. We have also in the last chapter seen the conception of Christianity as a Christendom, or people organized under the royal supremacy of Christ, in which kingdom authority is in the hands of a hierarchy to which the people owe obedience, all being further bound together by what might be called a communal tie, but which is more truly a blood tie, in that all are members of Christ and children of one Father with the right of inheritance in their Father's Kingdom. The Church is regenerate humanity in solidarity.

Turning next to the Sacraments. These are a ceremonial expression of the union and mutual responsibilities of the head and members of this Kingdom.<sup>1</sup> The ceremony of Baptism, for instance, effects the new birth into it, for it is an "effectual sign of grace." As the ceremony is definite so the effect is definite. In the individual in himself it sows the seeds of the reconstruction of his nature: the inordinate desire or "concupiscence" which he inherits is not at once reduced to order, but the work of reduction is begun. It also changes the individual's status, making him a "member of Christ, a child of God, and an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven." Those who are thus brought into this state of salvation and continue in the communion of saints have in the Eucharist or Lord's Supper—sometimes called the Mass—a sacrificial feast of double signification. First it is a ceremonial expression of the sacrifice of Christ's death in which all are united with their Founder in the common offering, which is that Founder's Body and Blood under the form of bread and wine: and thereafter the same Body and Blood, under the same form, are food for the strengthening and refreshing of the soul. These are the two great sacraments for all. Besides them there are other ceremonial expressions of God's gracious assistance: Confirmation, or the laying on of hands, adding gifts of the Holy Ghost:

<sup>1</sup> N.B.—No one teaches that the graces can be received *only* through the ceremonial channel of the Sacraments. God can give grace how He pleases. It is certainly given, or guaranteed, so to speak, in the Sacraments, to be used for the profit or abused to the detriment of the recipients.

the word of Absolution to such as return in penitence after falling away in sin: and the Anointing of the sick for special support in sickness and impending death. Grace also is given corresponding to the ceremonial union of Marriage and for the special duties and responsibilities of those who are ceremonially set apart for the Apostolic Ministry. In all these sacraments we have a definite ministration of God's grace for every need and state and duty which a man may be called upon to fill in the Kingdom in which God is methodically at work on the reconstruction of humanity.

Such methodical work must tend to a final consummation or end, in which the kingdom of reconstructed humanity attains completion: for this the individual looks in the life of the world to come, which follows the resurrection of the dead, in which all who have persevered will enjoy the perfect consummation and bliss both of body and soul. It is then that the Redeemer will appear to judge both the quick and the dead. Nothing can be more right and just than that He who has paid so great a price should sever those who have taken advantage of the benefits obtained thereby from those who have neglected so great salvation. On His right hand will then be placed, not only those who have persevered in using the sacramental means of grace within His formal kingdom, but those also who were true to such light as was given them and who were as Pius IX, (I think it was he) said were of the soul of His Church, and are then called from north and south and east and west to sit down with Abraham and Isaac and

Jacob in the final assembly of the Church of the Firstborn, while those children of the Kingdom who were unfaithful and despised their birthright will be among those who will be cast into the outer darkness where is weeping and gnashing of teeth. It is at least a pious opinion that theirs will be the outermost of all darkness and a depth of the pit deeper than that of the Jews who rejected their Messiah, on the principle that to whom much is given of them shall much be required.

I would ask my readers to remember that here is offered neither proof nor justification, but only a brief descriptive account of the Creed of Christendom—which claims to be the full and final explanation to man of the universe in which he finds himself, an explanation which points to “the Resurrection of the Body and the Life Everlasting, Amen.”

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE BASIS OF NATURAL SCIENCE

THE Analogy between the Creed of Christendom and the doctrine of Science—The process of research and criticism by which the body of scientific doctrine is arrived at—Heresy in Science—The general principles of Science or knowledge are as stated in Hobbes' *Leviathan*—The meaning of "Motion"—Sensation and Inference—Judgment of Relationships—Expressed by definition—The four primitive elements of Earth, Air, Fire and Water—The three Kingdoms, Animal, Vegetable and Mineral—Introspection as well as observation of their motions contribute to our judgment on Animal Nature—The fundamental difference between Man and the rest of the Animal Kingdom—The sense in which the word rational is used as a distinction between man and the brutes—This broad primitive classification of the constituent objects of the Visible Universe enriched and further classified by discovery but not modified—Illustration drawn from a box of shells—Confirmation from Professor Ray Lankester—As an example of this an outline is given of the History of Chemistry from the days of Alchemy to the discovery of *Radium*.

My next task is to give an account of modern scientific knowledge and teaching. This knowledge and teaching forms a body of doctrine in many ways analogous to the Creed of Christendom: but not altogether so. The Authority for the Creed is the Word of God and His testimony, or, as we commonly call it, "revelation," and the last word has been spoken; after speaking to us at sundry times and in divers manners by the prophets, God hath in these *last* days spoken unto us by His Son. There is nothing to be known, all the progress that can be is in the broadening and deepening of our

understanding of the deposit, under the guidance of the corporate wisdom of the Church Catholic which is custodian of that deposit. Natural science is concerned in describing things that are seen, and in arriving by process of reasoning at the relation of things to one another. Here there is not only the question of broadening and deepening our understanding of the things that are seen, but also that of seeing the things that have not yet been seen, and finding their relationships to things already known, and perhaps having to correct previous judgments. The last thing has not yet been seen. So much for the difference.

The great body of scientific doctrine is made up of the collection of facts contributed by an innumerable host of observers. Inferences are drawn from these facts by process of reasoning. These inferences are never the work of one man, though one man may have suggested certain of them : but, having been suggested, they are most closely criticised by others, and do not take their place in the generally received body of doctrine until they have passed through this fire of criticism and are accepted by the general body of scientists, who, though not exactly defined, do constitute an authority analogous to that of the Church's Hierarchy. At any rate this body is able practically to brand as "heretics" all who differ from well-established conclusions and to prevent the general body of reasonable mankind from paying any serious attention to their opinions. No one, for instance, would be listened to who now maintained the earth to be flat, or who denied the laws of motion and

attraction on which the calculations of astronomers are based. Where the received doctrine is less certainly true a heretic in science may gain some hearing from the general public, but not from scientists, who do not take seriously those who deny, for example, the efficacy of vaccination or the doctrine of evolution. Beyond the body of what is practically universally received as truth there is room for a great deal of diversity of opinion, and also for *faith*! That is, for a conviction that certain theories must ultimately prove to be true in the light of things hereafter to be seen, as for example that the production of life from non-living matter must some day be accomplished.

As it is important for our present purpose not merely to give a summary of what is at this time known, and of the theories now generally received as to the nature and relationships of things, but also to form some idea of what may ultimately be known, it seems necessary to say something about the general principles of knowledge, and for this I cannot, I think, do better than quote one or two passages from Hobbes' *Leviathan*. Hobbes was a philosopher of the seventeenth century, when what we now call Natural Science was in its childhood. It was only at that time that Harvey made his great discovery of the circulation of the blood, a matter now so elementary that it is taught to policemen and railway porters at ambulance classes. I choose these sentences from Hobbes for two reasons: because they are, in spite of their curious phraseology, extraordinarily simple

and lucid, and because knowledge has enormously increased since his day and so we have an opportunity of judging whether the limitation of the possible range of knowledge therein indicated has in any way been overpassed.

A simple thought or perception he describes as "a representation or appearance of some quality or other accident of a body without us which is commonly called an object. Which object worketh on the eyes, ears and other parts of man's body, and by diversity of working produceth diversity of appearance. The cause of sense is the external body or object which presseth on" (or, as we should now express it, stimulates) "the organ proper to each sense either immediately as in the Taste and Touch or mediately as in Seeing, Hearing and Smelling,<sup>1</sup> which pressure, by the mediation of nerves and other strings and membranes of the body continued inward to the brain and 'heart' causeth there a resistance or counter pressure or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself, which endeavour, because outward seemeth to be some matter without; and this seeming or fancy is what men call sense and consisteth as to the eye in a light or coloured figure, and to the ear in a sound, to the nostril as an odour,

<sup>1</sup> That which is tasted or touched comes into immediate contact with the body. That which is heard or seen affects the body by the mediation of light or sound waves emanating from it. The thing smelt *seems* to be at a distance, but we do not smell a distant object, we smell evaporations from it which come into immediate contact with the organ of smell. The distinction is apparent rather than real. I have modernized the spelling where necessary.

the tongue and palate as a savour and to the rest of the body in heat, cold, hardness, softness, and such other qualities as we discern by our feeling, all which qualities are called sensible, and IN THE OBJECT THAT CAUSETH THEM ARE BUT SO MANY SEVERAL MOTIONS OF THE MATTER BY WHICH IT (i.e. the object) PRESSETH ON OUR ORGANS DIVERSELY."

In the above statement motion does not of course mean only the transfer of the object from place to place, as when a bird flies from one tree to another, for we see stationary objects such as chairs and tables ; but we see them by means of those " subtil motions " which cause the waves of light or sound. All knowledge then consists in the sensations excited in us through " pressure " or stimulation by either the gross or the " subtil " [*i.e.* molecular] motions of external objects, and in inferences made from those sensations. For example as I sit writing, I see some ewes feeding in the park : the seeing consists in light waves coming from the sheep to me : the distance of the sheep from me I judge by the space which they occupy in my field of vision. In making inferences I am helped by memory, for it is my power of preserving the impression of past sensations which enables me to make comparisons ; it is by making comparisons that we form the orderly body of knowledge and doctrine which we call Science ; and it is by this knowledge of things seen, remembered and compared that we not only know what is and what was, but can also tell what will be : we can foresee, that is to say, how motions now

present to us will be continued. I see, for instance, some lambs running with the ewes, and I foresee from past experience, that they will become sheep. Astronomers again, from past experience of the motions of earth and moon, know when full moons and eclipses will occur. This foreknowledge we turn to practical account. As the small lamb will grow into a large sheep we feed and tend it till it is convertible into mutton. As the moon will be full at a given date I choose that date to invite friends, who have to come long distances by dark country lanes, to come to dinner. We are not, however, concerned here with the practical applications of Science but with the inference as to the nature of things which we derive from the sensations caused in us by the motions of matter.

The conclusion at which we arrive from observing things is essentially an estimate of relationship, and is attained by the process of comparing objects perceived. This is, perhaps, best seen by noting the manner in which formal definitions are framed. Everything is, as we have already seen, defined *per genus et differentiam*, that is by its likenesses and its differences: it belongs to a *genus* or class, the other members of which it resembles, and its difference is the points of unlikeness which make it a distinct species. Take for instance man: man was defined by the schoolmen as "a rational animal"; that he is animal expresses his likeness in body, flesh and bones, to other animals, his difference is that he is "rational." Take again tiger: if we say that the tiger is a

" striped cat," we rightly assign it to the *genus* or family of cats, but stripes are an insufficient difference, as several other members of the family are striped ; if we say that it is " a large cat " we again find that largeness also is not a sufficient difference as lions and jaguars are also large cats : but if we say that it is a large striped cat, we mark sufficiently its specific difference, as no other cat is both large and striped. It is just thus, by thinking of the definitions of things, that we learn to think rightly about them, or to correctly judge their relationships ; knowledge being the correct correspondence of thought to thing.

Let us now turn to man's deeper reflections on the things which he sees and hears and feels. He sees around him matter, or stuff. This stuff is not all alike. Chalk, for example, is not like cheese ; at least, we notice first their differences, but further reflection shows likenesses, a piece of either has a definite size and shape of its own, both are " solid," and in their solidity differ from milk, water and wine, which having no stability have to be retained in cups, pots, and such like vessels. These liquids, in their turn, differ from air and other vapours which can be retained only in closed vessels, for they are not only formless, but of no limited size. Air is, moreover, invisible : it can only be felt and heard as wind. Besides this, there is a something violent which gives out light and heat and consumes other objects : this fourth thing is " fire." And so primitive man divides matter into the four " Elements " of earth, air, fire, and water, which is but a clumsy



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way of saying that matter may be solid, liquid, or gaseous, and that there is a violent energy released in the transmutations of matter.

But there is also another mode of classifying objects according to their motions. The differences between objects which are alive and objects which are not are obvious to all, though they are very difficult to express in the terms of a formal definition. All, however, can see that a stone has no perceptible motion in itself. It moves only when thrown, it becomes hot only in a fire and soon cools if left to itself, and changes in its structure break it up, and it loses its identity. There are other objects which have motions of their own which we call "life," and which maintain their individual identity, while they grow and their juices circulate. When their growth has culminated they deteriorate, and finally lose their distinctive motions, or, as we say, die, and when dead the body disintegrates and its identity is lost. But before death they shed from themselves small particles which we call seeds or eggs; these in their turn grow, flourish and decay, each egg preserving its identity and, in its growth, maturity and decay repeating the motions of its disintegrated parents. Among living things we further distinguish those whose motions include locomotion, and so we have three classes of objects, the non-living or non-self-moving, and the living or self-moving, in some of which the self-motion is growth only, or vegetative life, and in others also locomotion. These are the old familiar "Kingdoms," the Animal, Vegetable and Mineral.

We learn, therefore, simply by seeing matter in motion, and by comparing and contrasting the motions that we see, to classify the states and motions of matter as the "elements" of earth, air, fire, and water, and to assign definite objects to either the Animal, the Vegetable, or the Mineral Kingdom.

We, however, form certain judgments about living things which are not wholly based on our observance of the motions of the outer world. We have each another object of study and knowledge, and that is our own personal self. I know that I have feelings and a memory and a will: I know that I strive after the things that do, or seem to do, me good, and especially after those that tend to preserve life; and in observing the motions of other living objects, I see that those which have locomotion do not just take the good things that come to them to preserve life and to promote growth, as do the plants which take up the moisture in the air and soil that comes to them, they go about in search of nourishment, their movements and actions are like my own: I therefore assume that they are conscious and have feeling and make purposeful efforts to maintain life. I cannot see their feelings and know them directly. I only infer that they have them because their motions resemble my own. This makes a new distinction between the animal and vegetable kingdoms; the former we judge to be conscious or "sensitive," the latter to be not conscious, or merely "vegetative."

Having distinguished the animal kingdom from

all other kingdoms, partly by knowledge of animals as locomotive objects, and partly by inference from self-knowledge, we are led to assign ourselves to the animal kingdom in that the matter of our bodies exhibits the motions of life and locomotion. But we have yet another task before we have completed our classification of the objects of which the visible universe is composed. We have found our likeness to animals, we have yet to find our difference. If we examine the body of man it reveals *none*. Man is born and grows and moves about and eats and sleeps and begets his kind and dies as do other animals.<sup>1</sup> The form of his head, the proportions of limbs and brain, and the exact position of his internal organs are sufficiently distinctive to mark man off from any other given species, but give no ground for marking him off from animals in general. An ape is, in bodily structure, nearer to a man than to a dog. A dog, as a mammal, is more like a man than he is like a bird. A bird or a frog or a fish, being vertebrates, are each more like to a man than to any invertebrate animal. Observation exhibits directly no difference between "man" and "brute."

It does do so, however, indirectly, for the movements of animals are, in the light of self-knowledge, indirect evidence that they feel and think, and this evidence tends to show that man differs in his mode of thinking and feeling from other animals. This difference is expressed by the word "rational." Man is said to be "a rational animal." We know

<sup>1</sup> Ecclesiastes iii, 19-20.

how other men think and feel, not merely by inference from their movements, but because they can tell us. For man has learned speech, that is to say, a device by which the motions of sound can be made to convey thoughts from one man to another.<sup>1</sup> From this we each of us know that other men are as ourselves. We not only feel and think and act intelligently, that is to say, take appropriate measures to bring ourselves into touch with objects which cause agreeable sensations and to keep at a safe distance from those which are disagreeable: but we know that we think and feel, and ask why we think and feel, and realize that we have a destiny. Out of this self-consciousness arises a sense of duty our intelligence is directed to attaining that destiny, as a point of honour, and we regard those who neglect their destiny in favour of sensual gratification as disgraced.

So far as we can judge from the actions of other animals they have not this self-conscious realization of destiny and duty, this vision of the *ratio* of their being to the universe which makes us "rational." They may be intelligent, and by process of thought, and not by mere instinct only, take appropriate measures to reach to what is good and pleasurable: and they may even make simple generalizations. I can remember a mare that I was once driving as leader of a tandem up the street of a strange town: she was evidently on the alert and closely watching the houses on both sides: in one of them there was

<sup>1</sup> Note that even here knowledge comes to us *only through the motion of matter!*

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an archway leading to a builder's yard and the mare tried to swing round and go up it ; the meaning of this attempt was that whenever she was driven into a town at any distance from home she was always driven into some inn yard where she was stabled and fed, and the entrances to such yards are usually through an archway under the inn : and she had made the generalization that archways under houses in towns lead to stables with corn in the manger ! Such a generalization shows considerable intelligence, but it does not show reason, for it is directed only to a gratification of sense : it offers no evidence that the mare had questioned the meaning of her existence, or realized that she had a purpose or destiny in life, or, as we might say, bore a *ratio* to the universe.

Thus we divide man from other animals : man being rational and using his intelligence to direct his actions to what he feels convinced that he ought to attain to : the remainder being brute animals, which use intelligence to direct their actions only towards enjoying what is pleasant and avoiding what is painful. In doing this they, above all things, endeavour to avoid death and often to avoid the death of offspring rather than their own ; and so they will bravely face pain and evil in order to escape worse, but this action, although by it they fulfil the law of their being, is not rational unless they realize that what they are doing is their duty.

We have thus classified objects into non-living and living : and then living objects into plants and

animals by the difference of their motions, that is into plants which have only vegetative unconscious life, brute animals which have sentient or conscious life, and man, the rational animal, who has a rational or self-conscious life, with a sense of duty.

I have insisted on the difference between rationality or reason and mere intelligence, because much that is said now about animals ascribes to them some degree of "reason." With that ascription I gladly agree on the understanding that what is now commonly called reason is simply "reasoning power," which I have called "intelligence." It is intelligence, or reasoning power, by which I can follow the logical proof of a proposition in Euclid, and it was a less degree of the same intelligence which induced the mare who led my tandem to expect stables and oats behind archways under town houses. If, however, we agree to use "reason" to denote this intelligence, then we must find some other word to express the self-conscious realization of destiny and voluntary effort to attain it, which we know that we possess, and which all the evidence before us tends to show that the rest of the animal kingdom does not possess.

This concludes our first survey of the visible universe, and our classification of the objects comprised in it. Our knowledge of these objects is derived, as Hobbes has said, from the "motions of matter pressing upon our organs diversely." It may be said that I have gone back to a very primitive stage of science, and that it is *modern* science, which has made such enormous

strides, that has caused so many difficulties and has robbed men of their God and their hope in a life to come. Perhaps that is so, but, if it be so, it is from this broad and simple understanding of the Universe that Science has grown up. I have now to say something about that growth. And first I would say that I do not think the great increase of knowledge has done anything to require us to alter these broad and simple conceptions, but only to adorn them with a wealth of detailed understanding of an almost incredibly immense minuteness. I will try and make my meaning clear by an illustration.

We have among our homely possessions a box of small shells, which we use as counters in family games of cards. To ourselves, who are not learned in the details of marine biology, they are simply a box of shells, gathered on the shore during sea-side holidays. Were a learned "conchologist" to pay us a visit, he would tell us what sorts of animals had lived in the different shells and perhaps in what countries they were found, and what their habits were. But however much he might tell us, he would not upset our previous judgment that what we possessed was a box of shells. So I think modern science enriches rather than subverts such primitive ideas as that "matter" is divided into earth, air, fire and water, though it helps us to express ourselves in more accurate language and to know something of the real relations of these "elements."

I must add here two observations on the results of modern scientific discovery by Professor Ray

Lankester.<sup>1</sup> The first relates to the discovery of *Radium*, up to which time chemists had regarded matter to consist ultimately of "atoms" of the elementary substances such as oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon, sulphur, phosphorus and the metals. The discovery of Radium has destroyed the idea that the atoms of the elements are indivisible and immutable, for we now know that one element can be changed into another. "The kind of conceptions," says the Professor, "to which these and like discoveries have led the modern physicist in regard to the character of that supposed unbreakable body the Chemical Atom . . . are truly astounding. Nevertheless *they are not destructive of our previous conceptions, but rather elaborations and developments of simple views.*" And I would add that in so far as the discovery has altered the belief in the fixity of the chemical elements, it has justified the old and simple belief in the unity of matter and energy, truly, though naïvely and clumsily, expressed as the four elements of Earth, Air, Fire and Water.

Take again the case of man. In pre-scientific days he was classed as an animal and differenced by his rationality. So far as his bodily structure and functions are concerned his difference from the anthropoid apes is quite trifling, and modern anatomists believe that man and these apes had a common ancestor. On this subject Professor Ray Lankester says, "The mental qualities which have developed in man, though traceable in a vague

<sup>1</sup> In *The Kingdom of Man*, 1907.


and rudimentary condition in some of his animal associates, are of such an unprecedented power and so far dominate everything else in his activities as a living organism, that . . . they justify the view that man forms a *new departure* in the gradual unfolding of Nature's predestined Scheme. Knowledge, reason, self-consciousness, Will, are the attributes of man." Man is a rational animal. The naïve and simple classification of the objects of sense, into earth, air, fire and water, and into animal, vegetable and mineral kingdoms, the first of which kingdoms is divided into the sub-kingdoms of rational and brute animals is as it was, just as our box of shells is as it was before the names, structure and habits of the molluscs that lived in the shells had been described to us, and is, for the purpose for which we use it, no better a box of shells and no worse than it was before. The growth of Science is a growth of detailed knowledge starting from a broad and simple understanding of the objects studied.

It remains to find an adequate cause for this great growth of knowledge. The cause I think to be something greater than mere curiosity, the apish desire to investigate the mechanism of a cupboard door; it is Faith, a great faith in the unity of things or "being," a conviction that underneath the likenesses by which diverse species are brought together in a *genus* there must lie some actual organic connexion; relationship is not simply the formal placing of objects side by side in a catalogue, it is felt to be a reality. It may not be that this faith in unity has been the sole motive of discovery and

invention, practical advantages or economic motives, some praiseworthy and some otherwise, have often been mixed with it, as also mere curiosity and the love of adventure for adventure's sake; but whatever motives, noble or base, brought men into possession of new facts, it was faith in unity which made men persevere in the investigation of their meaning and relationship.

Let us close this chapter with a brief review of the history of Chemistry, the science of the nature of matter, starting from the era of the four elements, earth, air, fire and water. "Earths" are clearly of different kinds, such as clay, coal and chalk, lead, silver and gold. But if we believe in unity, there must be a real relationship between these earths, and one can be transmuted into another. If this be so, then the cheaper substances can be transmuted into gold, and if this can be done cheaply the discoverer of the process will make his fortune. Hence the search of the alchemists for the "Philosopher's stone." Many transmutations were already known, such as the change of ores into metals by the addition of fire. From alchemy followed a long chain of experiments which resulted eventually in what we may call the standard conception of matter, viz. that each substance consists of ultimate particles all alike, called "molecules": and that "molecules" are composed of "atoms," and that transmutations from one substance to another results from the breaking up of molecules and the formation of new combinations of atoms: and that the molecules of some substances consist of diverse and some of

similar atoms. Those whose molecules consist of similar atoms were called "elements," and those with molecules of diverse atoms "compounds." For example, the gas oxygen is said to consist of molecules each of two oxygen atoms and the gas hydrogen similarly of molecules each of two hydrogen atoms. If we represent an atom of oxygen by O, and an atom of hydrogen by H then  $O_2$  and  $H_2$  stand for the molecules of oxygen and hydrogen respectively. Water consists of molecules, each of which contains two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen, and is represented by the symbol  $H_2O$ . Now if we mix oxygen and hydrogen together in the proportion of one to two and apply a spark, the two are transmuted into one substance, water. We imagine the atoms of the oxygen and hydrogen molecules to fall asunder and to form new combinations, two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen uniting to form a molecule of water. Chemists represent the change thus in a formula.



In arriving at this stage, something further was learnt, which was that "Fire" is not a kind of matter, but a motion of molecules and atoms sufficient to cause them to give out light and heat, and that, according to the violence of this motion, the same substance is either solid, liquid or gaseous. Thus water when its molecules are but little agitated by heat, or, as we might say, when there is little "fire" in it, is ice, that is a solid or "earth": when it is heated sufficiently, or when more fire is put into it,

it becomes liquid or a "water": and when further heated it boils and becomes gas or an "air." We thus establish a unity or real relationship between "earth," "air," "fire" and "water." Every substance may conceivably be in a state of "earth," of "water," or of "air," according to the amount of molecular motion or fieriness of it.

But the faith in unity was checked by the apparently ultimate and unbreakable character of the elemental atoms. Oxygen was not transmutable into hydrogen or lead into gold, and the idea of a philosopher's stone, based on a faith in unity, seemed a childish dream. Then the atoms of the elements were "weighed," and when the weights were tabulated they were found to form a series, and such a series that the elements whose atomic weights were multiples of each other or which were, so to say, an "octave" apart in the series, were found to have similar properties. There were gaps in the series, but it was prophesied that elements would be found to fill them, and that they would have certain properties, and such prophecies have been fulfilled. Now it is evident that if the elements form such a scale then faith in unity begins to revive; it is felt that there must be some real unity underlying so orderly a series of substances, and the discovery of Radium, and that it is a true "element" and that it changes or transmutes itself into other elements such as helium and lead, has given the expectation that lead may yet be transmuted into gold, and that then the faith in unity of the old alchemists will be fully justified.



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Knowledge, therefore, is increased and systematized by the observation of matter in motion, aided, in some degree, by self-knowledge, and stimulated by holding tenaciously to a belief in the real relationship and underlying unity of the objects of study as a fundamental article of faith.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION OF VISIBLE PHENOMENA

**THE** Root Doctrines of all Physical Science are (1) The Indestructibility of Matter, and (2) the Conservation of Energy—A Simple Experiment—The "Occasion" of the release of Energy—Life a Mode of Motion in which the identity of the living object is preserved—The Subject Matter of the Special Science of Biology—which is divided into Morphology and Physiology and into Zoology and Botany—With further Subdivisions—Evolution—The Cell the unit of life—Its essential Structure—The processes of life in a single Cell—Origin of the Cell from previous Cells—By Division—By Conjunction—Individual Animals consisting of one cell only—Of many and diverse cells—The *Hydra* an example—The problem of the origin of life unsolved—The doctrine of Evolution, that all forms of life are descended from a common ancestor—As a result of the laws of heredity and variation—Lamarck's theory—Darwin's theory—Mendel's studies in heredity and variation—"Discontinuous Variation"—The supposed descent of the Elephant and Man from a common stock—The facts of Geographical distribution are in accord with the theory—Weismann's denial of the inheritance of acquired characters—The chromosome number in different species—Conclusion.

It is now time to give an account of the doctrine of Science in the matter which really concerns us, that is to say, its teaching as to the nature of life, and of the relations of living things. I have very briefly alluded to the principles of what we know about the nature of matter and energy, the nature and property of the material out of which objects, both living and non-living, are made: this is the sphere of Chemistry and Physics. From the properties of matter and energy discovered in this  
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department of science two "laws" have been observed which it is important to keep in mind all through this chapter. They are the laws of :—

- (1) The indestructibility of matter.
- (2) The conservation of energy.

We saw in the last chapter that when oxygen combined with hydrogen, two " molecules " of hydrogen and one of oxygen broke up and the atoms regrouped themselves so as to form two molecules of water. The whole process was essentially one of rearrangement, nothing being gained and nothing lost ; there being the same number and weight of atoms after as before. And this is true of all changes of matter in the universe, they are in all cases rearrangements of pre-existing matter, the quantity of which in the universe is constant ; nothing adds to it and nothing subtracts from it.

If, for example, we burn a candle, the matter of the candle is not destroyed, it combines with the oxygen of the air to become a gas called Carbonic Acid, which mixes with the rest of the air. If we weigh a candle in a closed vessel full of oxygen (it must be a large vessel) and then burn the candle the candle will disappear ; but when we weigh the vessel with its contents it is found to be of the same weight as before. The air in the vessel has increased in weight to the same extent as the candle has diminished. The quantity of matter is not affected by the burning of the candle.

The idea that there is a fixed quantity of "energy"

in the world is not so easy to grasp. Energy is the cause of motion. The motion may be the gross mechanical motion of any object as a whole, or the motion of its molecules, which gives it a temperature, or the undulations of the "ether" which we call rays of light or electricity, or the expansive force of compressed gases such as steam : and one kind of motion can be converted into another. Again, energy may be stored up as "latent energy" when it is not actually causing motion but is ready to do so. Immense expansive force is for example locked up in gunpowder waiting till the spark explodes it : much heat again is locked up in wood and coal which will be given off when they are set on fire : and much force is locked up in a heavy weight lifted to a height which will become actual force when the weight can fall.

With regard to the word "when" in the last sentence, the latent energy stored up in gunpowder will become actual and will propel the shot from a gun *when* I pull the trigger. This pulling of the trigger is not the matter which moves, that is the shot, neither is it the force which propels it, that comes from the powder, but it is the "occasion" of the release of the stored force, and that occasion is *I* ; the pull of my finger, the leverage of the trigger, the blow of the striker in the cap, and the ignition spark which the cap discharges are but connecting links ; I myself am the true occasion. This idea of the "occasion" will be of importance to us later on.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* chapter xiii, page 197, and Fig. 8.

We can now proceed to the teaching of science concerning the phenomena of living objects, commonly called "Biology."

Living objects consist of matter whose mode of motion is such that they maintain their individual identity in spite of the changes involved in that motion. It need hardly be said that by motion we here mean the molecular or chemical motion of the living substance, as well as the grosser visible movements such as the action of the limbs. This individual identity is preserved through the various phases of growth from the initial germ through maturity, to senile decay terminating in death; life is the special mode of motion by which this individual identity is maintained. At some phase of life, usually during maturity, the individual gives off germs or seeds, which are new individual identities that will repeat the forms and phases of their parents.

When we consider the enormously diverse forms of life which are known even to people with a quite limited experience, we can see what an enormous and diversified science Biology is. The field is far too great for any man to have a detailed knowledge of more than one or two departments of it. We may study the form of living things, or the share which their various parts take in the processes of life. The former study is called Morphology or anatomy and the latter Physiology. It belongs for example to morphology to know the shape and position of the liver, and for physiology to tell its function or the part it plays in the economy of the body. It is impossible however for anyone to

undertake the whole of morphology or the whole of physiology, for it would come within the scope of the former to describe such diverse things as the number and form of the bones in a frog's skull and of the petals in an orchid, and of the latter to elucidate the mechanism of the circulation of the blood and of the function of green colouring matter in the leaves of trees ! So the study of living things is divided into the separate study of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, that is into Zoology and Botany, each with its own morphology and physiology.

The study of biology requires however further subdivision. One man may give his attention to seaweeds, another to flowering plants, another to marine animalculae, another to insects, and another to vertebrates. Those who study vertebrates must moreover give their special attention either to some one class, or to some special department. Of these departments I will name four which are of primary importance. (1) Osteology, which studies skeletons, and to this department belongs Palaeontology,<sup>1</sup> which studies the forms of animals of bygone geologic ages of which only the bones remain. The palaeontologist is dependent on the geologist proper to tell him the age of the formations on which his finds occur. (2) Embryology, which studies the morphology of embryos, and the phases passed through in the passage from the simple germ to the fully formed individual.

These two sciences are of vital importance to

<sup>1</sup> i.e. Vertebrate Palaeontology, for the study of fossils, shells, plants, etc., also belongs to this science.

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an understanding of the relationships of different forms of life. So also is (3) Heredity or the fact that each generation is like its parents, though individuals vary within certain limits and transmit their peculiarities to some extent to their descendants. (4) Histology. This is the study, with the aid of the microscope, of the structure of tissues and organs. It is very closely related to physiology, because an understanding of the functions of organs depends, partly at least, on a knowledge of their structure. It is to histologists that we owe our knowledge that the unit of living matter is the cell. It is the province of physiology with the aid of histology to discover, if it can, the essential nature of life as a special mode of motion, and its relation to the motions of non-living matter on the one hand and to "mind" on the other. It has therefore to be in diplomatic touch, so to speak, with Chemistry, or the study of matter as matter, on the one hand, and with Psychology, or the study of mind, on the other.

So far I have said nothing about evolution or, as it is popularly called, "Darwinism." I have spoken only of facts, for facts must be known before inferences are drawn from them. Darwinism is an inference from comparative morphology, supported by certain "laws" of heredity and physiology. The law of heredity has already been stated: it is that every individual is like its parents, but with some variation, the offspring being a replica of the parent, correct, if we may so say, to at least one or two places of decimals.

The law of physiology is that living objects spring only from antecedent living objects. There is no positive evidence for this "law," but only the negative one; we have no right to say that living objects *cannot* arise from dead matter, but only that after much careful investigation it is found that they do not do so. Corruption does not, as was once supposed, breed worms: worms breed worms by laying their eggs in the corruption on which worms feed. "Abiogenesis," as the arising of life from dead matter is called, does not happen.

There is yet one more thing to be known and realized before the doctrine of evolution can be understood, and that something is the Cell. The matter of which every living object is composed is found to consist of particles called "cells" which are large enough to be seen under the microscope, or of fibres which are known to be derived from cells. The cell is a minute fragment of matter; about 25,000 average-sized cells laid in a row would measure about an inch, and a cubic inch of "flesh" composed of such cells, would comprise one hundred and fifty-six thousand million cells! But though it is so minute, the cell is nevertheless a body of complex construction (Fig. 1).<sup>1</sup> It will suffice for our purpose to say that it consists of what is called protoplasm: that this protoplasm seems to consist of jelly-like matter held together in a meshwork: that within this protoplasm is a nucleus, which

<sup>1</sup> All the illustrations come together at the end of Part 1.

consists of a network of what is called "chromatin"<sup>1</sup> embedded in the protoplasm, and encased in an envelope ; that within it also is a small dot called the attraction sphere or centrosome. These are the essentials of the cell, besides which it also sometimes contains bubble-like cavities called vacuoles and scraps of foreign matter. Vegetable cells have an enveloping membrane, made of cellulose ; it is the matter which, when derived from dead dry plants and trees, is known as wood and as the fibres of which linen and other threads are made ; but an envelope is no necessary part of a cell.

Next as to the processes of life as carried on in such a cell. The life of the cell is the mode of motion of the molecules of the cell. This motion involves a continual breaking down of its substance, matter is continually falling out of the living mode of molecular motion, and reverting to the modes of inanimate matter. This waste matter the cell casts out, and if it did not replace it, it would decrease till it vanished. But it does replace it, by taking into it other inanimate substances, and modifying their modes of motion until they are its own—the living—mode of motion, so that the new matter is built up into and becomes an integral part of its own proper substance. This breaking down and building up of substance (in spite of which the cell maintains its individual identity) constitute the vegetative processes of life. Besides this a cell may respond to the *stimuli* (or "pressures" as Hobbes calls them) of

<sup>1</sup> Because it is deeply stained by the pigments used in preparing specimens for the microscope.

external matter or of light or heat by gross visible movement or change of shape. These we can call the sensitive processes. Those cells which have these sensitive properties use them to find and embrace the particles of matter by which their wastage can be made good.

Further, the origin of every cell is previous cells, either two cells arising from one by division or one cell arising from two by conjunction. The division of a cell is most interesting (Fig. 2), and one factor of it is of importance. To give the briefest outline. The attraction sphere first divides into two spheres which place themselves at opposite poles of the cell. The cell matter takes the form of rays converging on the two spheres; the rays between the two form a spindle. The nucleus is at the equator of the spindle; it loses its envelope and the substance called chromatin takes the form of V shaped rods, called chromosomes. These are always of a fixed and even number. Each chromosome splits longitudinally into two, and the separated halves slide down the threads of the spindle in opposite directions, so that the halves of each chromosome go to make up a new nuclear network beside each attraction sphere. The cell substance then divides. Two cells which are going to unite are the result of a curious kind of cell division in which half the number of chromosomes have been got rid of. These cells are called "gametes" or marrying cells. If the number of chromosomes in the dividing cells from which a gamete is derived be four, the gamete will have but two.

Two gametes by uniting, will contribute two chromosomes each to the "zygote," the cell which is the offspring of their union, which will thus regain the original number of chromosomes, and all the cells which come from its division and subdivision through perhaps many thousand generations, will retain this number till gametes are again formed.

Two uniting gametes are not usually alike. The female is large and charged with much nourishment, but has no attraction sphere; while the male has only its moiety of chromosomes and an attraction sphere, the cell substance being reduced to a minimum. The male and female gametes in plants are found in the pollen grains and ovules or unfertilized seeds respectively, and in animals in spermatozoa and ova. Spermatozoa have temporary tails with which they swim (Fig. 3).

So much for the cell as a unit of life. We must now consider briefly the relation of the cell to the living individual. The living individual may consist of one cell or of many. If it consist of one cell the individual identity of the cell and of the animal are the same. *Vorticella* (Fig. 4) is a unicellular animal, whose parts are sufficiently described in the subjoined letterpress. When such a cell divides, the result is two separate and independent unicellular individuals. After many generations some of these animalcules are known to lose half their chromosomes and become "gametes," with perhaps the distinct forms of ovum and spermatozoon; two such gametes unite, and

from the union arises a new cell, the "zygote," which starts a new host of animalcules all alike and all independent but all arising from the divisions and subdivisions of the original zygote cell.

The *Hydra* (Fig. 5) is a very simple multicellular animal. It is simply a bag with a hole in it, having tentacles which are hollow, the cavity of the animal extending into them as the cavity of a glove does into its fingers. The wall of this bag consists, as the figure shows, of two layers of cells of different size and texture. Those of the outer layer are sensitive and can change their shape in such a way that the hydra can move as a whole. By these movements it can suck water into its central cavity through the hole, or can eject it. When this water contains scraps of nourishment it is the cells of the inner layer that take it up and digest it, building part of it up into their own cell substance and passing some on to the cells of the outer layer. The cells of the hydra are a co-operative system dividing the functions of life between them. They are also components of a single individual identity.

Most of the animals that we know are far more complicated than a hydra, both in their form or morphology and in their physiology or functions, but in principle they are the same. They are an assembly of cells dividing between them the functions of the life of the single individual identity of which they are the components. How does such a group of cells come to be so assembled together and to have one individual identity in common?

Let us keep to the *Hydra* as an example. At certain times the cells of the outer layer thicken into two pairs of lumps on the sides of the body. The cells in these lumps undergo the special form of division by which they become "gametes." Those in one pair of swellings becoming ova, and those in the other spermatozoa. The swellings burst, and ova and spermatozoa are turned loose into the water. A spermatozoon meets an ovum and they unite to form a "zygote" as already described. Each such zygote is as much an independent monocellular individual as is the *Vorticella*. But when the cell divides, the daughter cells remain together with one individual identity between them, and this union continues through further divisions (such as are shown in Figure 6,) until a *morula* or blackberry-like bunch of cells is formed. This morula becomes a hollow ball of one layer and then the cells begin to differentiate, those on one side taking the character of lining cells; these become depressed into a cup, just as a deflated indiarubber ball can be made into a cup of two layers; by growth round the edges, this cup becomes a bag with a small hole in it. It is then in all essentials a *hydra*, for growth alone will suffice for its elongation and the throwing out of tentacles. Now in this perfected *hydra* all the cells have arisen by division and differentiation from a single cell, during which division they have stayed together with one common individual identity; and so it is with the more complex animals. They were each of them once unicellular and have become what they are by cell division

and cell differentiation, much more complex but in principle the same as that of a *hydra*. Nay more, the early stages of all of the higher animals are the same as those of a hydra, all pass through the bag-with-a-hole-in-it or *gastrula* stage. It would be most interesting to follow them through their further stages, but it would be irrelevant and would hinder our purpose.

It is enough for us, and yet it is vital for us, to grasp, that every cell springs from an antecedent cell ; that every living individual is, in its beginning, unicellular : that the mode of motion which we call life has, so far, been seen only in cells : that matter which is inanimate, that is, whose mode of motion is other than that of life, takes on the living mode of motion only when it enters a cell and is there caught up into the living motion of the matter of that cell. Life is a mode of motion, but matter only takes on this mode by association with matter already moving in that mode. How did matter *first* take on this mode of motion ? That is a question which no one has yet succeeded in answering. It is a question, however, which I ask you to keep before your minds, as it must be realized by all who would have any understanding of the principles of biological doctrine and the difficulty of the questions which biological inquiry has yet to solve. It is a question to which we shall have to return, for, surprising though it may seem, the possibility of there being a God or life for man in a world to come seems to some to hang on the answer

which must be given to this, as yet, unanswered question!<sup>1</sup>

We must now state the doctrine of evolution, and give the reasons for believing it to be true, and the obstacles and difficulties which stand in the way of believing it.

The doctrine is that all living forms, both vegetable and animal, including man, are descended from one elementary unicellular form of life, indeed, ideally, from one single cell, or as Pooh-Bah said in *The Mikado*, from a "primordial atomic globule," which is the ancestor of the Cedar of Lebanon, of the hyssop on the wall and of Solomon who wrote about them; of the beasts that die of anthrax, of the microbes which are the cause of anthrax and also of M. Pasteur who discovered the microbes. As an idea, it imagines that complex and specialized forms have arisen from the simpler and more generalized forms, by process of the hereditary preservation of variations. There are several accounts of how these variations arose.

Lamarck suggested that the individual improved in those points of its structure which were necessary for its preservation, and that these improvements were handed on to subsequent generations. The giraffe, for instance, had to stretch its neck to browse on leaves, and so from generation to generation their necks became longer, the spotted giraffe once having had a short neck like the

<sup>1</sup> I must also ask my readers to remember that I am now engaged in giving an account of Orthodox Scientific doctrine, "without note or comment": discussion at this stage would be out of place.

*okapi*, which is a newly-discovered striped giraffe. The Lamarckian idea is admirably expressed in allegorical form in the "Just So Story" of Rudyard Kipling, in which Old Man Kangaroo, "who was once a different sort of animal, with four short legs," grew hind quarters of modern jumping power by his efforts to escape from Yellow Dog Dingo.

Darwin's idea of "the survival of the fittest" was based on the slight differences which occur accidentally in individuals. Some kangaroos would have longer legs than others. Those with shorter legs would be caught and eaten by yellow dog dingoes, and those with longer ones would escape and transmit their long leggedness to their offspring.

According to both Lamarck and Darwin, the progress from generation to generation is gradual.

Darwin also thought that among conscious sentient animals, like would be attracted to like and would mate and transmit a double portion, perhaps, of their likeness to their children; and that when animals are unlike beyond a certain degree they are not attracted to each other. A lion does not mate with a tiger except in captivity. This idea is called "Natural Selection."

The Augustinian Abbot Mendel discovered that where diverse individuals mated, some peculiarities would be "dominant" and tend to prevail in all offspring, while others would disappear, or be "recessive." Now it is a fact that sudden "freaks" arise with new features fully developed. Let us suppose, for example, a genuine long-

legged kangaroo to be born at once to a pair of "different sort of animals with four short legs." Supposing long-leggedness to have so occurred, we have only to suppose it to be a "dominant," and long-leggedness would appear in the majority of the progeny of this long-legged "freak," though he would only be able to mate with kangaroos of the old type with four short legs. This sudden appearance of "freaks" which give origin to new kinds or species is called "discontinuous variation."

This much appears true in any case, that, once variations have arisen, those only which are advantageous will survive. It is plain, too, that when a form is perfectly fitted for its mode of life, all variation will be for the worse and the law of survival of the fittest will be a hindrance to variation; and the harder such a form has to fight for life, the less chance such variations will have.

It is now seen that variations must have arisen, not when the struggle for existence was keen, but when life was easy, and that when hard times came and the struggle grew keen the good varieties would alone survive. It seems, to me, moreover, that all the above modes of variation might quite well coexist. It must be added that the gradual progressive changes imagined by Lamarck and Darwin could, as a rule, give rise to diverse types, only when the descendants of common ancestors found themselves under different conditions. Such are the accounts given of the manner in which diverse forms can have arisen from an elementary common ancestor.

I have yet to say how far known facts justify the belief. Fig. 7 gives a double series of skulls starting from a common type. The amount of modification in each skull, as compared with that next above it, is not very great. The skull at the head of the two series is that of a primitive generalized carnivorous mammal, yet series A ends in man and series B in the elephant. So that the initial skull AB is one that might have belonged to the common ancestor of men and the elephants. I only give the single example, because one example dealing with two marked and well-known types serves best to illustrate a principle. The special features which gradually disappear or become exaggerated, can be sufficiently seen in the figures themselves and the letterpress appended to them. All the skulls are those of forms which either exist or have existed in past ages.

Further if the initial skull AB is really that of an ancestor of the elephants, it must have existed in the age before those of the first terms of the respective series A and B; also A<sub>1</sub> and B<sub>1</sub> must have existed in the age before A<sub>2</sub> and B<sub>2</sub> and these last in the age before A<sub>3</sub> and B<sub>3</sub>. And this is actually the case, as is shown from the geological formations in which each of these types is first found. Thus such skulls as AB which is typical of such forms as *Hyae-nodon* and *Proviverra*, occurs in what geologists call the lower Eocene. In the upper Eocene are found Lemurs similar to A<sub>1</sub> and also B<sub>1</sub> *Meritherium* and B<sub>2</sub> *Palaeomastodon*. These are followed by apes with skulls similar to A<sub>2</sub>, in the next age called

Miocene, in which is also found *Mastodon* intermediate between *Palaeomastodon* and existing elephants which last first appear in the Pliocene age, at the end of which age the first traces of man begin to appear.

Yet again, we must imagine the common ancestor of any group of forms as existing in some certain place; therefore if those forms, which seem so to be, are actually descended from it they will only be found in regions to which they could have migrated from that place. There is not space to give any instances of this, but the facts of the geographical distribution of animals, a most interesting subject, are fully in accord with the theory of evolution.

There are two difficulties in the way of the Evolution theory. Lamarck's idea of progressive improvement assumes that something of the progress made by an individual is transmitted to its offspring; that the old man kangaroo, who has by actual flight from yellow dog dingo acquired increased jumping power, will transmit to his children a greater jumping capacity than he had at the outset of his career. It must be remembered, however, that the cells from which his offspring are derived are separated from those which are exercised in jumping long before he begins to jump, and Weismann has maintained that it is therefore impossible for the reproductive cells to be affected by changes in other parts of the body required later in life. This doctrine is called the denial of the inheritance of acquired characters, and is now so generally received as true that any one who doubts the truth is regarded as a heretic. Haeckel is a "heretic" in this respect.

The other difficulty is the chromosomes. It has already been explained that every individual is an assemblage of cells, that every cell contains a nucleus, and that all nuclei in any given species have the same number of chromosomes, and that the chromosome number of any individual is the same as that of its parents. Now let us take two animals, a rat and a mouse for example, which are almost exactly alike, except for size and colour, and the fact that they do not mate together. It is very easy to imagine them having a common ancestor, easier than to imagine it for a St. Bernard and a fox terrier; but if the divergence was gradual, how and when did they come to have different chromosome numbers? It would be impossible to imagine the change occurring gradually; there must have been a sudden change at some time, since which rats and mice must have remained distinct.

Yet biologists do firmly believe in evolution in spite of all difficulties. The positive evidence of likenesses of form, of geographical distribution, of geological succession, together with the uniformity of the laws of life in all cells and the connexion between chromosomes and Mendel's laws of variation<sup>1</sup> (a matter too complicated to discuss here) together with that faith in unity of which I have already spoken convince them that the difficulties will certainly be cleared away some day.

<sup>1</sup> Mendel observed these laws at work by crossing various varieties of garden peas; but others are finding the same laws at work not only among other plants but also in the case of animals. A personal friend of mine is investigating it in relation to pigeons.



## CHAPTER X

### ON THE APPEARANCE OF CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE DESCRIPTION AND THE EXPLANATION OF THE UNIVERSE

**DIFFICULT** to see where the Creed of Christendom can come into collision with the Doctrine of Science—Yet difficulties are felt—Four difficulties specified for subsequent discussion.

IF the reader will now cast his mind back over the last four chapters, he will have the Creed of Christendom, and the scientific account of visible objects, that is to say the observed motions of matter, set before him as if they were in parallel columns, and he can exercise himself by considering where these two bodies of doctrine come into conflict or collision with each other. The real effort seems to me to be to realize that the chapters dealing with the Creed of Christendom belong to the same book as those which give information on the teachings of Natural Science; they seemed to me when writing them to have as little to do with each other as Portia's great speech at the trial of Shylock has to do with the dry details of Statute Law.

The Christian Creed is an explanation to man of the universe and of man's place and prospects therein. When writing of it all thought about matter and motion and chromosomes and evolution entirely and naturally receded from my mind as things utterly irrelevant. When considering the hope of

everlasting life, the question whether the kangaroo was once a "different sort of animal with four short legs" is one of which I cannot be conscious. Were it on the other hand part of my duty to discover "the different sort of animal with four short legs" from fossil remains I should not consider that my prospects in the hereafter depended on the kind of animal that the ancestral kangaroo turned out to be ; as was said at the beginning of the book the explanation and the description of a thing cannot well be conflicting, and the Christian explanation of the universe and the scientific description of it being explanation and description respectively seem to conform to the general principles of all relationships of explanation to description. The idea of setting up the teachings of science as a bar to the acceptance of the Christian Creed and the hope of immortality which it offers, appears to me as absurd as it would be to barricade a road to block the progress of an airship.

It is true the less a fact that there may be passengers on the airship, who are perturbed by the baronets and spectators upon the earth who stand behind the barricades in confident expectation of the fall of the airship ! And so we must dismiss the fears and expectations which actually

are in their crudest form some of the objections which are said to be constituent parts of

the theory of evolution from monkeys : therefore

(2) The Flood did not happen in the manner described in detail in the Book of Genesis : therefore the Bible is not true and the explanation of the universe which it contains is discredited.

(3) Evolution is the doctrine of ascent from lower to higher forms : therefore the doctrine of original sin which teaches of a descent from an original righteousness must be false, or at least requires modification.

(4) The universe consists of matter in motion, and every motion is caused by antecedent motions and can be exactly predicted from them : therefore there is no such thing as free-will.

These four "difficulties" are by no means independent of each other. To begin with, the Evolution Theory is at some point concerned in all of them. Again the Darwinian hypothesis touches the credit of the Bible in so far as it gives—or rather *seems* to give—an account of the origin of mankind other than that recorded in Scripture, though it does not make so seemingly acute a difficulty as the denial of an universal deluge.

The doctrine of Original Sin, again, rests on Scriptural authority in those early chapters of Genesis whose historical value has been especially challenged by modern scientific knowledge and belief. In all of these matters, moreover, there crops up the question of human nature. Is man such that God should visit him, and should have made him a little lower than the angels, finally to promote him to a coronation of glory and worship ?<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Psalm viii.

Or is he but a whirligig of material molecules in which the motion of the whole man is but the sum of the motions of his component particles, the orbits of which are but part of a purely mechanical and predetermined motion ?

If, however, the same issues run through all the four objections to religious belief with its hope of immortality, it does not follow that all must be met in the same way, except for this, that for their study, though it may not be necessary to be a professional expert either in Theology or in Natural Science, it is necessary for the mind to make an effort of close thinking, and to begin with a careful inquiry as to the exact meaning of what is taught and held by the various parties concerned. A writer may help his readers over some of the difficulties, but he cannot save them the trouble involved in making a serious effort of thought. The matters involved are of such diverse character as the relation of Inspiration to historical truth and of Mind to Matter that it seems to me best to give each of the four questions a chapter to itself and to proceed at once with the question of truth of the Scriptures.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE TRUTH OF HOLY SCRIPTURE

SCRIPTURE Narrative apparently discredited by Science, *e.g.* in the matter of the Deluge—Conceivable modes of meeting the difficulty—Reasons why the Scripture narrative *cannot* be regarded as historical in all details—Brings us face to face with the problem of the relation of Scripture truth to historical accuracy—Books of Scripture "Canonized" by the Church—As Profitable for instruction in Righteousness—The Church *could* exist without canonized Scripture—But needs to preserve Authentic Testimony to the Facts of Christ's life—The Authority of a Witness depends on Integrity and Ability—The Ability must be natural—The narrative must not attain to a consistency which exceeds the possible limits of Accuracy—Written documents the manner of recording testimony—When they record the testimony of Eye-witnesses their standard of accuracy high—Inspiration in the teacher rather than the recorder—Jeremiah and Baruch—Christ and the Evangelists—Differences between the New and Old Testaments make the Standard of possible accuracy lower in the latter than in the former—Nevertheless the Biblical History of the Hebrews must be, broadly speaking, true—Their history must be remarkable or it could not have resulted in the modern Jew—Confusion of folk tales with historical personages—The didactic value of narrative, treated as allegory, asserted by St. Paul—"Criticism" a legitimate Process—The conclusions of Critics to be received with caution even when based on grounds of Scholarship—When based on general considerations their authority no greater than that of other men—Limitations of legitimate Criticism—Conclusion: the books of Scripture true with the kind of truth proper to the classes of literature to which they severally belong.

"THE Deluge as described in Genesis did not happen, therefore the Bible is not true."

If it be not "true" then the credit of Christ as a witness to the things that are not seen is compromised, for He acknowledged the Old Testament

books to be the Word of God. And if this be so, then a large body of testimony as to human immortality and as to the nature of our lives after what we call death is discredited.

There are three conceivable ways of meeting this difficulty. They are :—

(1) By disproving the assertion that the deluge did not happen as described in Genesis.

(2) By admitting that the deluge did not happen, but maintaining that other parts of the Bible may still be true.

(3) By maintaining that the "truth" of the Bible does not depend on the historical accuracy of every detail of every narrative statement contained in it.

As regards the first method of meeting the difficulty, it is as well to realize that it is not that the possibility of such an event is denied, but that evidence is adduced that such an event *did not* happen.

The next step is to face the fact that the weight of evidence against a general deluge is enormous, so great in my judgment that we must accept it. Let us consider the account.

There is in the account<sup>1</sup> nothing supernatural except the warning to Noah that he should make preparations for safety. Noah having made his preparations, the rain came and submerged the earth, so that all flesh which moved upon the earth, fowl and beast and creeping thing and man died. This means nothing less than the destruction of the whole terrestrial "*fauna*" which was replaced by

<sup>1</sup> Genesis vi, vii and viii.

the descendants of the birds and beasts and creeping things which went with Noah into the Ark. The sons of Noah are said to have re peopled the earth with their descendants, whose locations in Palestine, Syria and the Isles of the Gentiles are given with more or less precision, and definitely connected with the Empires of the Euphrates basin which belong to the historic era.

Now rain might (?) cause a rise of waters amounting to fifteen cubits. This at a liberal estimate could not be more than fifty feet. But it is questionable whether the clouds hold enough rain to cause such a rise in the general sea level, and it is certain that, if it did, only low-lying grounds would be covered, and that though the inhabitants of vast low-lying plains might not escape, yet men and beasts might be found to re people these plains who had survived on the uplands.

Yet again, supposing the whole earth to have been submerged. Then representative beasts from all parts of the world must have taken refuge in the Ark, if so, they would, after the flood, have been distributed promiscuously over the earth, unless they were all repatriated to their proper geographical regions. Even supposing this vast number of creatures could have been maintained for five months on one vessel, there would still be the lack of point in collecting and saving many of them, and the still greater lack of point in repatriating them in their proper habitats.

Further, the three sons of Noah cannot *at the same time* have been the progenitors of all the races of

mankind, black and yellow as well as white, and also the several founders of local tribes round about Palestine who are all of one race. Yet unless all these things be true, the narrative of the flood as described in Genesis is a narrative of that which did not happen *as there narrated*, and if it did not so happen, then either :

- (1) The Bible is not true, or :—
- (2) The untrustworthy narratives must be cut out of it, or :—
- (3) They may be scripturally true without being historical.

I have chosen the Noachian deluge as a test case because it seems to me a good example, and one which will force us to consider the relationship of historical to Scriptural truth. We cannot accept it as a narrative of historical fact, accurate in all its circumstances and details. Yet our reasons for rejecting it, as not historical, are not that it was a miracle and therefore *could not* have happened, but because it is represented as a natural phenomenon, and the evidence is that it *did not* happen. Yet again, the events narrated do not form a vital epoch in the relations of God to man, though the narrative is one of value none the less to the religious explanation of the world. But it is only a test case and the principle involved is one of general application. Let us consider broadly the relation of historical accuracy to inspiration.

The Bible is presented to us as the inspired word of God. It is so presented to us by the Catholic

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Church of Christ, by whose authority the books included in the Bible, which by the way is not a book but a library, are accepted as Scripture, and by whose authority other books are excluded and are therefore not regarded as possessing the quality of "inspiration." The books which receive this *imprimatur* of the Divine Society, which lays claim to be indwelt and guided into all truth by God the Holy Ghost, receive it as being works of men who were moved by the same Spirit to write things "profitable for correction or for reproof or for instruction in righteousness."<sup>1</sup> Other men in other ages have been moved by the Spirit to write, and their writings may have been profitable for correction or for reproof or for instruction in righteousness, but they are not recognized as Christian Classics, and so are not included in the "Divine Library."

Now it was possible for the Church to exist without Scriptures. It is true that she had from the beginning the literature of the prophets, by whom God spoke to mankind before the coming of His Son, and who looked forward to and foretold the coming of that same Son, as well as the historical records of God's ancient people ; but she might conceivably have done without them : and she did exist and establish her traditional organization and discipline, and teach Salvation through Christ Alone and administer His Sacraments, for quite a generation before the books which compose the New Testament began to be written, for thirty or forty years more

<sup>1</sup> ii Tim. iii, 10.

while the literature from which she selected them was being written, and for a yet longer period while she slowly and quietly made the selection from those writings which has become the New Testament ; so that the Church existed, and grew, and was glorified by martyrdoms, and survived false teachers for the best part of three centuries before a definite collection of books became to be finally, generally and exclusively regarded as Canonical Scriptures. Therefore the Church might conceivably have existed till now without such a distinction ever having been made, that is to say, without any of the books having been " canonized." Some have, I believe, held that the Church could have existed and maintained her place in the world even if the books of the New Testament had never been written, but that is not quite the same thing.

Our hope of Glory and our means of Grace are the outcome of " the redemption of the world by our Lord Jesus Christ," " Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven and was Incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary and was made man." Who also " was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate, who suffered and was buried. Who the third day rose again and ascended into Heaven." Our hope of Glory then rests on acts done visibly in this visible world by The Son in visible flesh and speaking to us with audible voice in these last days. It is this hope of Glory which the Church offers to mankind, and the Church must have reliable testimony to the fact that the acts of redemption

on which this hope rests, have happened, and to the sayings by which the Redeemer made known the conditions on which men might enter into the inheritance which He had purchased for them.

The first witnesses to the words and deeds of Christ were the Apostles. Their functions were various. By reason of their Office, they were stewards of the mysteries of God: they were commissioned to baptize, to consecrate the Eucharist, and to remit or retain sins, they also laid hands on or "Confirmed" those who had been baptized, and ordained others who should exercise the like ministry, and who should preach as they preached, so far as authority to preach was concerned. So far as preaching power was concerned, each depended on his personal gifts, the inward inspiration whereby a man is made able to bring home to his hearers his corrections and reproof and instruction in righteousness. In these matters the Apostles had no necessary advantage over their successors who had the same official powers and may have had even greater natural gifts. They differed in the circumstance of their lives however. The Apostles had seen the Lord and their successors had not. They could say "we saw and ate with Him after He was risen from the dead," this their successors could not say. Now what belongs both to the Apostles and to their successors called for supernatural endowment, for no man can remit sins without divine authority or preach effectually without inspiration. What was peculiar to the Apostles needed none. When a thing visibly happens in this invisible

world, and when audible words are said with bodily mouth, as the acts of Christ visibly happened and His words were audibly spoken, it is within the natural ability of any ordinary man who was present to say what he saw and heard. Indeed, did a man bear testimony to something that he had seen or heard on any grounds other than his natural ability to see and to hear, and to remember and to repeat what he had seen and heard, his testimony would be worthless. If the Apostles laid claim to bear testimony to events on grounds of some supernatural power of perception, their testimony would have done little or nothing to establish the events to which they testified.

There is yet another feature in the evidence of eye-witnesses which should never be lost sight of, and that is that the power of human memory and human speech to reproduce events witnessed are limited. A single mind can take in, as a rule, but one or two simultaneous events, though the actual happenings may be far more complicated. No human narrative can be completely and exhaustively accurate, and when two eye-witnesses give separate accounts of one complex series of events they will not only not tell the same things, but also not give their separate accounts in such wise that the two narratives are consistent in every detail. So true indeed is this principle of evidence that when two separate testimonies to an event fit each other too neatly, the witnesses are suspected of collusion, their testimony lacks those signs of the limitation of human ability which help to carry conviction to



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the hearers. We arrive then at the paradoxical, but none the less true, conclusion that evidence to be trustworthy must show some degree of inaccuracy! This really conforms to Bishop Pearson's rule that we assent to that which is credible, on the ground of the ability and integrity of the witness. A really honest and truthful witness will not conceal the limits of his ability.

We must next consider how the Church preserved the Apostolic testimony. The one function of the Apostles which could not be transmitted to their official successors was their eye-witness-ship. Other ways may conceivably be possible, but in a civilized and literary age, the most obvious method is to commit their testimony to writing. Certain men were moved to "set forth in order a declaration of those things which were most surely believed" among the first generation of Christians as they were delivered by those "who from the beginning were eye-witnesses."<sup>1</sup> Here, again, nothing is wanted but ordinarily good ability and integrity, no supernatural qualifications are required. Indeed, any pretence that supernatural or occult powers were used in preserving the narrative of the sayings and doings of Christ would defeat the very end for which the narrative was written down, for it would fail to convince the world at large that the story that it had to tell was true. Now if the Gospels and the Acts be written by eye-witnesses, or from information collected at first hand from eye-witnesses, the standard of possible accuracy must be high,

<sup>1</sup> S. Luke i, 1 and 2.

but even here it cannot be *absolute*. Little details of time and place may easily be confused, an episode may be placed in a wrong position, and a compiler may even conceivably have included an untrustworthy anecdote.<sup>1</sup>

It is not now my business to defend the historic truth of the Gospel Narrative, but to maintain that that historical truth is the outcome of the diligence and ability and integrity of the writers, including in ability access to authorities, and not to some supernatural inspiration, and that therefore the accuracy is not greater than natural means allow. It does not seem to me necessary that the writers of historical matter included in the Bible need be regarded as "inspired men" at all. It is Jeremiah who is inspired when he pronounces the doom of Jerusalem "with his mouth," not Baruch who writes his pronouncements "with ink in a book,"<sup>2</sup> and it is not the evangelist who says "Blest are the pure in heart," it is Christ who says it.<sup>3</sup>

It is time, however, that we should turn from the New Testament to the Old. In the Old Testament we find ourselves in a very different atmosphere. The New Testament is the record and the interpretation of the Life and Work of one Man, Jesus of Nazareth. It consists of books in which little scope exists for "inspiration." This may sound startling, but if we remember that it is Jeremiah the prophet and not Baruch the Scribe who is

<sup>1</sup> The historical accuracy of the Gospel narrative is further discussed in Part ii, Chapter ii.

<sup>2</sup> Jeremiah xxxvi, 18.      <sup>3</sup> S. Matth. v, 8.

inspired, we shall see that this is true. There is in the New Testament no one "inspired" to declare the things of God. It is impossible to speak of Christ as "inspired." He is not a prophet such as were the prophets who spoke the things of God, stammering mysteries they barely understood themselves in times past to the fathers: He is The Son, Who, from Himself and of His own inherent power and knowledge, explains and redeems His own universe. There is nothing then left for others to do but to record and interpret His life and work.

As recorders such men *need* no inspiration whatever. The supernatural lies in Christ and His work, the record of it in the natural ability and integrity of man: the entry of any supernatural or occult factor into the making of the record would destroy its evidential value as a record. There is space for inspiration in the interpretation of Christ such as is contained in the first fourteen verses of St. John's Gospel, but it is not the same thing as the direct "Thus saith the Lord" of the prophets who spake in times past, that is, in the Old Testament times before the final speech of God to us by His Son. There is, therefore, more scope for inspiration in the matter of the Old Testament than in that of the New.<sup>1</sup>

But there is another difference. The New Testament is not only the record of one unique Man, but

<sup>1</sup> Inspiration is superseded in these last days not only by the direct declarations of the Son of God, but also by the entry of the Holy Ghost into a new relationship with man on the day of Pentecost.

is also of one age and in one manner at least as compared with the Old Testament, in which the speech of many prophets at sundry times and in divers manners is spread over the age long history and embedded in the literature of a peculiar people. The Old Testament, including the deuterocanonical books, constitutes the bulk of the surviving literature of the Hebrew People from the beginning to the fulfilment of the Messianic hope. Here again it differs from the New Testament which is the vital nucleus, but still only the nucleus, of the Christian literature, much of which has, no doubt, yet to be written.

In spite of all these differences, however, the same principles apply. In so far as the Old Testament is a history of the Hebrew people, its value as a record consists in its being the outcome of human diligence and human integrity ; it must be as accurate as natural human ability can make it *and no more*, or its evidential value is destroyed. But, though the same principles apply, the conditions are different, the standard of naturally possible accuracy is much lower in the Old Testament than in the new. The writer of the Second Book of Samuel or the Scribes who collected the records of the Israelite Kingdoms into that book, had not the same opportunity of verifying their narratives, as had the author of the third gospel. To continue.

It must be remembered that no nation gathers to itself a literature until it becomes conscious of its own national existence. Till then its records are but carelessly preserved by verbal traditions, which are

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liable to get mixed up with world old tribal folk tales. Now I personally am convinced that ancient national traditions verbally preserved contain far more historical fact than is commonly supposed, and I believe that folk tales are often themselves the preservation of actual events of a perhaps almost unimaginable antiquity. I think, however, that where traditions are verbally preserved, their date very easily gets lost, and that tales get assigned to places where they did not occur, and to historic persons not concerned with them, as the cat story was attached to Sir Richard Whittington. But though a minute accuracy in detail is not possible in the archives of a nation whose origin goes back to the border period between historic and prehistoric times, it does seem that the history which such a nation gives of itself must, broadly speaking, be its actual history, unless there are very grave reasons to the contrary.

Now the Hebrew people were "peculiar." They had their specific differences from other peoples which were the matter of their peculiarity, but they had also their generic likeness to other peoples or they could not have been a people at all. Wherefore that they started from the retinue of a nomad patriarch residing among aliens in Canaan: that they sojourned in Egypt in the time of famine and so escaped assimilation with the Canaanites: that they were kept separate from the Egyptians because the latter had race prejudices against shepherds: that they were yet considerably affected by Egyptian culture: that they escaped from Egypt

in a great "trek" under the leadership of a remarkable man: that the memory of deliverance from Egypt was strong enough to prevent complete assimilation with their neighbours for many centuries: that they were finally cut off from other nations by the Babylonish captivity, so that for the future they could keep their race and their traditions distinct from that of all other peoples (though they lived among them and shared their citizenships), and fight for the independence of their holy city as a spiritual centre under the Maccabees, seems to me to be a reasonable account of the history of a people so peculiar as to have for its final and remarkable product the modern Jew.

It seems to me plainly ridiculous to be asked to reject this history because it is not sufficiently commonplace, which is the objection which lies at the root of much so-called criticism. It would be as sensible as to demand that the history of the Napoleonic wars should be rejected as incredible because they do not present Napoleon to us as a commonplace person! So remarkable a people as the Jews must have had anything but a commonplace history, and therefore the history which we have must stand until some other adequate cause for their existence, and one better attested than that which we have, can be produced.

The truth of the history as a whole is not spoiled nor is the "mighty hand and stretched out arm" of an over-ruling Providence got rid of by admitting that folk tales may have become attached to some of the characters. Take for example the

Story of Joseph in the House of Potiphar. There is not one word in the story which is supernatural or which perhaps even lifts it out of the commonplace in oriental society, but I have seen a folk tale very like it which was current in Egypt. It is therefore quite *possible* that the Israelites adopted the tale and attached it to Joseph just as the Cat Story was attached to Whittington. We can never *know* whether this is the case or not, but it cannot very much matter whether it be so or not. I choose this example because it is one in which no one can be biassed by any inherent difficulty in believing the tale.

Take again the Book of Job. His personal history has nothing whatever to do with the national history of the Hebrews. Also it is cast in the form of a poem, and it seems contrary to all literary or historic truth to suppose the speeches of Job and his three friends are verbatim reports of their actual words: nor can we imagine that the presentment of the Court of Heaven is other than symbolical, especially as the book is in the form of a play and could be acted almost as it stands. It does not seem to matter, therefore, by whom or when or where it was written, or whether the plot is derived from fact, from folk lore, or from fiction, so long as it is profitable for instruction in righteousness.

But what can be the use of such stories if they are not "true"? Let us take another story, that of Abraham's two sons, "the one by a bondmaid and the other by a free woman." That might be a folk tale and it might quite equally be history. I

personally think that it is more probably the latter, but whichever it be its allegorical meaning as expounded in the Epistle to the Galatians<sup>1</sup> is the same, and it is this which constitutes the value of the story: it is an interpretation of life, and so is the story of Joseph's vicissitudes, and that of the sufferings of Job. The Old Testament is not all history, but it is all literature, it is the Classics of a peculiar people: and it is as the literature of the people of God that it is the word of God. Every word, every story, every poem, every book is "true" *with the truth proper to the class of literature to which it belongs*, and its mystical meaning, its philosophy of the relationship of man to God and of God to man, its explanation of the universe, whether it be through the medium of hymn, or drama, or prophecy, or "wisdom," or folk tale, or myth, or history, is a sure guide in the conduct of life.

As for the question what is folk tale, what myth, and what history, it is for critics to determine—if they can. The work of criticism is a legitimate work and there is no sense in screaming "infidel" at those who undertake it. But let every one remember that though it may be lawful and not impious to criticise, it does not follow that the results of this or that critic are true: much which passes as criticism seems amazing, and some of it childish. Professional critics are to be listened to respectfully when they tell us that some anecdote is in different style from its context and therefore probably by a different hand (but even then the

<sup>1</sup> Galatians iv, 22, *ad fin.*

critics are not certainly right) because they have a knowledge of the grammar and construction of the language in which such works are written which other people have not got. To give an example of such criticism: I have in my possession the design for the cover of a child's picture-book<sup>1</sup> which was shown to a well-known artist. He expressed the opinion that it was the work of two separate artists; the dog in the child's go-cart seemed to him drawn by some one with considerable genius for go and motion but without technical training, and the fox in the right-hand bottom corner by some one else, for it was very correctly drawn but lacking in life and go. Now the criticism of the artist as showing the difference in the merit of the two figures was most instructive, but his inference that they were by different hands was wrong because, such as they are, I drew them both myself! The moral of this for textual critics is obvious.

But critics do not always base their criticisms on their special knowledge of languages and history, but sometimes on general considerations: they can then lay claim to no special authority. Supposing, for instance, they say that some writer A says nothing about some event narrated by B, they say something which is within the reach of every one's knowledge. When they say that, therefore, A knew nothing about that event, they are saying that which does not necessarily follow, and to build further inferences from it, as to say that, therefore,

<sup>1</sup> *The Sad End of Erica's Blackamoor.* Ed. Arnold.

the event did not occur, but was fabricated by B to serve his party ends, their reasoning is plainly fallacious to every man with the gift of reasoning.<sup>1</sup>

To cut short the matter of criticism. It is not the business of critics to say whether the subject matter is possible or impossible, because that does not belong to scholars or men learned in letters and history, but to students of nature and such like men of science. Neither are they special authorities as to the probability or improbability of a story from the standpoint of what live men and women are likely to do under given circumstances, for in that matter any observant and intelligent man of the world is as good a judge as they. It may be even said without unkindness or disrespect that, as a rule, he would probably be a better judge, for the work of scholars and critics involves a preoccupation which removes them from the moving accidents of the main current of life into quiet backwaters. It is

<sup>1</sup> Mr. J. M. Barrie pokes kindly but none the less forcible fun at this style of Criticism in *Peter Pan* when discussing the question of Peter's Goat.

"If you ask your mother whether she knew about Peter Pan when she was a little girl, she will say, 'Why, of course I did, child!' and if you ask her whether he rode on a goat, she will say, 'What a foolish question to ask; certainly he did.' Then if you ask your grandmother whether she knew about Peter Pan when she was a girl, she also says, 'Why, of course I did, child;' but if you ask her whether he rode on a goat in those days, she says she never heard of his having a goat. Perhaps she has forgotten, just as she sometimes forgets your name and calls you Mildred which is your mother's name. Still, she could hardly forget such an important thing as a goat. Therefore there was no goat. . . !"

perhaps because, though their learning and industry are great, their own lives are lived under quiet uneventful conditions that they seem willing to accept narratives only when so revised as to become quite commonplace. The true business of a critic is to tell us whether a work is from its grammar and style such that its author could have been a competent witness to that which he sets forth as fact, and that what he has to tell is not in flagrant discord with what other reliable authorities have to tell, and if he claim to be an eye-witness that his geographical allusions are not gross blunders. On the inherent credibility of the subject matter the critic is not, as such, an authority.

To sum up the thesis of this chapter. My contention is that the Bible is the Word of God as being the Classic literature of God's people. We may (I have not said this before) believe that every book and every paragraph, nay, even every sentence and every word comes to be where it is under the overruling providence of God, and that in that sense we may regard it as "verbally inspired" and as "every word true." In saying this, however, we do not necessarily mean that every word is *historically* true, but only that it is true with the truth proper to the class of literature to which it belongs, so that it is profitable for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness; that it is, as we say, "true to life," to the life of God and the life of Man and the relationship of the one to the other. In so far as it contains a record of God's actual dealings with men it must of course be historical, for records

belong to history and not to poetry, drama, or philosophy. But to be historical and of evidential value to the world, the preservation of the record must be natural, it must fall within the ordinary powers of honest human ability. The recorders as such are not inspired as the prophets or teachers are. Supernatural assistance would destroy the evidential or apologetic value of the record.

Wherefore, though the deluge did not happen exactly as recorded in Genesis, yet the Bible may be "true."

## CHAPTER XII

### THE EARLY CHAPTERS OF GENESIS

THE antediluvian section of Genesis not historical—Records of contemporary testimony could not have been preserved—If Myth, they are valuable, for Myth is essentially didactic—Opinion of Critics on the Composite Character of the early Chapters of Genesis—The Doctrine of Creation—The Story of Eden allegorical in form and terms—This no bar to its didactic authority—Its teaching as regards (1) Man's Nature, (2) His Environment, (3) His Fall, (4) The Hope of Restoration—We are told no facts in the narratives which we could not, on logical grounds, know to have happened—The didactic values of (1) Babel, (2) The Deluge, (3) The Translation of Enoch, (4) The Genealogies—Abstract truth must be administered to the Simple-minded in concrete stories—That such regard the stories as historical, a matter of little or no moment—Recapitulation—The Early Chapters of Genesis are explanatory—They give not merely a religious explanation of the Universe but *the* Christian Explanation.

IN the last chapter we considered broadly what we can mean by saying the Bible is "true," and we have seen that it is a library rather than a book, and that to be true each book which composes it must be true with that sort of truth which is proper to the class of literature to which it belongs. Historic books have the truth proper to history and poetic books the truth proper to poetry and so on. We started the chapter with a concrete difficulty relating to a narrative in the opening chapters of Genesis. The truth of the Bible does not stand or fall with the accuracy or otherwise of the dates and dimensions included in every narrative. That is one matter. Another is that these opening chapters

contain matter of vital importance as they deal with the origin of the universe and of man. The question for consideration is whether they continue to have any doctrinal importance if we do not consider them as historical.

As regards Old Testament narrative in general we cannot always regard it as written by men sufficiently near to the events narrated to make any such standard of accuracy possible as was attainable by the Evangelists. Supposing, for example, what is quite easily supposable, viz., that Moses collected and wrote out all the stories of the Hebrew Patriarchs, he was writing at a distance of some centuries from the events, so that as an authority for facts in the days of Abraham he is on a par with a modern chronicler of the reign of, say, Queen Elizabeth, whereas the Evangelists are on the same footing as men at the present day writing an account of the times of the Franco-Prussian, or, say, the Crimean War, who either took part in those events or know personally those who have done so. What then can we say of the Mosaic authority for the events narrated which are anterior to the call of Abraham?

My answer is that I do not think that we can regard the book of Genesis as an *historical* authority for the antediluvian era any more than we regard Tennyson's poems as an *historical* authority for the Arthurian legend. Much of that legend is probably true, as many of the Greek legends, such as those connected with Theseus are now being found to be historically true.

But of their date we know nothing or of their place, except that where events are preserved by verbal tradition their antiquity is, as a rule, under-estimated, and that they are often assigned to localities known to the generation that preserves them.<sup>1</sup>

But though Tennyson be no historic authority, he has given a poetic interpretation to the Arthurian legend which must be of value for all time if we are right in placing his works among the English classics, a fact which may help us to a sane understanding of the opening chapters of Genesis, although the two cases are not exactly analogous.

The opening chapters of Genesis are an account of the origin of the universe and of the human race. It is difficult to see how it can be an historical account, because it is difficult to see how human testimony to these events could have been preserved ! But if we suppose the stories to be folk tales or myths, how come they in the Word of God ? Folk tales are often the verbal preservation of actual events, prehistoric and inserted in a wrong context. Myths seem to me essentially didactic narratives, a form or artifice for conveying doctrine. To educated minds with a philosophic training it may be possible to present abstract philosophy in an abstract way, but for others it must be in parables, for only so can the doctrine be presented in terms of concrete thought.

<sup>1</sup> Localities of the adventures of Arthur and his Knights are shown in Wales and Cornwall. The Bretons who are also Kelts also show them in Brittany.

"Contradictions also occur. In one place, for instance, it is said that all animals were to be taken into the ark for preservation in pairs (vi, 19, 20 ; vii, 8) : in another Noah is commanded to choose the clean beasts and fowls by sevens and the rest of the beasts by twos. The rain is said in one place to have lasted forty days (vii, 12), but a few verses later on one hundred and fifty (vii, 24)."

This is legitimate "criticism" because the conclusions are based on the language and construction of the narrative, and not on the *a priori* probability or improbability of the subject matter of the narrative. It does not follow that the conclusion is certainly right because the criticism is legitimate, but only that it is a reasonable conclusion. It also certainly does not involve any assent to any particular theory as to who wrote the various contributions to the composite narrative, or as to when they were written. The only thing that is certain is that if the narrative is of composite origin the component parts have been brought together by somebody, and that somebody seems to me to have been an honest man, for he has given the various versions of the story as he found them, and not trimmed them up so as to make them consistent in their subordinate details.

Now if we are right in regarding the early chapters of Genesis as a composite document, and that composite document as the Word of God, we shall believe that the coming together of the component parts has taken place under the guiding hand of

Providence, in which case there must be some point in the contradictions to which Mr. Foakes-Jackson draws attention. The point seems to me to be to prevent us from regarding the details of the stories as historical, and God seems to me to have taken the same provident care by other means with regard to the chapters on the creation and fall. To proceed to the subject matter.

Genesis i, 1 to ii, 4 simply represents God as the cause of all things, bringing the totality of being into existence by the fiat of Himself the universal cause: it is this and this alone which is properly called creation, which means to cause existence or make out of nothing (*producere e nihilo in esse*). This production out of nothing occurs not in six days, but "in the beginning" (*in principio*), after which follows the distinction of being or the "substance" of things into different kinds and the appearance of specific objects, which differentiation St. Thomas Aquinas calls *distinctio et ornatus*, which, according to the interpretation of some of the saints, may be said to have been some change of the creature which is measurable in terms of time (*aliquam mutationem creaturæ, quæ tempore mensuratur*).<sup>1</sup> It is this *distinctio et ornatus* which constitute the events of the "six days." Whether the "six days" are to be taken literally is, according to St. Thomas, an open question; he shows that St. Augustine did not think that they should be taken literally, but as representing the natural order of the works

<sup>1</sup> *Summa Theologicæ Pars Prima. Q. lxxiv, A. i.*

which are assigned to their respective days (*ille ordo dierum referendus est ad naturalem ordinem operum quæ diebus attribuuntur*).

In the story of the Garden of Eden we are presented with a "tree of knowledge of good and evil." There is no such tree in any book on botany, nor do we give such names to actual plants or trees: where we do find similar names is in the *Pilgrim's Progress*. A "Doubting Castle" and a "Slough of Despond" are terms of the same *genre* as a "Tree of knowledge of good and evil." The latter therefore seems to be a term of allegory, and if one term in a story is allegorical the rest must be allegorical. The people are not real persons, but representative personifications. "Christian" is a representative personification of Christians in general, and so may not Adam and Eve as they appear in this story be representative personifications of primitive man? Indeed, can Adam and Eve be anything else? in the light of Gen. v. 1 and 2, which says:—

"This is the book of the generation of Adam. In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made He him: male and female created He them and called *their* name Adam, in the day when *they* were created."

This allegorical quality belongs especially to the section of narrative which extends from Genesis ii, 4 to the end of Chapter iii.

Being allegorical, its essential object is to teach principles. I have seen it maintained in a

discussion on the doctrine of original sin<sup>1</sup> that the story of the fall cannot be used in support of any specific teaching on the subject, as criticism now shows that the story is not historical. I do not think that we can protest too strongly against such a line of reasoning. If no teaching is to be derived from it because it is not historical, then no doctrine is to be learned from our Lord's parables : also if it be not historical and have nothing to teach, what business has it in the Bible ? The presence of historical matter in the Word of God is sufficiently justified by the preservation of the facts which it places on record, but matter which has nothing to do with the recording of facts would be utterly pointless had it nothing to teach. The value of an historical record lies in the facts, the value of a story in its "moral."

Now the doctrine of the opening chapters of Genesis is as follows. God is the first cause of all things. Substance is brought into being out of nothing, and things out of substance. Man out of that which is not man. Man is, moreover, made in the image of God. Thus much we learn from parts of Genesis not included between Genesis ii, 4 and the end of Chapter iii. From that part we learn something more of human nature. Man is from the dust of the ground, and so is every beast of the field and every fowl of the air : they have one common material origin by whatever mode they proceeded therefrom. But man is

<sup>1</sup> *The Origin and Propagation of Sin*, by the Rev. F. R. Tennant.

something more : in man there is the "breath of life" which makes him a "living soul," and it is presumably by the relationship of the breath of life to the dust of the earth in man that he is the image of God. In this there is nothing historical. We know, on logical not on historical grounds, that man is in bodily structure an animal and is chemically composed of the "dust of the ground : " also, as says Professor Ray Lankester, that man's mental qualities mark a new departure in the world's history. All that we are told here is that both these known factors are from God. The essence of the tale of Eve's origin is that woman is *not* an inferior animal, but is as human as is man ; both sexes share one common humanity.

Next as to environment. We know without being told that man had an environment from the first, and that his physical environment was what it is now, that is, earth and sea and sky and beasts and rivers and trees. We also know that he must at some time have begun to feel the sense of duty and to say "I ought" and "I ought not," for that sense of duty is a fact and must have begun somehow, so that there was that in his environment which could be represented in terms of allegory as "forbidden fruit." We are told that, till man did what he should not, he enjoyed communion with God "whose voice walked in the garden in the cool of the day," and that there was "the tree of life also in the midst of the garden ;" he saw God in nature or felt the unseen power behind the moving pageant of visible things. We are told that

influences external to himself, influences tending to rebellion against God (which must therefore be personal as things cannot rebel) moved man to disobey, and that when he had disobeyed he still felt the Presence and became afraid of it. The choice of evil is presented to us as a free-will choice.

We are told that as a result of disobedience man's environment was changed. But the change is on the spiritual side, an angelic or spiritual barrier is set between man and the "Tree of Life"; life also becomes a sore travail for man, male and female, full of vanity and vexation of spirit, as has been observed in Ecclesiastes. Further, to the powers of evil is promised a full retribution for the harm which they have done to mankind, while to the latter hope is given that from among men shall rise up a deliverer and avenger of the ills of a fallen race: "The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head." So much for "cosmogony" or the origin of the universe in general and man in particular.

There remain the genealogy of the patriarchs from Adam to Noah and from Noah to Abraham, the godliness and translation of Enoch, and the story of the Deluge and of the building of Babel and the Confusion of Tongues. These are in the form of folk lore rather than of allegory, but they have their allegorical value as have "the two sons of Abraham, the one by a bond-maid and the other by a free woman."

In all folk tales there is fact preserved, and as fact is preserved by illiterate people in verbal forms

with extraordinary fixity, folk tales may be of an enormous age.<sup>1</sup> Now very many nations retain traditions of a flood, and the only way of accounting for this fact seems to be that there once was a flood in which a family and its domestic animals saved themselves in some vessel in which many of the wild things took refuge. It is not, however, the fact that perhaps it enshrines history that makes the flood story biblically valuable, but its allegorical force, or, as we say of children's stories, its moral, and there seems to be the same moral to it as to the stories of Enoch and of Babel, and that moral we may call the survival of the fittest, or perhaps the elimination of the unfit.

Take Babel first: it is the attempt of man to regain heaven by his own power, that is to "survive," and it is a failure, and to the reader the attempt is presented as a self-evident impossibility and a predestined failure.

In the matter of the Deluge the deliverance is the work of one man, under divine guidance at every point, so that the salvation is of God, and it prefigures the Sacrament of Baptism wherein we are made members of Christ, children of God, and inheritors of the kingdom of heaven.<sup>2</sup> The survival of the fit is, moreover, no mere scramble

<sup>1</sup> They *need* not be of great age. "Little Jack Horner" is a folk tale in the form of rhyme. It enshrines facts. The facts happened not in the dim past of Arthurian legend but when the Monasteries were dissolved in the reign of Henry VIII.

<sup>2</sup> I Peter iii, 21.

for the means of bodily subsistence. Noah "walked with God," and therefore he found grace in God's sight, and God stooped down to him and lifted him up out of the destruction which comes on those "the imagination of whose hearts is only to do evil continually."<sup>1</sup> Enoch also "walked with God" and "God took him." The moral here is the same, but it is made plainer that deliverance from death is not an affair altogether of this life, but that it is the eternal life which God has prepared for those that love Him.

Of the genealogy of Abraham it seems sufficient that it asserts the common descent of the chosen people with that of the rest of mankind, and therefore the blood relationship of Christ Jesus the son of David, the son of Abraham, to the whole human race.

The portion of Genesis which we have been considering, if our way of regarding it be the right way, gives an explanation of the universe, and seems to me to confine itself most strictly to the business of explanation. The form of the explanation is, moreover, such that it can be taken in by the illiterate and simple-minded. They may take the concrete stories in which the explanation is embedded, the stage setting, so to speak, for historic fact, but what if they do? What matters is that they should grasp the explanation of the universe. Their estimate of the accidental accessories of the matter is of very secondary importance. I can remember, when I was a small child, and "dust"

<sup>1</sup> Genesis vi, 5.

meant to me what it means in the technical language of housemaids, thinking of God as collecting the "dust" off bookshelves and heaping it in a form with head and body and limbs. The idea presented "difficulties" to my childish mind: any matter would have done for God to breathe the breath of life into, but a more sticky material would have been easier to work in the preliminary stages. But though I pictured the matter to myself in this childish way, the explanation of man's origin was to me then what it is to me now, viz., that man's body is of the earth earthy, that into this body is breathed the breath of life, so that man is from God and for God, and that, if the imagination of his heart turns away from evil and he desires to walk with God, God will reach down to him and "take" him. I don't think that the childish idea about the "dust" was of much consequence.

I said at the beginning of this chapter that we could not regard the early chapters of Genesis as historical authority for the narrative any more than we can make Tennyson an historical authority for the truth of the Arthurian legend, for the matters dealt with in those chapters are essentially prehistoric: but that the essential facts that the world had a beginning, and that man also had a beginning and must therefore have wrongly exercised the power of choice on some prehistoric occasion for the first time are known to us from logical necessity, not from historical testimony: and that the stories are allegorical and mythical devices for conveying to us the explanation of the facts.

The tales seem to have been gathered from various sources, and to have been current narrative among other Semitic people than the Hebrews, but those Hebrews, one or more, who were concerned in bringing them together in their present form, whether Moses, or Ezra, or the supposed writers unknown by name whom critics designate by letters such as " J " " E " " D " and " P,"<sup>1</sup> in bringing them together touched them with the spirit of prophecy as Tennyson touched the Arthurian legend with that of poetry. The tales may be the folk tales of the Semites, but the interpretation, the explanation which they convey is the Word of God who in times past spake unto the fathers by the prophets, even though at the sundry times and in the divers manners of " J," " E " and " P." The " manner " is the manner of folk tale and myth because God's audience were but grown-up children, and moreover Oriental children, who love tales. The child may know that there is powder in the spoon and that it is the powder that matters, but the attention and interest are caught by the jam. And as we also must become as little children ere we would enter the kingdom of God, we also must love these tales which as a matter of fact are among the most immortally popular tales in the world.

But to return to our purpose. The business of

<sup>1</sup> " J " is the Jehovist, who is held responsible for the Passages in which God is spoken of as Jehovah (the Lord, A.V.). " E " the Elohist who calls Him Elohim (God Almighty). " JE " he who combines the two titles. " D " is the deuteronomist, and " P " the compiler of the priestly code.

science is description of the phenomena of the universe. The doctrinal basis of religion is an explanation of the universe as a whole and of the place of man therein. Man is immortal and master of his fate for, if he walk with God, God will take him. The early chapters of Genesis give such an explanation, and that the Christian explanation, and that is their only concern. The shapes and connexions of the visible things, the furniture so to speak, of this temporal world is what we see it to be, when we take the trouble to look.

## CHAPTER XIII

### CONCERNING THE RELATION OF MIND TO MATTER

SCIENCE has nothing to say against Theism as such—Darwin's Letter to Mr. Romanes—Difficulties may still remain in regard to Human Nature—The denial of Human Free-will destroys Religion—Free-will is denied by those who hold the purely mechanical theory of life—Hobbes' analysis of the voluntary motions—Analysis of the act of shooting at a mark—The *crux* lies in the turning point between Sensation and Action—The Popular conception of the matter—The impossibility of really grasping the relationship of mind to matter—Hobbes really asserts the voluntary nature of certain motions—And reveals the fact that his analysis is the result of introspection—Free-will known from introspection as certainly as material objects by observation—The practical difficulty in which those who deny Free-will are bound to involve themselves—Monism and Dualism—Though we only *know* mind in conjunction with matter it may none the less exist otherwise—Science no hindrance and no help to belief in the personal survival of bodily death.

WE have in the last chapters discussed difficulties about the truth of Holy Scripture. They are difficulties which arise from an assumption that the historical kind of truth is the only kind of truth.

The falsity of this proposition is exposed when we have realized the falsity of the assumption that historical truth is the only kind of truth which can entitle a book or document to stand part of the word of God.

I have taken this difficulty first because historical and critical questions are rather of the nature of a side issue, and it is convenient to get them out of the way. We are thus left free to consider the points

at which the teachings of modern science seem to come into collision with the explanation itself which Christendom gives of the universe.

The dispute really revolves not round the existence of God but round the nature of man. Against Theism pure and simple, that is against the proposition that there is a Supreme Being, science can say nothing. Science can find no escape from the difficulty of the Unknowable as presented to us by the late Mr. Herbert Spencer. No new discovery in the fields of natural science, which can be only an extension of our knowledge of the modes of motion, can ever discover whether matter is self-existent or has been brought into existence by an Intelligent First Cause. The belief (*i.e.* Theism) would be still tenable, were the whole body of Christian doctrine with its scriptures and traditions finally and indisputably discredited to-morrow; this belief is in fact held by those who do reject the Christian doctrine. In this connexion the following letter from Darwin to Mr. George Romanes is not without interest :—<sup>1</sup>

“ MY DEAR ROMANES—

\* \* \* \* \*

“ I have read your anonymous book<sup>2</sup> (some parts twice over) with very great interest; it seems admirably, and here and there very eloquently, written, but from not understanding metaphysical terms I could not always follow you.

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<sup>1</sup> From *The Life and Letters of George John Romanes*.

<sup>2</sup> *A Candid Examination of Theism*, by “Physicus.”

“ With regard to your great leading idea, I should like sometimes to hear from you verbally (for to answer would be too long for letters) what you would say if a theologian addressed you as follows :—

“ ‘ I grant you the attraction of gravity, persistence of force (or conservation of energy) and one kind of matter, though the latter is an immense admission : but I maintain that God must have given such attributes to this force, independently of its persistence, that under certain conditions it develops or changes into light, heat, electricity, galvanism, perhaps even life.

“ ‘ You cannot prove that force (which physicists define as that which causes motion) would inevitably thus change its character under the above conditions. Again I maintain that matter, though it may in the future be eternal, was created by God with the most marvellous affinities, leading to complex definite compounds, and with polarities leading to beautiful crystals, etc., etc. You cannot prove that matter would necessarily possess these attributes. Therefore you have no right to say that you have “ demonstrated ” that all natural laws necessarily follow from gravity, the persistence of force and the existence of matter. If you say that nebulous matter existed aboriginally and from eternity with all its present complex powers in a potential state you seem to me to beg the whole question.’

“ Please observe that it is not I, but a theologian

who has thus addressed you. But I could not answer him.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Yours very sincerely,

"CHARLES DARWIN."

The essence of the question could not be more clearly and simply put. Nothing could show more plainly not only that our present knowledge of the nature and relations of visible things does not justify us in saying that a God cannot have been the ultimate cause of their existence, but also that no knowledge which ever can be gained as to the structure, motions and relationships of visible things can ever show how "matter," that is the ultimate something or "substance" of which all visible things are made, came to be an existence.

Natural Science has then nothing to say against the existence of a God or of other spiritual beings such as angels and devils, it can only say that they are outside its field of vision. But man does come within the sphere of our vision, and it is in regard to the nature of man that difficulties still remain. For though it is inconceivable that natural science, or knowledge of things visible, can disprove the existence of God, it is still conceivable that it might discredit the religious explanation of the universe, because that explanation is a great deal more, as we have seen, than mere Theism or the assertion that the universe is the creature of an Intelligent First Cause. It is an explanation in which man is concerned not only with God as the

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Cause of the universe but also with himself as having his proper place in the universe and therefore a relationship with God, and a religious explanation is one which declares man's relationship to God to be one of a certain loyal devotion and service. This cannot be too often asserted nor can it be made too clear that religion is no mere assent to a body of doctrines, a Westminster Confession, a collection of Articles, thirty - nine or otherwise, Tridentine Decrees or even the Creed of Constantinople, but *conduct* based on a doctrine. Now it is of the essence of duty that it is voluntarily performed, a machine has no duties. If therefore it can be proved that man is a machine and not a free agent, he can have no duties. In which case there may be a God who made the universe, He may be surrounded by living creatures, cherubim and seraphim, angels and archangels, principalities and powers, who being subject to him are in eternal beatitude or who as rebels are doomed to impotent malignity, or there may not. But, whether such be the case or no, man, if he be not a free agent, has no part or lot in the matter, the explanation of the universe is *to him* not religious.

There are those who maintain just this, that man is a machine, and that modern scientific knowledge affords proof of their contention. This is one of the most real of modern difficulties, which underlies a great deal of practical modern doubt. "Man is descended from monkeys, therefore there is no God" may be a self-evident fallacy, but it is still maintained that it is a fallacy only in the last link

of the chain of the reasonings which underlie it. Let us follow them out.

Man is descended from monkeys. Monkeys are animals. Animals are composed of cells. Cells are composed of matter in motion. The motions of matter in cells are transmitted to them from other motions. When the motion of one piece of matter impinges on another, if the conditions are exactly known then the result can be exactly foretold and must be inevitable whether known or not, for motion causes nothing but motion and matter is indestructible. Therefore the universe is in fact a purely mechanical system of motions, in which every evolution of every particle could, with sufficient knowledge, be exactly calculated for an unlimited period of future time, and therefore man, being a group of cells whose every action is predetermined, though he may know what he is doing just as he knows that the clock on the mantelshelf is going, is yet as merely a spectator of his own movements as he is of the going of the clock, and his seeming control over his actions is an illusion, he has no free-will.

If the materialistic hypothesis be true, man has no future, for the life of a man is only the mode of motion of the particles of his body, and when he dies, that is when this mode of motion ceases, he *ipso facto* ceases to be man.

It is important to realize that this theory, if true, destroys religion even though it does not militate against the existence of a God. It may be useful also to point out that the theory is not dependent

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on whether man is descended from monkeys. Man is so far as we see him a living body ; his body is composed of cells. In cells we see only matter in motion. If therefore man is nothing but matter in motion he is a machine all of whose movements are pre-determined quite apart from the question how man began to exist, and he would be as much of a machine if the first man had sprung ready made from a heap of dust as if he be a variation from apelike ancestors. The really crucial difficulty has no proper relation to the theory of evolution at all, it turns on another branch of science, namely physiology, which investigates the processes of life, the kinds of matter which enter into the composition of protoplasm, the living substance of which cells are made, and the chemical reactions and other motions of the particles of these kinds of matter.

In these matters we now know a great deal more about the functions of all parts of the body, and the processes that go on in its cells than was known in the days of Hobbes ; nevertheless the fundamental idea of the mechanical theory of life is expressed by him as exactly as a few simple sentences can express it. We have already quoted his analysis of sense as "the reproduction within us of some quality or accident of a body without us." The cause of this sense is "the external body or object which presseth on our organs diversely" by reason of its qualities which are "but so many several motions of matter by which it presseth on our organs diversely." We have already followed Hobbes thus far and agreed with the truth of what

he has said ; objects do impinge upon the senses only as matter in motion. Now further these impinging motions which are carried to the brain and " heart " by " strings and other membranes of the body " " causeth there a resistance or counter pressure (we should call it a ' reaction ' ) . . . which seemeth to be some matter without, and this seeming or fancy is what men call sense," <sup>1</sup> " All such fancies are motions within us, relics (*i.e.*, remaining consequences) of those motions made in the senses."

Speaking of outward bodily motions he divides them into two sorts, one sort of which he calls " vital " which are " continued without interruption throughout the whole of life. Such as are the course of the blood, the pulse, the breathing . . . to which motions there needs no help of imagination. The other is animal motion (as he calls it), as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs in such manner as is first fancied in our minds." Now if this very clear statement be carefully followed through, we see that it presents to us a series of motions, in which the turning point is the " fancy " or " imagination." First there is the movement of the object, the light or sound waves which it causes : these waves set in motion the strings and other membranes of the body, or as we should say the nervous system, which motion reaches to the brain, and there becomes a feeling, fancy, imagination or thought. From this thought or fancy proceed " going, speaking and the like voluntary motions " which " depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way

<sup>1</sup> *Leviathan*, Part 1, Cap. 1.

and what." "The Imagination is the beginning of all voluntary motions."

This doctrine is a perfect summary of the principles of modern physiological doctrine.

The crux of the whole question lies in what Hobbes called the "seeming, fancy or imagination" which is acted upon by the pressure or stimulus of external objects, and reacts upon them by going, speaking and the like. To make the problem a little clearer I suggest taking a definite example of shooting at a mark or object with a pistol and giving a diagram to illustrate it (Fig. 8).

Let us follow the stages through. The man "Richard Roe," is standing with his pistol aimed at a target ready to shoot. The target or object (Obj) gives off light waves (LW) whereby, in the old-fashioned language of Hobbes, it "presseth mediately" upon the eye (S). This pressure disturbs the receiving membrane of the eye which we call the *retina*, and this disturbance is transmitted along that "string of the body" which we call the optic nerve (Ss). By coursing along this "string" it arrives at the brain (B). Now every link in the above chain from the object to the brain of Richard Roe is matter in motion as Hobbes has said: our modern knowledge amounts only to a more exact knowledge of the nature of the motions and of the matter. This is a striking testimony to Hobbes' insight.

Let us follow the chain of events which start from Richard Roe's brain and end in his trigger finger. His brain initiates a motion in the motor nerve or

Such is the popular conception. We are so used to it that we see no difficulty in it, but when we come to think out the relationship between personality or "mind," and the bodily mechanism of brain matter, the question is found to be enormously difficult; it is impossible to conceive the relationship. But then it is equally impossible to say what we mean by "Time" and "Space" when we make any serious attempt to think them out.

Hobbes does something to get us out of the difficulty. He says the "fancies" or ideas of our minds are nothing but motion, for "motion causeth nothing but motion." So far he appears to deny free agency, for when motion causes motion the resultant effect is the inevitable necessary result of the precedent cause. But he also distinguishes between the "vital" motions "which need no help of the imagination, and "animal motions" such as "going, speaking, moving any of our limbs (or crooking a trigger finger) in such a manner as is first fancied in our minds." These motions therefore he clearly attributes to a voluntary origin. Now that which is voluntary is not inevitable, as is the motion of matter when caused by matter.

Hobbes helps us again by showing how he comes to assert the voluntary character of animal motions such as going, speaking or shooting. The fancy he says is a "relique" (or result) of the motions of sense, and "because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions" (such as firing a pistol) depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which

way and what, it is evident that the imagination is the beginning of all voluntary motion. Now I am certain that Hobbes did not see these "motions" going on in somebody else's head. The only way by which he could arrive at such an account of the origin of voluntary motions would be by introspection. He knew, as we all know, that thoughts come to us as "reliques" or memories of past sensations. He knew that he thought about the relations of the matters brought to his knowledge and that out of this consideration sprang his voluntary motions. The doings of other people presented themselves *to his senses* as but so many motions of matter and nothing else. But as these motions consisted in going, speaking and the like he inferred that the visible motions of the masses of matter, which we call other people, proceeded from the same inward processes as he knew to occur in himself, and to result in his own goings and speakings. He therefore judged that the inner substance or unity which is the centre of these moving masses of matter was a self-determining personality like his own.

The conclusion of the matter therefore is this. To maintain that life is from beginning to end a mere mechanism in which every motion is the exact outcome of antecedent motions,<sup>1</sup> on the ground that nothing else is to be seen in a living organism is a very bad kind of question-begging. Such may say that it is beyond question that bodies are

<sup>1</sup> Just as all the wheels in a watch revolve in their orbits with a motion which is the inevitable consequence of the action of the mainspring.

He is indeed as much out of his depth as we are when we try to think out the relation of the mechanism of the material body to free-will personality. It is more scientific to accept facts as facts even when we cannot understand them.

This the materialist refuses to do. He assumes that nothing exists except what can be seen (an obvious fallacy), and that therefore a man is nothing but matter in motion. That is a thoroughly consistent theory, but it is arrived at only by ignoring the knowledge of mind which comes from introspection, that is from thinking over the processes of thought by which we determine to do this or that. Materialism is consistent only by a sacrifice of fact, and must therefore be rejected. Yet *attempt* must be made to arrive at a consistency which reconciles the fact of the mechanism which we see by looking outwards, with the process of thought by which we determine to do this or that which we perceive on looking inwards. Various theories of "Monism" and "Dualism" are attempts to do this.

Monism asserts the unity of mind and matter. Mind, according to one theory of it, is a property of matter, and matter being mechanism therefore mind is mechanism: but it is of the essence of the idea of mind that it is not mechanism. This Monism therefore explains mind away and is really materialism. It also sacrifices fact. Another Monism, which is very metaphysical, refines the objects round us away till they are nothing but ideas in the mind, so that this also is not really true to the facts.

Dualism asserts mind and matter to be separate things which lie, as it were, parallel to each other: this ignores the fact that mind and matter react on each other. The motions of matter impinging on the body, and transmitted to its nerves and "other strings and membranes" are a cause of thought: and thought turning outwards as "will" is the cause of "going, speaking and the like voluntary motions" of matter. Mind is, as it is said, a cause in nature.

The truth is that Monism and Dualism are each striving to state a truth—Monism the real interaction of mind and matter, and Dualism that mind is not mechanism, for it is not predetermined, and that mechanism is not mind. Neither can, however, erect a consistent theory without sacrificing something. We are in fact face to face with an insoluble paradox, and must accept it as such, our ultimate position being that mind is real and that matter is real, and that reality is one, though how this can be passes our comprehension.

Having arrived at this point we have learned two things:—

(1) That mind is real, and therefore the will free, and the idea of probation credible.

(2) That the relation of mind to matter passes comprehension, and that therefore we cannot expect all the facts which we know to fit together logically and consistently. This is a most wholesome moral lesson: for most of our difficulties arise out of a pride of intellect which assumes that the universe

is wholly within the grasp of human understanding, and which therefore rejects facts which do not fit into the consistent scheme, which a human intellect has constructed—a pride of intellect which will even deny its own existence in the interest of logical consistency !

Finally if “mind” or free-will personality is real, we know of it only in relation with material bodies, but it does not follow that that is the only mode in which mind or personality can exist, as the late Mr. G. J. Romanes has said in *Mind, Motion and Monism*, any more than it follows from only seeing one person look out at the window of a house that there is but that one person in it.

To conclude. “Modern Science,” says Haeckel, “has not taught us a single fact that points to an immaterial world.” This is absolutely true, and I am convinced that it always will be true. But it is false to say that it “has shown more and more clearly that the supposed world beyond is a pure fiction,” or that man’s soul is “absolutely bound up with its material organ” and passes away at death like the souls of other mammals,” for what is beyond the ken of scientific observation, Science can never disprove : it has nothing to say in favour of and nothing to say against belief in a personal survival of bodily death. We are therefore left free to believe in a future life, if we see fit to do so, on grounds other than those of natural science.

## CHAPTER XIV

### EVOLUTION AND ORIGINAL SIN

**RECAPITULATION**—The Work of Redemption involves the Idea of a Fall—Objection that the Doctrine of the Fall is inconsistent with that of Progressive Evolution—By some who hold that Science and Religion can be reconciled—If religion will concede something on this point—The Assertion of this inconsistency and the consequent need of Concessions Questioned—There are two kinds of imperfection, Immaturity and Deformity—Which can co-exist in the same subject—Original Sin does not cause retrogression but abortive and misdirected progress—The Fall itself presented in the Drama of Eden as a false step forwards—But Higher Forms may be Wicked—"Good" and "Bad" not synonymous with "Higher" and "Lower"—Fallen man still progressing to a Higher Form—The interpretation of the Flood Story and the Babel Story teaches this—Man cannot make true progress without Redemption—The formulated Doctrine concerning Original Sin—An innate defect but not total depravity—The defect, if innate, is hereditary—May be the insubordination of instincts derived from brute ancestors—But in the first instance must have been acquired—That acquired characters can be transmitted to offspring denied by many authorities—But not all—The force of heredity also so exaggerated as to involve the denial of free-will—But that there is an Innate Weakness in man, and that Men have overcome is a known fact—Even if inexplicable.

THE supposed conflict between the teachings of Science and the Church's doctrine of original sin stands somewhat apart from the other difficulties with which we have had to deal : and so much so that some advantage might be gained by reserving it for the second part of this book. It seems better, however, to keep all the difficulties which Science is supposed to raise against religious belief in general, and the hope of a future life in particular, to one

section of the work, and in the other to deal with misconceptions and moral difficulties anent that specific future which Christendom tells us is waiting for us beyond the grave.

We have seen so far that Science offers no barrier to the religious explanation of the universe any more than does a barricade across a road to the progress of an airship. The order and relationship of things is whatever Science may find it to be : but whatever that order and relationship may be, God may still be the Author of the totality of existence. Man consists of a material body which, whatever else it may be, is certainly a mechanism, and yet every man knows himself to be a personal free agent. Science knows this personal free agency from introspection, but even so it only knows of it as inextricably bound up in a material body, it knows nothing of disembodied personality. This ignorance of science is no bar to the possibility of personality surviving the death and disintegration of the material body. Ample room is thus left for a religious explanation of the universe. Such as :—

That there is a God.

That He has created free-will personalities, who are responsible to Him for the use that they make of their freedom.

That those free-will personalities whom we call men will survive the disintegration of their material bodies and thereafter attain, or fail to attain, "Beatitude" according as they have filled or refused to fill the place in life to which they were called here.

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If we now consider what the future life can be like, we shall see that we cannot expect any information from Science. We must either content ourselves with free speculation, the freedom of which is, of course, very splendid, but the splendour is empty, for the surmises of such speculation cannot be verified : there is not much point in our splendid guesswork with no key by which to discern the good guesses from the bad ones. The only source of knowledge in such matters is the testimony of an authoritative witness. The witness who claims to be an Authority is The Son who in these last days hath spoken unto us. If He be the Son He must know.

It will be our business in the second part of this book to examine that testimony, and the historical, critical and moral difficulties which surround it. It must suffice for the present to say that after death He reveals to us a judgment which will separate the sheep from the goats : and that He shows us how we may be counted as Sheep, that is, attain to Beatitude. Now the Son presents Himself to us not only as a Revealer, but also, and more prominently, as the Redeemer. And Redemption—to borrow Canon Masterman's words<sup>1</sup>—means restoration, not the establishment of a new relationship, but the re-establishment of a union that has been broken. The future which Christ and His Church reveal to man is one which holds out a hope of final triumph for the members of a fallen race. The doctrine of the Church on original sin is the formal statement of the nature of that fall.

<sup>1</sup> *Interpreter*, November, 1905.

It might seem that my next step should be to state again and more fully the Church's doctrine on this point. It would if some particular theory of the fall were attacked, but this is not so. The difficulty advanced is that modern science proclaims a progressive development from lower to higher forms which is in conflict with any idea of a fall whatsoever. This objection is raised by Sir Oliver Lodge and is briefly but vigorously expressed by Professor Inge. "Is it or is it not," he asked in the *Interpreter* for October, 1905, "a divinely certified truth that the life history of the human race includes a moral catastrophe which reduced to ruins a noble and complete work of God? . . . We must frankly take our choice between the Pentateuch and modern Science—between the theory of a ruined human nature and the theory of a gradual development from lower forms."

This brief sentence is of special value as giving the extreme characteristic expression of a certain attitude towards the scientific description and the religious explanation of the universe. This attitude of mind is contemporary and it is therefore entitled to call itself "modern thought." What is this attitude?

We have compared the relationship of the religious explanation of the universe to the scientific description of it, to the relationship of an airship to a barricade. This school of modern thought would acknowledge the broad justice of the comparison. They would maintain that scientific Atheism, the assertion that modern discoveries have abolished God, is out

of date. They would heartily acclaim Haeckel's statement in the Preface to the *Riddle of the Universe*, and repeated in that of its sequel *The Wonders of Life*, that he is a child of the nineteenth century, adding the truism that this is the Twentieth. They would admit that God is the Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the End, of the universe, and that Man, His free-will creature, will attain his destiny, or "find himself," by fulfilling the law of his being which he has received from his Creator, and would maintain that the Creator is none the less the author of man's being for the "fact"<sup>1</sup> that manhood has arisen by an evolutionary process from a brute ancestry. But it would enter a caution.

In the terms of our illustration this would amount to a warning that, although the barricade was clearly not high enough to bar the passage of the airship, yet it included one or two very tall poles which were lying right in the line of the course which the airship was taking: that it was unfortunate that the obstacles had not been foreseen and the course otherwise directed, but that, things being as they are, the airship must either run atilt at the poles and knock them down, or perish in the attempt, or that it must alter its course. But this school of thought approves of the airship and wishes her a successful voyage, and also believes that in charging their poles she would get the worst of it; they hope, therefore, that her

<sup>1</sup> Evolution is *not* a fact, it is only a theory howsoever firmly we may be convinced that it is the theory which truly proclaims fact.

navigators will take the more prudent of the two alternatives.

But we have not yet exhausted the possibilities of our illustration. I am supposing our airship to be not a dirigible balloon, held up by a gas bag, but made on the aeroplane system. Now such a machine may undoubtedly travel through the air, but its planes or wings must be kept at a definite angle to the wind; if the angle be altered the machine may rush down an inclined plane of air to its destruction or cockle up and collapse. Now suppose the navigators of the airship to see that, if they attempt to alter its course as their friends suggest, their ship must inevitably lose her balance and collapse, then their only hope of keeping afloat is to go straight ahead, they have no choice but to continue the course originally adopted, and if the poles are really high enough to be in the way, then they must hope to knock them down.

*If the Poles are really high enough.* Are they? Those who stand under a pole and look up it see it foreshortened, a position in which it is very difficult to guess exactly its true height, and the perspective of an approaching bird, balloon, or airship is such that its apparent height relative to the pole may be most deceptive, so that if the airship keep steady on her course she may go clear over the top of the pole, arrive safely at her destination, and leave the pole upright and uninjured. The bystanders may, for the moment, be chagrined at their miscalculation, but they must ultimately be glad that pole and airship have both survived.

“We must frankly take our choice between the Pentateuch and modern science—between the theory of a ruined human nature and the theory of a gradual development from lower forms.” The Pentateuch is the airship and modern science is the pole, and it is asserted that one or other of them must give way. But if the airship alter its course, the whole Christian Scheme of Salvation must collapse: its essential idea is redemption and regeneration, both of which mean restoration from a fallen state. Is it possible that modern thought has miscalculated the height of the pole? Is it unkind to suggest that Dr. Inge is a Professor of Divinity and that he may have miscalculated the height of a biological pole? I propose that we take the measurements afresh.

“The theory of a ruined human nature,” is the theory of a fall from perfection to imperfection: “the theory of a gradual development from lower forms” is the theory of a rise from imperfection to perfection. The collision seems manifest and inevitable. Is it? Let us test these phrases by a concrete example. The growth of a cock pheasant from an egg to the splendours of full plumage is a case of gradual development from a lower form or of a rise from imperfection to perfection. The same cock pheasant “rocketing” over the tree tops, suddenly brought to earth by a charge of shot and running for his life with a broken wing is the ruin of that pheasant’s nature, or a fall from perfection to imperfection. I must confess that I do not here feel compelled to “frankly take my choice”

between two irreconcilable events. I do not feel compelled to either abandon or modify my belief that pheasants are damaged by shot or refute the doctrine that they are hatched out of eggs! And yet I have used exactly the same terms as have been used to describe the Christian Doctrine of the Fall and the scientific doctrine of evolution as they affect our conception of human nature.

The appearance of collision is produced by the use of the terms "perfection" and "imperfection": or other words to express those ideas, without realizing exactly what we mean by "imperfection." Let us try and extract clear ideas about imperfection from the cock pheasant. The cock pheasant in full plumage sailing over the tree tops is a perfect pheasant. The egg during incubation, or the new-hatched chick, is an imperfect or immature pheasant. The "runner" with his broken wing is also an imperfect pheasant, he is mutilated or deformed. Imperfection, therefore, stands for the two different and quite distinct qualities of immaturity and deformity. Let us now restate the two colliding propositions substituting the word which expresses in each the idea really connoted by the term imperfection.

"We must frankly take our choice between the Pentateuch and modern science—between the theory of a ruined human nature"—that is a fall from perfection to deformity—and the theory of a development from lower forms"—that is of a rise from immaturity to perfection. I do not feel that the necessity of making a choice is really urgent.

We may now take a fresh step. The relationship of maturity to deformity is complicated by the fact that deformity may intervene, before maturity is reached. The pheasant chick when hatched is immature, but it is potentially perfect, it will grow to perfection if "nothing happens." If injured in its infancy it will still grow, but it will be seriously handicapped by its deformity or disease, and will be a warped and sorry growth. The same is true of a child born under the curse of, say, inherited epilepsy. It progresses from infancy to childhood and manhood, but it is a poor manhood beside that to which it might have attained had it not been handicapped by this disabling "deformity."

Another thought—it is quite a modern one—which I would suggest is that the progress from lower to higher forms<sup>1</sup> is not altogether gradual. New species are now thought to have arisen from old by sudden jumps. Moreover, the adaptation of forms to their environment is not always a progress, the survival of the fittest is not necessarily, *teste* Professor Huxley, the survival of the best and highest. A "lower" and coarser form may survive under conditions under which a "higher" would succumb. The dodo, a clumsy flightless creature, was an adaptation of the pigeon to easy circumstances in which was involved no need of flight, but such a change seems a deterioration.

Again what does the doctrine of original sin

<sup>1</sup> What do the world's "higher" and "lower" exactly signify?

involve? Does it start us with a perfect Godlike being, the personification of an ideal civilization who is gradually deteriorating into an orang-outang? It seems to me that the general gist of Old Testament History is to represent a constant upward struggle of mankind against heavy odds, turning off into wrong paths and ending in failure and disappointment.

We are to regard the early chapters of Genesis as allegorical presentments of truth in a more or less dramatic form. The story of Eden is especially dramatic, it would be one of the very easiest of the Old Testament stories to place on the stage.<sup>1</sup> The earth is a garden stocked with trees, and watered with fair rivers and "the gold of that land is good and there is bdellium and the onyx stone." Into this "garden" God sends man, the last and newest of His Creatures, unlike all that had preceded him, or, to use the most modern scientific terminology, a "discontinuous variation." He introduces new conditions into the world, he is to dress and keep the garden. Hitherto the garden had grown as God made it to grow, "Nature" had been her own gardener, and the inhabitants of the garden had taken this beautiful wilderness as they found it. But man is to "dress" the garden and adapt it to his needs by cultivation, he is come to replenish the earth and to subdue it and to have dominion over. . . . every living thing that moveth upon the earth. As Professor Ray Lankester has said in the Rede Lecture of 1905, "What we call the will or volition

<sup>1</sup> I believe it often was staged in the old Miracle Plays.

of Man . . . has become a power in nature, an *imperium in imperio*, which has profoundly modified not only Man's own history, but that of the whole living world, and the face of the planet on which he exists."<sup>1</sup>

But on Man's entry into Eden all this was in the future. Mankind was but yet in its infancy, mother-naked and ignorant, or, as is said of young and incompetent domestics and new made matrons of tender age, "inexperienced." There was much room in him for increase in wisdom and in stature. Man was in the beginning a lower form made for progressive ascent to a higher state, "a little lower than the angels to be crowned with Glory and Worship" (Psalm viii.) But though Man in Eden was but a babe and a suckling he was without blemish, potentially perfect, and He was endowed with Divine Grace; the "voice of the Lord God walked in the Garden in the cool of the day," and there was "the tree of life also in the midst of the garden."

But there was also the tree of knowledge of good and evil, opportunity for gaining experience by trying experiments: this trying of experiments was, however, forbidden. "Of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." This is no arbitrary prohibition, the ignoring of which involves arbitrary retribution: for life is made to be lived and not to try experiments with, and to obtain knowledge of evil by doing evil

<sup>1</sup> Now published in *The Kingdom of Man* (Constable) under the title of *Nature's Insurgent Son*.

involves enduring the consequences of the evil done. If a child wanders up a hedgerow and eats the berries, it will find out which are good and which are poisonous, which would be a very good plan if poison was harmless. As things are, however, the scheme does not work, for after eating poison there is no "next time" in which to profit by the experience. The tasting of life<sup>1</sup> instead of living it is profoundly immoral, the tree of knowledge of good and evil is the tree of death, and by envy of the devil death came into the world, for, in spite of sufficient warning, man tried the experiment, he ate of the tree whereof the Lord God commanded him that he should not eat.

So does the drama present man's fall. It is a presentment in "no way conflicting with the idea of gradual progress from lower to higher forms." The fall itself was a misdirected attempt at progress, a vaulting ambition that o'erleaped itself. Now if man attain his destiny by living his life, it is manifest that he must fail of attaining it if he waste his time in trying experiments. But the grace of God is given to man to help him to attain his destiny, and so on failure it is reasonable that it should be withdrawn. But we are not left to guess or even to see for ourselves why grace is withdrawn from fallen man; we are told that it is "lest he should put forth his hand and take of the tree of life and live for ever."

<sup>1</sup> The immorality of "Tasting life" is well treated in an article with that title in a volume of Essays called "From Grave to Gay" by the present Editor of the *Spectator*.

It seems necessary here to distinguish carefully between higher and lower forms on the one hand and better and worse conditions on the other. Man is a "higher form" than a monkey, and an angel is a "higher form" than a man. The man may be a bad man, but his form is still man-form and therefore higher than ape-form. An angel may be a bad angel, but his form is still angel-form and therefore higher than man-form, even when the latter occurs in a good man. A bad angel is a higher form than a good man. It follows, therefore, that if man, though now a little lower than the angels, is destined gradually to develop into a higher form, as high as if not higher than the orders of angels, he might develop into that higher form, even though he were bad, that is a rebel against the divine Will, he might, in short, become a devil, and it seems just to prevent this that the Lord God . . . "drove out the man and placed at the east of the garden cherubims and a flaming sword which turned every way to keep the way of the tree of life."

Such a destiny for fallen man, if left to himself, would be far more in accord with the general principles of life than that he should revert to the lower or animal form, the "dust of the earth" from which he has sprung. The wicked progress to devilry rather than revert to apedom.

But the Garden of Eden is not the only act in the Allegorical Mystery Play with which the Book of Genesis opens, for there are, among other presentments, those of the Deluge and the building of Babylon. Now these stories, if they are to teach

us anything, are to show us the philosophy of all human history, they interpret the great events of all time and show the relationship of God to a fallen race.

Now in all this and in subsequent Old Testament history nothing is presented to us which is in the least like a gradual decline from a higher to a lower form such as "Science" so strongly objects to. There is presented rather the spectacle of abortive progress. Man, though fallen, had still to replenish the earth and subdue it, and he did till the ground, though without the Tree of Life it ceases to be a "garden." From the day of his expulsion man is represented as progressing; he acquires cattle, he dwells in tents, he becomes an artificer of brass and iron, he handles the harp and the organ and he calls upon the name of the Lord.<sup>1</sup> But as man becomes wiser, and increases in knowledge and in skill, he also becomes more wicked, every imagination of the thoughts of his heart is only to do evil continually. For God's pleasure he was created, but he does not serve that pleasure and it repents God that He has made him.

The story of the Flood is a story of the survival of the fittest. It is one, however, in which even the best can survive only with the help of God to warn and direct them, though human skill, in which man has progressed since his infancy, also contributes to the building of the Ark. The building of Babel<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Genesis iv, 19, *ad fin.*

<sup>2</sup> The Babel story is no bad allegory of the Roman Empire.

exhibits man's efforts at civilized co-operation and at gradual development from lower political forms. Here, again, God is represented as interfering in man's well-laid schemes, the workers are not really united, they have no really common aim. A common aim for good is out of the question, a common aim for evil would lead only to devilry, but fallen man is not wholly evil and so there is confusion. The whole scheme aborts and comes to nothing. As says the Preacher, all is Vanity and Vexation of Spirit, and it is so by the hindrance of God.

The meaning of this futility seems to be that the Grace of God and all that is represented by the tree of life is taken from man to save him. Those who "love that which God commands and desire that which He doth promise," who, by the conformity of their wills to the will of God, walk with God, as did Enoch and Noah, God will "take" and bring into safety and survival. This sufficiently disposes of the idea that the history of fallen man as interpreted by Scripture is an exact reversal of the upward progress of science: the opposition is only apparent and due to carelessness in the employment of terms.

We have still the doctrinal side of the matter to consider. The doctrine of original sin has already been briefly stated in Chapter vii.<sup>1</sup> This doctrine claims to be a statement of what it is in man which accounts for so much that in his outward history is abortive. This doctrine does not depend wholly on revelation, but partly at least on self-knowledge.

<sup>1</sup> Page 100.

As we know, by introspection, that we have a power of free choice, so also we know, by introspection, that that choice is practically limited by an innate weakness: we know what is right and good, but we do not always succeed in denying ourselves some immediate gratification which distracts us from its attainment. An example is the young man who, having all his work cut out to get through the books that he must know for an impending examination, cannot resist the temptation to "just look" into some vapid illustrated magazine on whose perusal he wastes the whole evening. Neither does any man doubt that this weakness, being common to all mankind, is hereditary, it is obvious that this want of strength and resolution in the pursuit of virtue and the avoidance of vice is a defect which "naturally is engendered in the offspring of Adam."

This doctrine of original Sin is, of all the items of the Creed of Christendom, that which comes most closely into contact with Natural Science, not only because it is in part a statement of our natural self-knowledge, and so far belongs to the side of science, but also because it is included in the general question of heredity, a subject in which workers in the field of Natural Science are profoundly interested.

The Church has taken charge of this matter in order to preserve the doctrine from being either explained away, or exaggerated. The Church teaches that in the fall the human race forfeited the supernatural graces termed "original righteousness,"

and so became incapable of attaining its supernatural destiny. This doctrine belongs to a region altogether out of reach of legitimate scientific criticism.

The Church also teaches that "Concupiscence," the lust for immediate gratification which we cannot altogether resist, is inherited, and is a real defect in us, as against the Pelagians who said that it consisted merely in the imitation of bad examples. Pelagianism explains it away. Imitation is quite another thing to an inherent defect of nature. Pelagianism, therefore, denies the universal *necessity* of Redemption to make it possible to do works pleasing and acceptable to God.

The Church denies that this fault or corruption is such that *every* act of fallen man is inherently wicked and detestable to God. This was the exaggerated teaching of Luther and of the Calvinists, who said that concupiscence was "both in itself and in all the motions thereof . . . truly and properly Sin" (Westminster Confession). This is manifestly an overstatement. Concupiscence is only cognate to sin in that it (1) is the result of sin and (2) tends to the commission of sin. The desire of sinful gratification is not a sin, it is the consent of the will to the gratification of the desire—whether the deed be accomplished or not—which is sin.

The Church admits that this concupiscence remains in those that are regenerated in Baptism, the difference involved in baptism not being the removal of concupiscence, but the addition of *gratia* which makes its conquest possible, it puts within

reach "the victory that overcometh,"<sup>1</sup> and so the attainment of that Beatitude which is our proper end and destiny.<sup>2</sup>

Now for the comments which can come from the side of science. The hereditary impulse to do things which were done by previous generations is common to all animals, and is called instinct. Man, therefore, as an animal should have his instincts which move him to satisfy his animal appetites and to obtain gratification in so doing. But man is said to be also "rational"; he not only has a life to live, but is conscious of the fact, and can consider what he must do to attain his destiny. From this follows the sense of duty or of "I ought to attain my destiny": "my appetites must be sacrificed to my destiny when they interfere with the doing of my duty." In a properly constituted rational animal the reason will control the animal appetites, and will do so from the first, even while

<sup>1</sup> I S. John v, 4.

<sup>2</sup> This infection of nature doth remain, yea in them that are regenerated. Art ix of XXXIX Articles.

Manere autem in baptizatis concupiscentiam vel fomitatem, haec Sancta Synodus (The Council of Trent) fatetur et sentit, quae quum ad agonem relicta sit nocere non consentientibus sed virilitur per Christi Jesu gratiam repugnantibus non valet, quinimo qui legitime certaverit coronabitur. Council of Trent, Session V, 5.

*Translation.* That the concupiscence or fuel of evil doth remain yea in them that are Baptized, this the Holy Synod (the Council of Trent) confesses and believes, which being left to afford a conflict hath no power to hurt them that do not consent to it, but fight manfully against it by the grace of Jesus Christ, for those who strive lawfully shall be crowned.

the animal is yet immature. Fallen man is a rational animal in whom the animal instincts are insubordinate. Now I do not say that the theory of evolution adds anything to this doctrine, but if we think of man's common origin with the brute from "the dust of the earth" as a descent from the brute creation, to which was added the gift of reason and the grace for subordinating the brute instincts by the inbreathing of the "breath of life," it helps us to realize the loss of control through a first act of consent to temptation better than we otherwise could. The theory of evolution helps us to understand the concupiscence which we know.

Two criticisms can be made however in the name of science.

(1) Most exponents of heredity deny the possibility of inheriting acquired characters.<sup>1</sup> Now the loss of control of the animal impulses must have been an acquired character. How then could it have become hereditary? Here we have come across what seems a real collision between scientific doctrine and the Christian Creed.<sup>2</sup> I cannot solve the difficulty, but I can say that the denial of the possibility of the inheritance of acquired characters, called Weismannism, is only the opinion of a school, even if it be a dominant school. I can also say that it is a theory the acceptance of which makes it difficult to see how existing forms of life could have

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* Chapter ix, page 147.

<sup>2</sup> This difficulty is raised by the Rev. F. R. Tennant, himself a learned biologist, in his book *The Origin and Propagation of Sin*.

come to be as they are by variation from a common origin, and one which seems to me to make it impossible to account for the origin of Instinct. I can add that Haeckel, who is well known to be no friend of the Creed of Christendom, strongly protests against Weismannism. Also that Mr. Herbert Spencer, who had an extraordinarily clear insight into the general principles of natural science, assumes that the inheritance of acquired characters is necessary to the theory of evolution. Also that Weismann's theory involves many difficulties, some of which are well raised in quite a new book, Mons. Felix le Dantec's *Nature and Origin of Life*. This book is written as a simple statement of biological opinion without any reference to the issues of religion, and it takes the most materialistic and mechanical view of the nature and origin of life.

(2) The force of heredity can be maintained to be so great as practically to rob a man of his free-will. His impulses may be said to be so strong as to be irresistible even with the aid of grace. I do not however know that anything has been advanced to controvert the fact that men and women have not merely "manfully fought under Christ's banner against Sin, the World and the Devil," but have also "faithfully continued as His soldiers and servants unto their life's end." They have conquered their hereditary impulses.

To sum up. The objection to the Christian doctrine of the Fall seems to be due wholly to a confusion of thought resulting from the use of terms which

connote different ideas under different circumstances. On the historic side, moreover, human history is not the history either of progressive deteriorations or of gradual steady advance, but of many efforts at the building of Babels which accomplished something, perhaps, but by no means all that was intended. The history of mankind is a history of progress under difficulties and by fits and starts. More of the ground made is held since the Christian Era than was the case before it.<sup>1</sup> On the doctrinal side, the matter is one of heredity, a fault naturally engendered, with which scientific opinions about heredity have many interesting points of contact, some of which are difficult.

It is a fact that the fault is innate or hereditary, whether we can explain it or not.

<sup>1</sup> *Vide Social Results of Early Christianity.—Schmidt.*

## CHAPTER XV

### PURE AGNOSTICISM

**HAVE** we arrived at a Secure Position?—From Illustration of Box of Shells apparently "Yes"—The Essential Relation of Science to the Religious Explanation of the Universe is Agnostic—Bishop Gore on the Point—The Principle of "Pure" Agnosticism really worked out by Mr. G. J. Romanes—Pure Agnosticism compared with the Attitude of Sir Oliver Lodge's Catechism—which practically asserts that Science can sift faith from Superstition—The teaching of this Catechism criticised—In the matter of the Fall inequitable—In that of Divine Grace jejune—Eliminates all idea of Christ as a Source of Spiritual Energy—The mere example of what He can do of little help to those who have not His Power—Pure Agnosticism preferable—It insists on the laying aside of all prejudice, and leaves every man Intellectually free—To Believe the whole Catholic Faith—and to Practise the whole Catholic Religion—If he will but make the Adventure of Faith.

WE have finished our consideration of the objections which may be raised in the name of Science to belief in a future life, and to the possibility of knowing, upon testimony, anything of what such a life may have in store for us. The question which we now have to ask ourselves is whether we have arrived at a position which we may regard as secure. We have arrived at a position, but may not some new and startling discovery upset it all, and demand the re-analysis of the whole question from the beginning, and the taking up of a new position?

Let us return to our box of shells. We keep them because they serve as counters for playing family

Nap and suchlike homely games after dinner. We knew nothing about the shells when we picked them up except that they were shells and had once been the home of some sort of snail-like animal. Some day a learned marine naturalist comes to stay with us, and after dinner we play Nap, and so produce our box of shells. Our guest begins to tell us all sorts of interesting facts about the shells, shows us the various kinds and tells us where they can be found, and from the fact that some are of rare kinds, only found in certain circumscribed localities, is able to tell us where we have been for our sea-side holidays. Our interest in our box of shells is thereby enormously increased, and our ideas about them are considerably enriched, but our old conception of them as a box of shells is in no way modified, and our faith in their utility as counters is in no way shaken.

Our box of shells is an allegorical representation of the universe, whose structure and mechanism are one thing, and whose purpose, or *raison d'être*, is another. They are as distinct in many ways as the natural history of our shells and our reason for keeping them in a box. We have in these days a knowledge of the mechanism of the universe enormously greater than it used to be in days gone by, though even then it was regarded by thinking men as a mechanism, but our conception of this mechanism as an environment in which we are appointed to serve our term of probation, that is to say our conception of its purpose is not affected by the minuteness of our knowledge of its structure and mechanism.

To return to our shells. Our guest has told us much that is interesting about them, but what he has told us has in no way altered the use to which we put them. It is imaginable that some day we may have another guest who can give us much more profound information about our shells and the microscopic structure and life history of their former inhabitants. Is it imaginable that such information should shake our faith in the use of our shells as counters? It is manifest that it could not do so.

In the same manner we may expect that no further discoveries can affect our conception of this visible universe as an environment in which it is appointed for us to serve our time of probation. In this matter, however, we do not depend only on analogies, for we have seen that the conception of the universe as a mechanism is now what it was in the days of Hobbes in the seventeenth century; so much so, that, in spite of his quaint turns of expression, Hobbes' analysis in the opening chapters of the *Leviathan* is the most lucid expression of the modern scientific conception of the universe which can well be found. And if Hobbes' conception has been deep and broad enough to provide a ready-made receptacle for the great mass of scientific discovery which has been launched on the world in the last 250 years, then the probability is that it is prepared to receive the discoveries which are yet to come. It is a conception which does not at all collide with our idea of the purpose of the universe as a sphere of probation.

But we have not yet exhausted the lessons which

can be learned from our box of shells. We must notice that as we have not been driven by any information about the natural history of our shells to modify our conception as to why they are kept in a box, so we have not felt called upon to question anything that our naturalist guest has told us about them: and so, in the same way, we can afford to leave, and must leave, science absolutely free to describe what she sees as she sees it. This is necessary justice and sound logic. For if we are able to rest satisfied that scientific discovery can, from its inherent nature, never interfere with Divine Revelation, we are also bound to admit that every man *must* be left free to describe what he sees as he sees it, and must not be tied down to see things as men of past ages saw them, merely because the men of those ages were also the authors of the books of the Bible. This is not only fair, but, when simply stated, is almost obvious.

Yet once again, if our naturalist friend, who knows so much about our shells and their whilom inhabitants, can say nothing against their use as counters, he can also say nothing for it. If you were to give a box of shells to a learned naturalist, you would expect him to tell you of what sorts they were and where they came from, but you could not expect him to draw any inference from that knowledge as to what the shells were used for, it would be manifestly ridiculous to do so. So we cannot expect science to do anything towards finding out what the universe is for. It cannot afford grounds for believing in God and in a future life of beatitude for such as diligently seek Him.

The box of shells is, however, only an illustration, and we must beware of pushing the analogy too far. We have said that as no new knowledge of the shells can *alter* our primitive conception that they are a box of shells and useful for counters, so no new knowledge of the mechanism of the universe can reasonably be expected to alter belief that it is such a mechanism as affords an environment in which we may serve a probation which will determine our status in a future and final life. That is true so long as it is only our environment which we regard as a mechanism. But we have also had to face the question whether we ourselves are anything more than an item in the mechanism with which we find ourselves in relation. For, if we are mere mechanism then all our actions are predetermined, and we have no free-will. Also, if all our actions are inevitable, there can be no probation, for there can be no uncertain issue as to the use which we shall make of our lives. Also, if we are only a mechanism, we cease to exist when the machine of life stops, and so there can be no hope.

Are we mere mechanisms, or is each of us made to be master of his fate? That is the crucial question. So long as man is the latter it does not matter *how* he began so to be, and so the opinion that man is descended from monkeys is not of any real consequence. This question, as we have seen, raises the whole question of the relationship of mind and matter, which is a most mysterious problem which we cannot solve, though we *know* the reality of "mind."

As we have seen, the religious explanation of the world is credible if mind or personality is real, and therefore probation and immortality possible. Of course a God is necessary to such an explanation, otherwise free-will is not conditioned by moral responsibility, but no ground has been so surely made as that made by Mr. Herbert Spencer when he showed that science could never determine what the self-existent beginning of things could be, and that therefore, whatever difficulties science could conceivably raise, it could raise none against the credibility of an intelligent and benevolent personal God as the first cause of all things.

We have also seen that an intelligent personal God, who can create an universe, that is to say, can cause it to exist by willing its existence, can by the exercise of the same will interfere in the chain of cause and effect which He has Himself originated—that is He can work miracles, so that if God is credible, miracles are credible, and therefore the Virgin Birth of Christ, and the Resurrection are credible, the acceptance of them is a matter of testimony, and the dogma that Christ is God manifest in the flesh is also credible. In fact, that particular explanation of the universe which we call the Creed of Christendom, taken as a whole, is credible.

In only one point of that Creed have we any appearance of collision, that is in the doctrine of Original Sin. But the objection that the Christian doctrine presents a fall from a state of original perfection while science presents a rise or progress from a lower to a higher state is apparent rather than real, and

is due to a loose use of the words "perfect" and "imperfect." What science presents to us is a progress from immaturity to maturity, while history shows us that progress handicapped and Christianity tells us that the handicap is due to a blemish in human nature which is the common inheritance of all men.

The other objection is that there must have been a first sin by which the blemish was first acquired, and that the present opinion is that acquired characters cannot be inherited. The whole nature of heredity is a very complicated question, and, in so far therefore as it is a difficulty, it is one which can stand adjourned: and we must rest content with the fact of experience that in every man there is a bias to evil and improvident self-indulgence which being common to mankind must be hereditary, however and whenever it had its beginning.

We have arrived then finally at the position that science has really nothing to say either for or against the religious explanation of the universe as broadly held by mankind and definitely formulated in the authoritative Creed of Christendom, because Science is purely agnostic. We have no more right to expect science to contribute to a religious explanation of the universe than we have to expect our accomplished naturalist who knows the names of all the shells in our box to tell us how to use them as counters in round games at cards.

This position has not been arrived at in a hurry, neither is it absolutely new. Bishop Gore, in

a sermon preached certainly before the year 1896,<sup>1</sup> said :—

“ It is quite certain that this scientific obstacle has been in the main removed. In part it has been through the theologians abandoning false claims and learning, if somewhat unwillingly, that they have no ‘ Bible Revelation ’ in matters of science ; in part it has been through its becoming continually more apparent that the limits of scientific ‘ explanation ’ of nature are soon reached ; the ultimate causes, forces, conditions of nature are as unexplained as ever, or rather postulate as ever a Divine mind.”

It was the late Mr. G. J. Romanes who worked out the principle of pure agnosticism. Having first come to see that the details of nature did not really demonstrate the existence of God, his faith suffered eclipse for a time, but he at last came to realize that these same details were in no way hostile to the possibility of a God. From being a Christian who had not been brought in contact with modern difficulties he became, through contact with them, an agnostic, and from an agnostic a “ pure agnostic ” (a position in which as he showed<sup>2</sup> one is intellectually free to believe), and he afterwards regained his faith.

It may sound cold comfort to those who are in doubt and distress to be told that, beyond perhaps the general conviction that there must be a Divine Mind

<sup>1</sup> The year in which the *Life and Letters of George John Romanes*, from which I quote, was published.

<sup>2</sup> *Vide Thoughts on Religion.*

behind the cosmic processes of nature, Science has nothing to say to help out belief. And it may seem even colder comfort if it is true, as I think that it is true, that what we see going on in the world as it is seen through the various instruments, skilled observations and inferences, which we may call the spectacles of science, does not point a man with an open mind positively to an intelligent First Cause; though what is seen through those spectacles by one who is *already* a loyal believer is a wonderful confirmation of his faith, for *he* sees through those spectacles the fingerprint of God as surely as the uninstructed believer sees it with the natural eye of a more childish but not necessarily more simple-minded wonder. To both these latter alike Nature is the manifestation of God, Who upholds all things by His will that they should exist. And so a scientifically learned father can join with another who is saturated with scholastic theology, and with a simple lay brother, who knows neither the modern nor the scholastic sciences, in the same community chapel in the Song of the Three Children, *Benedicite omnia Opera*, "Oh all ye works of the Lord, bless ye the Lord! Praise Him and magnify Him for ever!"

But is this pure agnosticism really such cold comfort after all? If you want something more helpful what will you have? Sir Oliver Lodge's Catechism? Let us look at it.

This Catechism is revealed by its title—"The Substance of Faith allied with Science"—to be a new theology. The title implies that Science

is as a sort of decanting process affording a strainer which lets through the pure wine of faith and keeps back the broken-up crust of transitory human ideas and expressions of it, while the wine adapts itself to the shape of the decanter as it is poured out of the old black bottle. The question is whether the alliance of the substance of faith with science is such a decanting. We must examine the resulting liquor to see.

To begin with the question of the Fall. The Catechism of this new theology proposes to us that :—

“ At a certain stage of development, man became conscious of a difference between right and wrong, so that thereafter, when his actions fell below a normal standard of conduct, he felt ashamed and sinful. He ‘ thus ’ lost his animal innocency, and entered on a long period of human effort and failure : nevertheless, the consciousness of degradation marked a rise in the scale of existence.” The meaning of this clause is rather involved. Does the sense of degradation come from knowing the difference between right and wrong, or from failure to attain to the standard of right ? If the latter, there was a time, however short, in which man knew right from wrong and had not done wrong. In that interval he was innocent, and his innocence was not merely animal or due to lack of perception. If this be so, then the sense of degradation, the feeling of shame and sinfulness, is reasonable, but the actual choosing of wrong can hardly be considered a “ rise in the scale of existence ! ”

If, on the other hand, the sense of degradation comes from knowing the difference between right and wrong, it must come from a sense of the need of effort united with the certainty of failure. Such an unhappy situation is conceivable, as that a being should find himself entering on a task which he cannot accomplish : but he need not feel ashamed and sinful because he cannot cope with impossible conditions, as a child need not feel degraded by not being a grown-up man. This second interpretation presents man as being in a position which is beyond him. To realize that such is one's lot, that, though perchance one is raised a step in the scale of existence, one has been placed in an environment two or three steps further up in the scale, should arouse, not a sense of shame and of degradation, but indignation and a rankling sense of injustice, which must result in a desperation which can but drown itself in a wretchlessness of most unclean living. The substance of faith allied with science seems rather cold comfort.

But perhaps the substance of faith preserves something of the old grace of God which helped man to surmount his inborn difficulties. Here is what the catechism has to say :—

“ There is a power in the universe, vastly beyond our comprehension ; and we trust and believe that it is a good and loving power willing to help us and all creatures, and to guide us wisely without detriment to our incipient freedom. This loving-kindness continually surrounds us : in it we live and have our real being : it is the mainspring of

joy and love and beauty, and we call it the Grace of God." This is very beautifully expressed, and such an idea of Divine aid is of the warmest consolation. But we are only to "trust and believe" that it is so, no authority reveals to us that it is so; and can we "trust and believe," in the benevolence of a power who raises us in the scale of existence only to set us a task beyond our powers, so that, however free we may be to attempt it, we are bound to fail, and who has so constituted us, that we feel shame and degradation in circumstances in which shame and degradation are a cruel and misleading discouragement? But to proceed.

This grace is specially manifested to "dwellers on this planet in the Life of Jesus Christ, through whose spirit and living influence the race of man may hope to rise to heights at present inaccessible." In this there is some consolation, but why is not our task more adapted to our capacities? It is not just to set a child man's work, and make him feel ashamed and miserable because he cannot do it, even if he will some day grow up and be able to accomplish it.

But what think we of Christ if our thought be in such alliance with or conformity to science as is set forth in this catechism? Here is a statement of belief, a formal Creed:—

"I Believe in one Infinite and Eternal being, a guiding and a loving Father, in whom all things consist. I believe that the Divine Nature is specially revealed to man through Jesus Christ Our Lord, who lived and taught and suffered in Palestine 1900

years ago, and has since been worshipped by the Christian Church as the Immortal Son of God, the Saviour of the World. I believe that the Holy Spirit is ever ready to help us along the way towards goodness and truth, that prayer is a means of communion between man and God ; and that it is our privilege through faithful service to enter into the life eternal, the Communion of Saints and the peace of God."

It seems as if it is the Apostles' Creed that has here passed through the strainer. The Commentary on this Creed tells us that " Time and Space are explicitly mentioned in order to emphasize the historical and human aspect of the Christian Manifestation of Godhead." Yet the statements that He was born of the Virgin Mary, that He rose again the third day from the dead, that He ascended into Heaven, and even that his sufferings were under Pontius Pilate, are absolutely ignored. That the Church has worshipped Christ as the Son of God, is a fact patent to all men, a mere truism : there is no word in the text of the new creed approving the practice. In the commentary on this and other articles of the Catechism, the idea of the Incarnation of God is said to be beautiful and the atoning sacrifice of the Cross consoling, the whole idea of Incarnation, as well as of some of the miracles and sacraments are expressions " of this wide and comprehensive character of Christianity." But " the statement that Christ and God are one is not really a statement concerning Christ," **it is only a mode of saying that the unknown must** ¶

in terms of the known, not the known in the terms of the unknown : the attributes of God are expressed in terms of man. "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father." But "every son of man is potentially also a son of God," though "the union was deepest and completest in the Galilean."

This means that "the Galilean" is but man as we are, though "grown up" so to speak, and equal to His task. God is only incarnate in Him as Beethoven is incarnate in his music. He so sympathized with us as to live with us, and endure poverty and an unjust death ; and grace is His Spirit of living influence, through which we may hope to rise to heights at present unattainable. This Christ is sent to us as a gift of God.

But what could such a Man do for us ? He could only stimulate us by example to make a fresh attempt to rise to the inaccessible heights to which He has attained, because He has a strength which we have not. Of what use is this unless He give us of His strength by actual communion ? Yet Christ is only here presented to us as saying "be strong !" In so saying is He any more help than such as have said to the poor, "be ye warmed and filled and yet gave nothing to warm and feed them ?" <sup>1</sup> And of what profit are they ? Of what profit is the man who, having no strong desire for alcohol becomes a teetotalter to set a good example ? Of what help is he to the dipsomaniac ? And if he say to him, "See. I can keep away from the drink, so why cannot you ?" would it be very

<sup>1</sup> St. James ii, v. 16.

surprising if the drunkard cursed him for a Pharisee ? Or a travesty of justice, if the drunkard went first into the Kingdom of Heaven ?

In truth it would seem that "the substance of faith allied to science" is not so much a process of decanting through a strainer, as a distillation in which all the strength and aroma of the wine is lost, and nothing but water remains. It would be better to drink out of the old black bottle, even if the crust be broken up and the wine made muddy, for it would still be wine, generous and stimulating, and not the cold comfort of mere example however flawless<sup>1</sup>.

Pure Agnosticism, as meant by Mr. Romanes, seems far better than this, just as the silent sympathy of a faithful dog is better for a wounded spirit than the didactic criticisms of a Job's comforter. It is as one who rather than undertake to distil our wine says that we need not even decant it, we need only to hold it firmly and pour steadily, and the wine will run into the glass without slipping the crust and will be as clear as crystal.

Let Mr. G. J. Romanes explain for himself what it

<sup>1</sup> In saying what I have said about the new Catechism of Sir Oliver Lodge, I have considered it as the work of a teacher, and I have therefore been at some pains to find out what he has to teach. I am writing without animus. As an expression of what are felt to be the possibilities of belief by men of science after a period in which most of them felt able to believe nothing, we must regard it as a hopeful symptom and receive and read it with respectful reverence. But as a message of a master to little children through their parents and teachers it seems, as I have said, cold comfort.

is to be a "pure agnostic." The term "agnostic" he tells us (in *Thoughts on Religion* edited by Bishop Gore) is used in two very different senses. "By its originator, Professor Huxley, it was coined to signify an attitude of reasoned ignorance touching everything that is beyond the sphere of sense perception—a professed inability to found valid belief on any other basis. . . . But the other and perhaps more popular sense in which the word is now employed is as the correlative of Mr. H. Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable. . . . *Pure Agnosticism* is as defined by Huxley."

Now it is clear to me that what Mr. Romanes means by pure agnosticism is that which finds no valid reason in the observation of things perceived, for or against the possibility of things not perceivable; and if Professor Huxley went on to profess inability to found valid belief on any other basis than sense-perception it seems to me that it is he that is departing from pure agnosticism and not Mr. Spencer; for his doctrine of the Unknowable is that God is inconceivable, and that self-existent matter is inconceivable, and self-created matter also. If God therefore exist, but is inconceivable to us, He cannot reveal Himself to us, but we can conceive that He exists, and therefore He can make known the fact of His existence, and so much of His attributes as is to us conceivable and may even assert his Unknowability beyond that point. And we, if we be *pure* agnostics, will be able to accept testimony to this effect as true, if the testimony have sufficient weight of authority.

I may add in proof of that being Mr. Romanes' real meaning, which is much more important than the question whether Professor Huxley or Mr. Spencer more nearly conforms to that meaning, that he gives Hume as an instance of impure agnosticism on the ground of his *a priori* objection to miracles. It is the absence of such *a priori* and prejudiced refusal to believe which constitutes the *pure* agnostic. So that "provided *we lay aside all prejudice, sentiment, etc.* (the italics are mine) and follow to its logical termination the guidance of pure reason, there are no other conclusions to be reached than these. Namely (A) That if there be a personal God, no reason can be assigned why He should not be immanent in nature or why all causation should not be the immediate expression of His will" (as Catholic Theology says that it is). "(B) That every available reason points to the inference that He probably is so. (C) That if He is so, and if His will be self-consistent" (as again Catholic Theology says that it is), "all natural Causation must needs appear to us 'Mechanical.' Therefore (D), that it is no argument against the divine origin of a thing, event, etc., to prove it due to natural causation." He adds as a note to this that defenders of the faith who have not seen this have failed to make the best of their case: it is a mistake to assume "that there must be something inexplicable or miraculous about a phenomenon in order to its being divine."

On the other hand, pure agnosticism can have

no *a priori* objection " to Christian miracles, including the Incarnation," and so it " must allow that it is only the event that can prove whether Christianity is true or false." Again, " The doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity seemed to me almost absurd in my agnostic days. But now as a *pure* agnostic, I see in them no rational difficulty at all. To the objection that it is opposed to common sense this pure agnostic says, " So it ought to be." Common sense is merely a rough register of common experience, " but the Incarnation cannot have been a common event."

Again no answer could be given by the pure agnostic to the question, Why it should be thought a thing incredible that God should raise the dead, though he might ask the Christian why he thought it credible : to which question the Christian would in Mr. Romanes' judgment answer, if wise, " I believe in the resurrection of the dead, partly on grounds of reason, partly on those of intuition, but chiefly on both combined : so to speak it is my whole character which accepts the whole system of which the doctrine of immortality forms an essential part."

Is this cold comfort to one in doubt and distress about his faith ? If the true position of Science towards religion is one of pure agnosticism then the Man of Science " can answer ' Amen ' to the giving of thanks " of the Christian Priest as he stands at the altar and says :—

ENGLISH BOOK OF COMMON  
PRAYER

## ROMAN MISSAL

It is very meet, right, and our bounden duty, that we should at all times, and in all places, give thanks unto Thee, O Lord, Holy Father, Almighty, Everlasting God.

But chiefly are we bound to praise thee for the glorious Resurrection of thy Son Jesus Christ our Lord: for He is the very Paschal Lamb, which was offered for us, and hath taken away the sin of the World; Who by His death hath destroyed death, and by his rising to life again hath restored to us everlasting life. Therefore, with Angels and Archangels, and with all the Company of heaven, we laud and magnify thy glorious Name; evermore praising thee, and saying:

Himself joining in the singing of—

Holy, holy, holy, Lord God of hosts, Heaven and earth are full of thy glory: Glory be to Thee, O Lord most High,

Vere dignum est æquum et salutare. Te quidem Domine omni tempore.

Sed in hæc potissimum die gloriosius predicare, cum Pascha nostrum immolatus est Christus. Ipse enim Verus es Agnus, qui abstulit peccata mundi. Qui mortem nostram moriendo destruxit, et vitam resurgendo reparavit. Et ideo cum Angelis et Archangelis, cum thronis et dominationibus cumque omni militia celestis exercitus hymnum gloriæ tuæ canimus sine fine dicentes.

Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus Dominus Deus Sabaoth. Pleni sinet coeli et terra gloria tua. Hosanna in excelsis. Benedictus qui venit in nomine Domini. Hosanna in excelsis,

and confessing it to be the Catholic Faith "that the Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity is to be worshipped." This is more than "the substance of faith allied to science" could sustain.

Pure agnosticism can, moreover, receive and examine the evidences of Christianity without *a priori*

prejudice, it cannot refuse to hear them on the ground that narrative of the miraculous is incredible. So that if a pure agnostic can feel satisfied that *at least* the Epistles to the Romans, to the Galatians and to the Corinthians are indisputably genuine letters of St. Paul, he has enough evidence to prove to him what the belief of the Apostles was, and that Christ was actually seen after He was risen from the dead ; because the pure agnostic has an open mind and can, on sufficient testimony, believe what is beyond the reach of his vision.

Still his agnosticism is no *help* to the faith of the Agnostic. What then is the individual to do ? He must make an adventure of faith. " Do the doctrine," as Mr. Romanes says,<sup>1</sup> " and if Christianity be true, the verification will come not indeed mediately through any course of speculative reason but immediately by spiritual intuition. Only if a man has faith enough to make his venture honestly will he be in a just position for deciding the issue."

" If any man will do His work he shall know of the doctrine (which is that God has given us in His Son the blessed hope of everlasting life) whether it be of God.<sup>2</sup> For it is the Spirit that beareth witness with our Spirit."

Will you say that one, whose faith was obscured as knowledge came to him, who suffered deep distress at losing it, who was yet too absolutely honest with himself to let his desires over-ride his reason,

<sup>1</sup> *Vide Romanes' Thoughts on Religion.*

<sup>2</sup> St. John vii, 17.

but who purified his agnosticism, and so found belief possible, as something which, though transcending reason, did not do it violence, who, therefore, made the venture of faith, and died in the Grace of the Most Holy Sacrament found but cold comfort through pure agnosticism ?

END OF PART I

A




FIG. 1.  
A TYPICAL CELL  
N. Nucleus. A. Attraction Sphere.  
V. V. Vacuoles.

B




FIG. 2. THE STAGES IN THE DIVISION OF A CELL

1. Single Cell at rest. 2. Attraction Sphere divided. 3. Attraction Spheres at opposite ends. Nucleus broken into Chromosomes, in this case four. 4. Chromosomes arranged on Spindle. 5. Each Chromosome split into two. 6. The halves of each chromosome receding from each other towards opposite attraction spheres, and 7. Forming two nuclei. 8. The Result. Two Cells at rest.



C





FIG. 3.

#### GAMETES FORMING A ZYGOTE

A. Two Gametes about to unite. The Male, or Spermatozoon, has two chromosomes, an attraction sphere, and a tail. The Female, or Ovum, has no attraction sphere, but two chromosomes, and much cell substance.

B. The Zygote resulting from the above ; p. is the point at which the spermatozoon entered. This Cell has four chromosomes and an attraction sphere. It is thus ready to begin the process of cell division and cell differentiation, by which it will become a replica of the parents who contributed the "gametes" of which it is formed. The "Zygote" has the same number of chromosomes as had the cells of its parents : the "Gametes" half that number.


D



F

This figure shows the progressive changes in skulls in two different lineages, i.e., the three incisor teeth in the upper jaw. 1, 1<sub>2</sub>, and 1<sub>3</sub>. The Canine teeth have the same letterings in the other skulls, their subsequent examination of various portions of the skull, from the relative size and position of points on the snout by following the letter T. And the position of Man's head in relation to the skull.

E



G. 7.

■ of descent. A. and B. from a common ancestor A. B. Certain of the teeth, ■ or Eye tooth C and the lower incisors L1 are marked. And as the same gerations and disappearances can be traced. Also the relative proportion of ■ marked N, O and Z. Also the growth of the Elephant's tusk from an ordinary ■ on to the backbone from the letter V.




FIG. 4.

*Vorticella*, an animal consisting of but a single cell attached by a stalk to some fixed object. N. is the elongated nucleus. V. a vacuole. The arrow points to a long recess bordered by hairs by which food particles are drawn into its interior.




FIG. 5.

*Hydra*. An animal of many and different cells, though a very simple one. C. Central Cavity within a body wall consisting of two layers of cells of different kinds. M. is the "mouth" or opening of the central cavity, and T. T. are the arms or tentacles.




FIG. 6.

Nos. 1 to 5 inclusive shows the growth from a single cell in No. 1 to the *morula* or "blackberry" stage in No. 5. Nos. 6 to 9 show sections starting from the hollow *morula*, and ending in the *Gastrula*, or bag of two layers of cells of different kinds, and with a hole in it which is in all essential features a *hydra*.

FIG. 7.

*Vide* pages D and E.



FIG. 8.

This diagram was made to help the reader to realize the steps in the action of shooting at a mark. The information comes to the Brain B that the aim is good through the eye and its nerve, the order going out by another nerve to the muscle whose movement fires the pistol. The turning point between the inward and the outward motion is in the brain. The shooter which is represented in the diagram by his name "Richard Roe:" can be at will choose whether he will shoot or no? Has the mind or personality the power of either connecting or disconnecting at will the brain mechanism marked B which intervenes between sensation and action?

The difficulty lies in the question, of the mind or personality of the shooter which is represented in the diagram by his name "Richard Roe:" can he at will choose whether he will shoot or no? Has the mind or personality the power of either connecting or disconnecting at will the brain mechanism marked B which intervenes between sensation and action?



## PART II

### MORAL OR A POSTERIORI DIFFICULTIES

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#### CHAPTER I

##### FREE THOUGHT AND TESTIMONY

ON the Basis of Pure Agnosticism—"Free Thought" in the sense of Unfettered Speculation not Justified—*Per Contra* the necessity of Testimony for the formation of any idea of the Invisible World—True freedom of thought has its analogy in the "freedom" of a skilled batsman—It must think logically about some definite object—The personal survival of Bodily Death can be known only from Testimony—The Witness is God speaking (a) through the Prophets (b) as The Son Incarnate—Moral and Sentimental Objections to the Traditional and Authoritative Presentment of that Testimony—A Digression involved—Are the Gospels a Reliable Record of what Christ did say?—The Gospels worthless if not Historical.

WE have now done with the question of *a priori* objections to any supernatural or religious explanation of the Universe or to the Christian explanation in particular, and to the hope of man that his personal identity will survive bodily death. We have seen that natural knowledge furnishes no help to the forming of a judgment in such matters, so that one who has learnt all that science has to teach him is, if true to his teaching, a "pure agnostic" as regards the purpose or *raison d'être* of the Universe in general and of man's final destiny in particular: just as the naturalist who tells us the names of all

## THE FUTURE LIFE

Things in our box is a pure agnostic as to the use which we may put them. There is no *a priori* restriction in the things that are seen to a future life as in the unseen order or to any imaginable conditions of life in the unseen order. So far as science is concerned we are free to think what

I repeat this because I want my readers to accompany me through the second part of this book with a clear understanding that, in arriving at pure agnosticism, we have gained a secure and permanent hold, and can leave scientific difficulties altogether behind us, and also because we shall need in the future to keep before us what we mean by a pure agnostic, as we shall have further need to use the idea. So far as science is concerned we are free to think what we like.

We are accustomed to the term "free thought," as the claim of a man to speculate freely on any question and form what opinions he may list, without reference to the "tyranny of dogma and authority." About the future life Science, being purely agnostic, leaves us free to think what we like, but if we lay claim to "free thought," as the term is usually understood, on such matters, I am afraid that Science would laugh at us! I can hear her saying, "I lay claim to describe what I see as I see it and when once my description of any object and its relationship to its surroundings is verified I claim that my description shall be bowed to as truth. As regards the things that are not seen I leave you entirely free: if you choose to evolve

## CRITICISM OF "FREE" THOUGHT 251

ideas about that which you cannot see out of your own unaided inner consciousness, *I* can raise no objection, *I* shall not dissent from your conclusions, but *I* cannot be expected to accept them for they seem to me worthless, as worthless as the many and ponderous volumes of a *savant* who, being commissioned to write a treatise on the camel, at once shut himself up in his study and wrote without having seen a camel, ever, in all his life ! *I* only claim to be loyal to what *I* see, and if *I* leave you free in matters which cannot be seen, it seems to me that you can only form ideas and conclusions on the testimony of those who have seen. If, therefore, you come back with information based on the testimony of witnesses who seem to possess sufficient ability and integrity

*I* will listen to you, and if the credentials of the witnesses are good *I* will definitely assent to what they have to say, though such matters are not my proper business. It was Bishop Pearson who understood the real meaning of pure agnosticism, though he did not know the phrase." Pure agnosticism, therefore, is anything but an ally to "free thought," it drives us, on the contrary, straight to authoritative revelation.

It may be profitable here to consider under what conditions thought can be really free. Real free thinking is in many ways analogous to free hitting. We may often read in the cricket news of the daily papers such a statement as that "So and So was in splendid form, and up to the luncheon hour was hitting out freely and rapidly compiling a score." Let us analyse this free hitting. It requires two conditions, (1) a ball to be hit, and (2) good "form"

on the part of the batsman. Free hitting is not wild "swiping," but is the result of steady practice and careful attention to the canons of form. It is when these canons of form have become second nature to the batsman—and the same principle applies *mutatis mutandis* to a golfer or an oarsman—that he can throw off self-consciousness and obtain a confident and easy mastery of the situation. The tyro may by swiping wildly, probably with his eyes shut, by chance hit a ball to the boundary, but the bowler will soon have an inevitable revenge.

So thought to be free must (1) have something to think about and (2) think according to rule. Wherefore, in relation to the things which are seen it must be loyal to what is seen, and in relation to those which are not seen it must either accept what it is told on the authority of those who know or must refrain from thinking altogether, and its thinking must be in accordance with the laws of correct reasoning. One cannot think freely unless one thinks logically about some object, the mere random contemplation of vagueness is not so much free thinking as wild guessing.

Now when the vital motions of our body cease our body ceases to be the expression of our personal identity. What becomes of personal identity at such a crisis is unknown, and therefore how good or bad conduct in this life, *i.e.* works done in the body, can affect unknown future conditions is also unknown. Wild guessing can be no help in such a case, for the guesses cannot be verified, *we must be told*: and told not only what our condition will

## TESTIMONY TO THE FUTURE LIFE 253

then be and whether and, if so, how it will be conditioned by our mode of conducting our life here, but even whether there will be a hereafter at all.

This testimony must come from God, who must either give intuitive revelations to such men as are said to have spoken as prophets unto our fathers, or the fuller testimony of the Son, who is "heir of all things, by Whom also the worlds were made," and Who, being manifest in the flesh and speaking with human voice, could testify to the things which He had seen and heard, and specially to the destiny of us whom, though we are His creatures, "He is not ashamed to call His brethren."<sup>1</sup>

Our task now is to consider the future life in relation to a *posteriori* or moral and sentimental difficulties. The natural method of doing so would be first to find from the records of Christ's life what He had said on the subject and the interpretation placed upon it, in the New Testament writings other than the Gospels, and in the authoritative propositions of the Church : to distinguish what is authoritatively taught from the details with which doctrine is, so to speak, "decorated," by the imagination to help the mind to realize it, and to note departures from the authoritative standard based on moral and other grounds, and whether they turn on objections to the formal teaching or to embellishments of it, and to consider how far these departures are justified and whether the alternatives which they suggest may not be worse than that which they revolt against evil.

But the sayings of Christ are contained in the

<sup>1</sup> Hebrews ii, v, 11.

18—(2413)

Gospels: is their narrative a record of what He actually said? The point is important, because they are the only records of the life and sayings of Jesus of Nazareth. We have already discussed the general question of the relation of Scriptural truth to historical accuracy in Chapter VI of Part I. We were there, however, chiefly concerned with the narrative of the early chapters of Genesis and the question whether the value of their doctrine of the origin of the world and the nature of man depended on the historical accuracy of the narratives contained in them. We came to the conclusion:—

(1) That the narratives could not be historical, because history consists in the *natural* preservation of records of events, and no natural records of the beginnings of man are conceivable.

(2) That the essential events of those chapters are known, not on historical but on logical grounds. We know that the world must have begun somehow, and that man must have had a beginning on it, their existence is a record of the fact. We know that man does "of his deliberate and wilful act as a free agent," a phrase used by Sir Oliver Lodge, "see the better and choose the worse," so we know there was a first time when he did so, and we know that there is a fault and corruption in the children of Adam. We know also that man's life has been one of wars and catastrophes, or "deluges," in which only the few have survived, and of attempts at co-operation and progress, such as would constitute towers reaching to Heaven, and that such ventures have ended in anarchy and failure.

## GOSPELS MUST BE HISTORICAL 255

(3) That the early chapters of Genesis offer a religious explanation of these permanent facts of life.

(4) That allegory is a suitable vehicle for such doctrine, and that we have Pauline authority for an allegoric or mystical use of the Old Testament stories.

Wherefore we concluded that the doctrinal value of these chapters is not dependent on their historical character.

The Gospels, however, are not in the same position. We cannot know *logically* what any particular person said at any particular time, but only by record of his words, that is, *historically*,<sup>1</sup> and the record must be by natural means. Moreover, if we wish to know what any particular person said and taught in some past time, we must have accurate records which faithfully preserve at least the substance of his doctrine. Let us take two examples.

(1) That of Jeremiah who prophesied against Jerusalem. If we are to know what he said, Baruch need only take pains to be accurate when he writes the words "with ink in a book."<sup>2</sup>

(2) Supposing Mars to be inhabited, and that an inhabitant was alleged to have projected himself through space and to have alighted on the dome of St. Paul's and exhorted the multitude. As a pure agnostic I could not reject the idea as *impossible*, but I should look closely at the evidence.

<sup>1</sup> Vide Pt. I, Chapter xi.

<sup>2</sup> Jeremiah xxxv, v. 18.

Now supposing some one to tell me that he knew it to have happened on supernatural or occult grounds, that he had seen it in the ink-pool or by crystal gazing, or that it had been written by "Planchette," it would be an effort to be even polite. But supposing some matter-of-fact person, say a policeman or a 'bus driver, to say that they had seen it, I should have to treat him with more respect, and if several such men were to give corroborative evidence I might feel constrained to admit the only explanation of the evidence to be that the fact was as stated. This brings out the importance of the preservation of the Gospel Record by *natural* means.

It is clear, however, that there are limits to the accuracy of evidence,<sup>1</sup> and it is said by some, to take an example, that the Fourth Gospel was written so long after the events that the possible standard of historical accuracy in that case is not very high, that in it Christ is "idealized," and that this idealization is with the object of presenting Christ as the Eternal Word. I have recently seen it said by a writer in the *Hibbert Journal* that, as the author has this theological purpose, it is unfair to expect him to be historical, that is, to confine himself to stating what he knows to be facts! This attitude is very difficult for anyone with a scientific training to understand. When a man of science has a theory to propound he is expected to use the utmost diligence in making sure of the facts on which he founds it, and so for that matter is a secular historian. Suppose, for example, that some historian wished to prove Henry VIII to have been

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* Pt. I, Chapter xi.

a democrat at heart, he would have to produce facts, not idealizations, as proofs of his theory. And so it hardly seems that the Evangelists are to be excused from veracity and accuracy on the ground that they have something to prove. St. Matthew sets himself to show his readers (probably Jews) how Christ's life was a fulfilment of prophecy: St. Luke to present Christ (in the Gospel) and Christianity (in the Acts) as, essentially, law-abiding and unlikely to give trouble to the civil power: and St. John to present Christ to his own, as their Lord and their God, all of which demand accuracy in the acts, on which the thesis is based.

We have arrived, then, at the point that the nature of the life hereafter is to be learned only from testimony, and that the testimony of Christ. The Gospels claim to contain a record of what Christ actually said. It is of vital importance to us, therefore, that the Gospels should preserve the substance of Christ's real teaching. Those who are satisfied that this is so and are not interested in the question of the authority of the Gospels can pass over the next chapter, which is a digression. It seems to me, however, that, as the trustworthiness of the Gospel narrative is in these days called in question, it is a necessary digression.

## CHAPTER II

### A DIGRESSION ON THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE GOSPEL NARRATIVE

**ARE** the Gospels historical?—An Answer obtainable only by subjecting them to Criticism by Scholars—Who must not be biassed by the nature of the Subject matter, they must be Pure Agnostics—A brief account of Gospel Criticism—The self-evident fact of the Interdependence of the Synoptic Gospels—The result of (1) Common Oral tradition? or (2) the use of Documents? or (3) Did one use another?—St. Mark—St. Luke—Sir Wm. Ramsay's indication of the accuracy of his references to events and date is Secular History—Especially as regards the date of Christ's Birth—St. John—Of later Date—Its purpose—Written either by "The Disciple whom Jesus Loved," or a fraud—Difficulty of reconciling the second alternative with the character of the Work—St. John's authorship received by his personal disciples and those who knew them—Some difficulties and counter-difficulties—Conclusion.

**ARE** the Gospels a trustworthy record of the sayings of Jesus Christ? It is important, as we have seen, that they should be so.

Their trustworthiness depends on the preservation by natural means of the testimony of eye-witnesses to what they had seen. Is the date, language, authorship of the Gospels such that they can have been written by eye-witnesses or by men who had access to eye-witnesses? Are the allusions to the events of secular history stated to have occurred at the same time and noticed for the purpose of giving the date of events correct, or are they blunders? If these are not correct, how were they

when? and why? Or are they only harmless blunders?

To answer these questions the Gospels must be subjected to criticism just as other historical documents are. The critics must be "scholars," that is men well acquainted with the language of the documents and with other languages of the time: also with the general history of the period, and of the documents and monuments on which it is based. It does not, however, belong to the critic to say whether the events narrated are possible or impossible in themselves, for to do so would be to beg the question, the events are events which can be known only on evidence. The just critic must therefore be a "pure agnostic." Yet again the critic must be logical, he must give reasons for the conclusions at which he arrives, and he must not treat a conclusion as a certainty unless the evidence which supports it makes it certain. It is often impossible to come to a *certain* conclusion, but only to hold that of two alternatives the balance is in favour of A rather than of B. It is clearly unjustifiable after showing A to be merely rather more probable than B to treat A as a certainty in proving something else. In no other branch of science would such procedure be tolerated.

But to give a brief account of Gospel criticism. Any attentive person, especially with the aid of such tables as are to be found in a teacher's Bible, can see that the first three Gospels tell broadly the **same series** of events, and that the fourth Gospel **is what they do not tell**. The first three are

called the Synoptic Gospels. Next, anyone can see that :—

(1) There is a considerable body of events told in almost identical language and in practically the same order by the Synoptists. (2) The events told only by St. Mark are very few indeed. (3) There is a body of events common to St. Matthew and St. Luke and omitted by St. Mark. (4) There is a further section peculiar to St. Luke.

Again, anyone can see that St. Mark begins with a rapid summary, mere headings, of the events of the preaching of John Baptist, the baptism of Christ, and His temptation, which are fully related by SS. Matthew and Luke : that from thence onwards the truths of Christ's ministry are told with vivid freshness down to the point where the women found the sepulchre empty and the angel who told of His resurrection, and then fled from the sepulchre "for they were afraid."<sup>1</sup> The remaining verses lapse into summary similar to that with which the Gospel opens.

Again, anyone can see that S. Matthew and St. Luke both tell of the birth of Christ, that both say that He was the Son of Mary by supernatural conception, and that He was born at Bethlehem in the time of Herod the Great. But they narrate totally different sets of circumstances. Here again anyone can see that the matter narrated in St. Matthew could have had only one source, St. Joseph. Only he could have known of the dreams. Also the visit of the Magi, the Massacre following it,

<sup>1</sup> Chapter xvi, v. 8.



and the flight into Egypt, which was under St. Joseph's control, would be just what would impress themselves upon and interest a man. They are also just the events to interest an author whose attention is directed to the fulfilment of prophecy. It is also obvious that the matter narrated by St. Luke could have but one source, Our Blessed Lady. Every item is of feminine interest: the details of the Baptist's birth, the Annunciation to Mary herself, and the intense interest in the future of her Son, each turning point in His growth from infancy to manhood, and the prophecy of a great but perilous destiny. It is also noteworthy that the Evangelist who records these incidents does so with perfect taste and delicacy, and that he seems to have had a peculiarly high and chivalrous regard for women.

How came the events to be recorded in these three Gospels? They *cannot* be each a separate history, written separately by separate eye-witnesses or inquirers who took down the verbal evidence of eye-witnesses, because there is a body of narrative common to all three which narrates the same events in the same form. Did all three:—

- (1) Use a common document?
- (2) Use the traditional body of oral instruction which had taken shape in the course of practical teaching, and had become by constant repetition a set form of words? or:—
- (3) Did the longer and fuller Gospels use the shorter and simpler ones, adding matter from other sources which each regarded as desirable to be preserved?

there are other considerations which go to establish S. Luke "as one of the great historians." It is the testimony of a really fair and honestly pre-agnostic critic, a man of great learning in the general history of the time and in the geography of Asia Minor, its history and the peoples who inhabited it in the first century A.D., I mean Sir William Ramsay of Aberdeen. Those who wish to go thoroughly into his reasons must read his books, especially *Was Christ Born at Bethlehem?* and *Paul the Traveller and Roman Citizen*. All that is possible in this short digression is to give the briefest outline of his work.

As regards St. Luke's second book, that is, the Acts, Sir William Ramsay tells us that in the first century<sup>1</sup> "Roman organizing skill was treating one by one the successive problems of government amid a semi-Oriental population (in Asia Minor) . . . and fostering among them a spirit of pride in the imperial connexion and contempt for the extra-provincial barbarians." St. Paul's missionary journeys occurred while this work was going on. Now it came to Sir William Ramsay, while piecing this history together, to "understand that Luke's brief references to the state of Central Asia Minor plunged the reader into the heart of the conflict between Græco-Roman forms of life and the amorphous barbarism of a Phrygian and Lycaonian population. . . . Such a state of things could not have been conceived or understood by a writer of

<sup>1</sup> This and all quotations are from *Was Christ Born at Bethlehem?*

the second century, when Rome had long been supreme over the whole of Asia Minor, and when the opposition between conflicting ideas, Roman . . . on the one hand, native (i.e. Phrygian, Pisidian, etc.) . . . on the other, had ceased to be a real force in the country." "One feels in all that concerns Asia Minor, Luke is treating real facts with real knowledge."

Now the importance of this is twofold. These facts of which St. Luke shows real knowledge were occurring between fifteen and twenty-five years after the Crucifixion. St. Luke was therefore clearly in a position to have known many eye-witnesses of the events of our Lord's life, including the Blessed Virgin herself.<sup>1</sup> Also, if he is so reliable in his second book, he is probably equally reliable in the first,<sup>2</sup> in which he claims to have been at pains to be accurate. But there has been a great difficulty. As follows.

The conventional Christian era is a miscalculation and is about six years too late, so that the year in which Christ was born is what we would count as B.C. 6. Herod the Great died in B.C. 4.

St. Luke tells us that "it came to pass in those days" (i.e. the days of Herod the Great) "that there went out a decree from Cæsar Augustus that all the world should be taxed. And this taxing

<sup>1</sup> St. Paul's journeys *end* in A.D. 58, when he was tried before Felix. At that date Our Lady, if still alive, as she certainly might have been, would have been eighty-six, were she twenty at the Nativity. It is, therefore, clearly possible for St. Luke to have met her before that date.

<sup>2</sup> Hamack is the latest champion of the Lucan Authorship of the two books.

was first made when Cyrenius (Publius Sulpicius Quirinius) was Governor of Syria. And all went to be taxed every one to his own city."

But <sup>1</sup> P. Sulpicius Quirinius was not Governor till A.D. 6, ten years after the Nativity. The "taxing" was a census or enrolment, not a tax. A general census under Augustus was improbable, as Imperial and Senatorial provinces were under different *régimes*. Herod was a *Rex Socius* or Tributary King under the empire (a position analogous to that of the Rajah of a native state in the Indian Empire), and the Romans would not interfere to make a census in a kingdom of this sort. Also if there was a Roman census they would not care about family considerations, such as every man being enrolled in his own tribal city, his usual place of residence would quite satisfy them. Herod Archelaus, who succeeded Herod the Great in Judea,<sup>2</sup> was deposed in A.D. 6. And then Quirinius did, according to Josephus the Jewish historian, make a census. This is the taxation in the course of which "Judas of Galilee rose up and drew away much people after him."<sup>3</sup>

Now to any attentive reader here is a real difficulty. It may be said in reply that tributary kings have to do what they are told; that if Augustus wanted a census Herod would have to make it, much as he might dislike it; that details

<sup>1</sup> I am making extracts from my notes of lectures delivered by Professor Ryle of Cambridge [now Bishop of Winchester] in the Easter Term of 1894. Sir William Ramsay's book was published in 1898.

<sup>2</sup> S. Matthew ii, v. 22.

<sup>3</sup> Acts v, v. 37.

would be left to him, as they often are in tributary kingdoms, and that Herod might gild the pill by giving it as Jewish and national a character as possible. To let every man be enrolled in his own tribal city would well serve his purpose.<sup>1</sup> Further, it could be said that the allusion to the rebellion of Judas of Galilee in the days of the "taxing" is recorded by St. Luke, so that he knew of the riots, while he represents that during which Christ was born as one which the people carried out quietly and with a good will. Might there not have been two "taxings"? might not "taxings" have been even periodic functions?

But the facts remain. Herod the Great died B.C. 4, and Quirinius was not governor till A.D. 6. We have one opening here. Quirinius was Governor in A.D. 6 no doubt, but is it safe to say that he was not governor before then? Might he not have been twice governor? It might be answered that the idea is conceivable but wildly improbable; but there is a more definite answer, which is that some one else was governor at that time. Quinctilius Varus governed Syria from B.C. 7 to B.C. 4.<sup>2</sup>

Now what are we to say? That the facts of Christ's birth matter and not the date? That is true, but can a writer who claims to be scrupulously accurate, and to give references to two events

<sup>1</sup> I don't know whether a general census is ever held in India, but, if it is, I suppose that in British Territories it would be carried out by the Indian Civil Servants in their way, and in the Native States by the Rajah's Officials in their way.

<sup>2</sup> This on the authority of Sir William Ramsay.

with the express purpose of giving the correct date of the events which he records, be trusted as a recorder of facts. Such a man would be a bad blunderer, and Sir William Ramsay thinks that he could not be trusted. Whether he could, under such circumstances, be trusted or not, however, it would have to be admitted, I think, that if he was after all proved to be right and if the difficulty were cleared up, his credit as a historian should be very high, for he would have come through a very severe test without a stain on his professional reputation. Sir William Ramsay practically demonstrates that he does. It might be sufficient to barely state his results and refer my readers to his book for the reasons, but as the reasons are most interesting and this chapter admittedly a digression, space may be spared to give an outline of the reasons.

Sir William Ramsay's first remark is that St. Luke's language does not say what office Quirinius held in Syria when the "taxing" was first made in the days of Herod. Any position of authority might apply, such as a military "command." It is known that Quirinius was consul in Rome B.C. 12 and that he was governor of Syria A.D. 6-9. We want his history between those dates.

In A.D. 2 Quirinius was made tutor to the Emperor's grandson Gaius and was charged with settling the affairs of Armenia in succession to Lollius, who left them in some confusion. It was just before this that he married Domitia Lepida, who had been betrothed to another grandson of Augustus, Lucius

Cæsar. He seems to have got back to Rome A.D. 4, for Gaius died at Lycia, in Asia Minor, on his way home. This fills up the time to within two years of the governorship of Syria in A.D. 6. It also implies that he had already had a very distinguished career.

To call a fresh witness, a marble found in the Tiber with an inscription. It is broken, and there is no name. It records the career and honours of some great Roman. It says that he "subdued a kingdom to Augustus and the Roman people," and that in consideration of these successes he was granted two "supplications" and triumphal decorations, that he was Pro-consul of Asia, and *the second time* became the representative of Augustus in Syria and Ph(oenicia). All the highest authorities agree that this was P. Sulpicius Quirinius. Now most consuls were made Pro-consuls of Asia about six years after their Consulate. The probable date of Quirinius' Pro-consulate is therefore B.C. 5-6, or one of the next two or three years, the latest being B.C. 3-2. The first command in Syria cannot therefore have been later than B.C. 4, and may well have covered B.C. 6, *that is to say, that it may well have coincided with the time of Christ's birth.*

Lastly, Augustus made a great effort to pacify the troublesome natives of the Taurus between B.C. 8 and B.C. 5. And this work would fall to the military authorities of the Province of Syria-Cilicia, and would be the "subjugation of a kingdom" recorded on the stone.

As regards the census. Actual census papers (papyri) have been found in Egypt. The census occurred every fourteen years. Specimens of papers exist for the years A.D. 20, 90, 104, 118, and so on, and a register refers to others in 61 (time of Nero), and previous ones. The scheme seems to have existed in Egypt from the beginning of Augustus' reign. The first and second enrolments would be in B.C. 23-22 and B.C. 9-8; B.C. 23 was the year in which Augustus formally became Emperor. Evidence is adduced for this cycle being extended over the empire generally, including Syria. The census in the time of Herod the Great should have been taken in B.C. 8 and in Roman Syria was then taken, but Herod would try to get excused, as the Jews might make a disturbance, and if they did the Romans might depose him; they would stand no disorder. He would at least secure delay.

St. Luke, it seems then, cannot be convicted of bad history because he says that Christ was born in Bethlehem when a decree went out from Augustus, while Quirinius held command in Syria, that all the world should be taxed, every man going to his own city, and Joseph and Mary in particular to Bethlehem, since they were of the house and lineage of David. His accuracy is, on the contrary, marvellously corroborated.

There remains the Gospel of St. John. This book is clearly not without reference to the other three, for one of its obvious aims is to supply what they omit: this shows that it must have been written after them, but not derived from them.

There is another reason why it is written later. The Church having become an organized body with its elders ordained in every city, the Apostolic foundation is laid. Questions are beginning to arise as to Christ's nature: He seems more than man. And this Gospel proclaims Him God, the Son of God, the "Word made flesh,"<sup>1</sup> through whom God in these last days speaks to us. Now it is said that in this Gospel Christ is idealized; that it is very beautiful and valuable, but that it is not history. But this Gospel *claims* to be history; it claims plainly to have been written by the Apostle who lay on Jesus' breast at supper,<sup>2</sup> and therefore to be reliable as adducing *facts* in support of the doctrine of Christ which it upholds. If it is written by that disciple, it is history; if it is not, the attestation that it is, is a lie pure and simple, and if this last be so it is difficult to see what value it can possess. So much is plain to anyone who can read the Authorized Version; he need not be a critic, or even know Greek.

If, however, we find in this Gospel narratives simply and naturally told, matter which supplements the writing of the other evangelists, assuming knowledge of what they tell, and in the narrative of miracles showing the same restraint as they, Christ working no bombastic miracles of self-advertisement; and if the whole show a good taste and absence of vulgarity, it is very difficult

<sup>1</sup> S. John i, v. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Chapter xlii, v. 23, and xxi, v. 24.

to believe that the Gospel in which they are contained is the work of a fraudulent liar. It is more natural for it to be what it professes to be. But can it be so?

The Apostles of Christ must have been young men when they followed the Lord as disciples; they need not have been much above twenty years old, the ordinary age at which young men are trained for their life's work. An apostle of the age of twenty at the Crucifixion would be eighty-five years of age in A.D. 90 or ninety-five in A.D. 100. A man who lives to a very great age is often a man of exceptionally good memory, especially of the events of early manhood. An apostle who loved the Lord would remember and turn over the events and the words of our Lord. He could remember the substance and the crucial sentences,<sup>1</sup> if not the words of His addresses.

Next, St. Irenæus, Bishop of Lyons, had learned from Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna. Polycarp was a disciple of St. John at Ephesus. Polycarp told Irenæus what he remembered of St. John's lessons. The same Irenæus received the four Gospels, and St. John was received and known everywhere and translated into Syriac and Latin thirty years before Irenæus wrote (in A.D. 190). Justin Martyr quotes St. John in A.D. 138. St. Polycarp who knew him quotes his first epistle. There is plenty of evidence

<sup>1</sup> A remembered speech is always condensed, the discourses of our Lord in St. John are not really long. The wording *may* be St. John's, but there is a sentence in St. Matthew xi, 27 and Luke x, 22, which is exactly like the speeches recorded in St. John.

to show that the Gospel was received by those who knew St. John or his personal disciples, and that St. John did live at Ephesus and survived to a very great age.

Professor Harnack thinks St. John's Gospel was written not before A.D. 80 or after A.D. 110. An apostle *could* have survived to the latest possible date.

The Gospel of St. John therefore seems to have been written at a date to which St. John seems to have lived, to have been acknowledged by men who had a direct personal tradition from the Apostle, and the work is of such a character that there are moral difficulties in supposing the statement, "This is the disciple that testifieth of these things, and we know that his testimony is true," to be a deliberate lie.

It is objected that the Gospel is not historical because :—

(1) The writer does not include the institution of the Eucharist in the account of the Last Supper. If he knew the other Gospels and wished to supplement them, this objection seems pointless.

(2) The other Gospels give no account of the raising of Lazarus, therefore it did not happen : for, if it had happened, they would have known of it, and if they had known of it they would certainly have recorded it. But there is no certainty. Writers and speakers do most unaccountably leave out what they ought of necessity to mention.

The whole issue may be looked at more broadly.

Can the Gospels be a mixture of history and exaggerated legend? If so, can we disentangle them? If we say the miracles are false because they are impossible, how can we trust the Gospels to give Christ's true words? Yet again, if the Gospels contribute items to one consistent picture of Christ, can they be an ill-authenticated patchwork of second-hand stories? No one can read Sir John Seeley's *Ecce Homo!* without realizing the consistency and the moral majesty of Christ as presented in the Gospels. Yet he shows that Christ claimed a personal allegiance which no good man could claim were he no more than man. He in fact claimed the allegiance which can be given only to God.

The words of the Gospels might be the words of Christ, even if there were no miracles and He were not the Lord from heaven. But it is only if He be "the Lord from heaven"<sup>1</sup> that His testimony as to what awaits us in the life of the world to come is of any value whatever.

What follows is written on the assumption that readers are agreed with the writer in believing :—

(1) That the Gospels are true histories and do preserve to us a true record of what our Lord said, and :—

(2) That His words are an authoritative witness for our purpose because He is "the Lord from heaven."

<sup>1</sup> I Cor. xv, v. 47.

## CHAPTER III

### " ETERNAL HOPE "

POPULAR opinions about the Future Life—Dr. Farrar's " Eternal Hope " a movement of a Revulsion against the then popular conception of Everlasting Torment—Of Calvinistic Origin—The rejection of Purgatory—To allege that it is Romish not a valid reason for its Rejection—The Popular Belief Shallow and Conventionalized, viz. : A finite arbitrary God with arbitrary Commandments, Rewards and Punishments—Error of Confusing Eternity with Endless Time—The " Eternal Hope " offers no criticism on this point—Confusion of the Nature of Punishment with the Number of the Lost—Is chiefly horrified at the Idea of Endless Physical Pain—And regards the Forfeiture of Destiny as relatively tolerable.

THE future life belongs to the category of the things which are not seen and are eternal. Of them we can have no knowledge except upon testimony. The Gospels record for us the Words of Christ,<sup>1</sup> and Christ is the Lord from Heaven. His testimony therefore is to be received. It is to be received both as it is recorded in the Gospels and as it is systematically propounded in the Creed of Christendom.

We have now to deal with modern difficulties of a moral or a *posteriori* character in relation to the standard belief in a future life. There are never moral difficulties in connexion with any matter in

<sup>1</sup> Those who do not agree to this can still follow with me if they assent to the Catholic Church, that is, visible, organized Christendom, as the infallible exponent of the faith of Christ.

regard to which there are not diversities of popular opinion in relation to the subject of debate, whatever it may be. In which case it is best first to study and sift popular opinion and then call in Authority to settle the matter. Judicial Authority does not speak until the special pleaders have said their several says.

No one could enter upon a consideration of popular opinions concerning the future life as they prevail at the present day in England, without reference to the series of sermons preached by Dean Farrar at Westminster in 1877, and published under the title of "Eternal Hope."

The importance of these sermons—it is much more accurate to speak of them as sermons than as a book—lies in the fact that in the days when the Dean was "Canon Farrar" of Westminster Abbey he was a great popular preacher. The bond between him and his audience was a community not so much of thought as of emotion. There arises, therefore the question as to how far he was a leader imparting his emotions to the people, or how far he caught up their feelings and voiced them with his eloquent rhetoric, and in voicing them reflected them back in an intensified form. It is a question which cannot be answered definitely ; the psychological connexion between an emotional speaker or preacher and his hearers is a very subtle and complex thing, and it is probable that the interchange of emotion is in its nature not far different from the waves of unanimous sentiment which will run through even a leaderless crowd in times of excitement or tension. **At any**

rate, the interaction between preacher and audience is probably sufficiently reciprocal and complex for his sermons to be a fair record of the common feeling of the public who "sat under" him, a public which was very large and thoroughly representative of the English middle-class sentiment of the time. It is this that gives the sermons their importance.

These sermons cannot be treated as a serious contribution to eschatology, i.e., the theology of the Future Life and the "last things." Preached to a great congregation whose attention is caught up by the oratory of a great preacher, they no doubt sounded, as all Canon Farrar's sermons did sound, fine. But read from print in cold blood, one begins to feel that the monster who excites the preacher's indignation, and which he accuses of in some way oppressing myriads of simple men and women who are incapable of resisting his tyranny, but who is at the same time in danger of being swept away by these same people, who, having once at the Reformation freed themselves from tyranny, are in no mood to again put their necks under the yoke, is but a monster of straw whom the preacher has made, quite unconsciously, and which he is now proceeding, in all good faith, to overthrow! The irony of the position is further emphasized by the fact that the monster is the horror of eternal torment, and that it is by reason of the fact that the Reformation has robbed us of the humane and reasonable but "corrupt" doctrine of Purgatory that the horror is so intolerable!

## THE FUTURE LIFE

It is not true to say that these sermons teach Universalism, or assert that every man must ultimately be saved. The sermons are too emotional to convey definite and systematic doctrine. They are rather agnostic on the point, maintaining that we have no decisive authority for regarding the retribution which must fall on the impenitent as unending, or for holding that no place of repentance is open to him after this present phase of life is ended. This is evident to any one who will read the sermons carefully and attentively, even without referring to the preface.

None the less it is true that anyone reading or hearing the sermons must lay them down with the feeling that if the Reverend Canon who preached them was to be relied on as a guide, it would be "safe" (as a lawyer says when asked for an opinion), for him, the reader or hearer, to be an Universalist. But to return to the sermons.

They are essentially the expression of revolt, on moral and sentimental grounds, against the then popular "orthodox" eschatology. To see them as such, the book itself must be read, unless the following samples may suffice :—

"What the popular notion of hell is, you, my brethren, are all aware. Many of us were scared with it, horrified with it, perhaps almost maddened by it in our childhood. It is that, the moment a human being dies—at whatever age, under whatever disadvantages—his fate is sealed finally and for ever; and that if he die in unrepenting sin, that

fate is a never-ending agony, amid physical tortures the most frightful that can be imagined ; so that when we think of the future of the human race we must conceive of a vast burning prison in which the lost souls of millions and millions writhe and shriek for ever, tormented in a flame that never will be quenched."

This occurs in Sermon No. III entitled, " Hell—What it is Not," and is followed by extracts from various authors describing in lurid language the pains of the lost. Again :—

" Which of us has not heard sermons or read books to the effect that if every leaf of the forest trees and every grain of the ocean sands stood for billions of years, and all these billions were exhausted, you would still be no nearer even to the beginning of Eternity than at the first ; and that (pardon me for reproducing what I abhor) if you could conceive an everlasting toothache, or an endless cautery, or the incessant scream of a sufferer beneath the knife, that would give you but a faint conception of the agony of hell ; and yet in the same breath that the majority of mankind are doomed to hell by an absolute predestination ? Which of us has not heard teaching which implied or did not even shrink from stating this ? And dare any of you regard such teaching as other than blasphemy against a merciful God ? If you are not unaffected when the destitute perish of hunger, or the dying agonize in pain, is there any human being, worthy the dignity of a human being, whose soul does not revolt and sicken at the notion of a world aflame ? "

What are the above passages but a moral and sentimental revolt against a doctrine of eternal torment finally and irrevocably incurred at death, and involving the bulk of mankind such as is stated in the passages themselves? If this opinion need confirmation we have it in the preface, where the author states that he "repudiates and condemns":—

(1) The physical torments, the material agonies, the "*sapiens ignis*" of Eternal Punishment;

(2) The supposition of its necessarily endless duration to all who incur it;

(3) The opinion that it is thus incurred by the vast mass of mankind;

(4) That it is a doom passed irreversibly at the moment of death on all who die in a state of sin.

It is, I suppose, unquestionably true that some such belief constituted the popular "orthodox" eschatology at the time (1877) when the sermons were delivered. It is a belief traceable to Calvinism and to the rejection of all belief in Purgatory as "Romish" and therefore (!) wicked. The real objection to the popular belief does not seem to me, however, to lie in its Calvinism, that is in a serious working belief in absolute predestination, because I suspect that only a minority even of Protestant Christians have held it as a practical working belief. The objection seems to lie rather in its shallow, unthinking conventionality. It is, for example, the shallowest of conventionality to

hold that a doctrine must be wicked *because* "Romish."<sup>1</sup>

But the popular belief was shallow and conventional in other ways. God is incomprehensible. We cannot think consistently of God as immanent in His works and yet transcending them, we cannot even think consistently of ourselves as immanent in our bodies and yet transcending them. We can only think of ourselves or of God in one way at a time. When a boy says to his neighbour, "Don't pinch me!" he thinks of himself as extending into or immanent in all parts of his body including the locality in which he is pinched. When he says, "Don't tread on my toe!" he thinks of his toe as objective to himself and of himself as transcending his toe, that is, of his personality as external and opposite to his members. So we at one time think of the world as sustained by the Divine Will, that is, of the visible universe as the expression of God immanent in it as the cause of its existence, at another we think of God as the Creator external

<sup>1</sup> The "Romish" system seems to me wrong because it claims for the Roman Bishop such absolute authority over other Bishops that they become merely his delegates, whereas history shows such authority to have been usurped, as it did not belong to early Roman Bishops, nor were the other Apostles mere delegates of Peter. But it does not follow that all that is taught under "Romish" auspices is wicked. On the contrary it seems to me that the great glory of the Roman Church has been her loyalty to the Faith once for all delivered to the Saints, a glory which has been spoilt by the "Spirit of Diotrephes who loveth to have the pre-eminence and casteth the brethren out of the Church" (III John v. 10).

as endlessness. Now those who have taken the imagery of "golden streets" and of "fire and worms" for physically literal facts, have gone a long way towards forgetting that endlessness is but a feeble attempt to picture futurelessness, they have come to think of endless time as the *real* meaning of eternity. For the events which can occur in golden streets or in connexion with material fire or worms, are events which happen under the conditions of time and space, and therefore occur naturally under a condition of endlessness which is a period of time, rather than under conditions of futurelessness or eternity.

The *Eternal Hope* seems to fail as a criticism and corrective of popular Protestant Eschatology because it accepts the shallow conventional thinking on which that eschatology rests, and proceeds to argue with that crude and vulgar set of tenets on its own plane. God is still the arbitrary finite personality, eternity is still but endless time and punishment arbitrary retaliation. The idea of love and mercy is on a level with the rest, it is presented as little more than a sentimental kindheartedness such as shirks unpleasant duties. That such an idea is but a comprehensible and shallow conventionalization of the incomprehensible mystery of Divine Justice and Mercy is self-evident and needs no discussion.

The failure of the preacher of *Eternal Hope* to get really at grips with the question is further shown by the following. He fails to make it at all clear that the doctrine of the torments which those suffer who are lost has no logical bearing on the

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question as to what percentage of human beings will be lost.<sup>1</sup> A man could consistently hold that the torments of the damned are of a more fiendish and arbitrary character than even the greatest master of turgid imagery could picture to us, but that these pains would be incurred by but an infinitesimal few : or that damnation means merely the loss of the highest attainable beatitude, that short of that it is a very tolerable state, but that it will include the vast majority of the human race. Moreover, the justice or injustice of a sentence of final exclusion is not affected by the numbers who may be subject to that sentence. It is just or unjust in each several case according to the merits of that case.

The failure of Canon Farrar's criticism is finally shown in that his main object is to combat the idea

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Farrar enumerates here among the mitigations, belief in the possibility of future purification, and that most men will at last be saved. But for the moment these issues are not to the point. The numbers of the lost and saved have nothing to do with the question whether it be just that any individual should finally be lost. To the matter of Purgatory we shall come in due course. It would be amusing, were the matter not so serious, to see the difficulty in which the doctor finds himself in this matter. It is obvious to him that Purgatory is what is wanted for a sane and reasonable Eschatology, but it is Roman, and it is "painful" to him that Rome should have a doctrine of the future life "less void of pity than the current belief of modern Protestants." Yet he cannot accept it, though he admits that it is inherited from the primitive Church. One would have thought that even if "overlaid by many untenable inferences," the inferences might have been got rid of and the primitive doctrine restored. No other course is really open to a man who believes a sound and primitive doctrine to have been overlaid with inconsequent inferences.

of physical pain as a punishment too horrible even for obstinate impenitence. It is this which is to him the great stumbling-block. Only admit, he says, that the fire of Gehenna is metaphorical and that the pain of loss (*pæna damni*) even if for ever of the beatific vision, rather than any pain of sense or physical torture is the essence of the sufferings of the lost ; and the greatest of all stumbling-blocks is removed from the path of faith and from our love of God and the peace, the hope, the dignity, and the happiness of human life.

If this means anything it means that the forfeiture of man's final and supreme destiny is quite a tolerable matter as compared with physical pain. Is physical pain the supreme evil? Even in this life is it so? The great pain of childbirth is physical pain, pain of sense (*pæna sensus*). The pain of childlessness is "only" a pain of loss (*pæna damni*). Ask any normal woman which hurts most.

But enough. Even if the *Eternal Hope* offers no definite and reasoned eschatology, it is the expression and record of a popular revolt on moral and sentimental grounds against a shallow conventional and hideous belief about the future life, and it shows us that there are three conceivable ways out of the moral difficulty, that of Universalism, that of Conditional Immortality, and that of the mere (!) loss of the beatific vision combined with some form of Purgatory.

It remains for us to consider these three in the light of the testimony of God who in **these last**



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days has spoken unto us by His Son and has also given us His Spirit. What God does cannot be contrary to justice. We might, by our natural sense of justice, be able to reject false theories, but we cannot arrive at positive truth without testimony.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE NUMBER OF THE SAVED

**THE unprofitable Curiosity of Speculating on the percentage of the Saved—No bearing on the justice, or injustice, of finally Shutting the Door in any individual case—The Subject, therefore, is not discussed.**

AN unknown inquirer asked,<sup>1</sup> " Lord, are there few that be saved ? " The answer he received was " Strive to enter in at the strait gate : for many I say unto you will seek to enter in and shall not be able." This is not the whole answer, for our Lord goes on to warn him that a day will come when the door will be shut. This is a warning against mere idle questioning. It is not easy to enter through the strait gate, therefore as it is a matter of personal concern to each one of us we must strive. To each one of us the question is, " Could it ever be just for the door to be shut with me outside ? " And if the answer be " yes " then it would be just to shut the gate in the face of all who had not striven to enter in when it was open, whether they were a majority or a minority of the human race.

Such speculations, therefore, as the general percentage of the saved or lost are idle questions. That God should not wish that any should perish but rather wills that all men should be saved and come to a knowledge of the truth, and yet they that would enter in must strive<sup>2</sup> should be sufficient for every man.

<sup>1</sup> St. Luke xiii, v.

<sup>2</sup> αγωνιζεσθε.



## CHAPTER V

### THE DIFFICULTIES OF UNIVERSALISM AND OF CONDITIONAL IMMORTALITY

"UNIVERSALISM" maintains that the door of Entrance is never Shut—It protests against Eternal Punishment as Unjust—The translation of *aiōnios* as everlasting—Maintains "Restitution of All Things" to mean that all will be saved, by Compulsion if Necessary—The retribution of Evil Deeds should be distinguished from the consequence of Being a Rebel—The meaning of *aiōnios* should depend on the Context—Universalism is inconsistent in Assuming the Security of the Blessed—Origen's system consistent but Intolerable—Difficulties of Compulsory Salvation—Involves the Self-contradiction of God.

WE have set aside curious questions as to whether the number of the saved be great or small, because they are irrelevant. To his own master each man standeth or falleth and the justice of the final judgment passed on him depends on what he is, not on the number of persons to be judged. When therefore rival schemes of eschatology are presented to us we have to consider not which we like best because of the hopes which it offers of agreeable final conditions to the largest percentage of human beings, but whether the system offers just conditions of life to the single individual, and whether there is authority for believing that system to be a system having real existence, for the justice or injustice of a non-existent system is a matter of no great importance.

The system of "universalism" as presented by

modern teachers is one which denies that probation ends with death for all those who cannot then be regarded as "saved." It is maintained that they will be subjected to very real and very terrible punishment, a punishment which may well be called hell, a worm which may never die and a fire which may not be quenched: but that though the fire may be everlasting it does not follow that the sinner will remain in it everlastingly.

It is maintained that to torment a sinner through unending ages for acts committed in a few years under many difficulties and temptations is not justice but barbarous cruelty.

Further, that "everlasting" is not a fair translation of *'αἰώνιος*. The Greek word *αἰών* means an age. *'αἰώνιος* may therefore mean a very long time but not unending time.

Further, it not being the will of God that any should perish but that all should come to a knowledge of the truth and a final consummation being foretold as a "restitution of all things," it is maintained that every soul of man must eventually conform to God's will and be received into beatitude, the punishment of the wicked being as a fire intense enough to "ultimately burn repentance into a Judas or a Jezebel." The real meaning of this teaching is that those who do not turn to God of their own free-will will be ultimately compelled to do so.

As regards the injustice of tormenting a sinner through unending ages for acts committed in a few years, Doctor Farrar nowhere **makes any**

distinction between will and deed, and the punishment of an evil deed on the one hand, and of an evil will on the other: yet the distinction is fundamental. The consequences of a deed done are proportioned to the deed, the criminal in a court of law receiving a corresponding penalty: but recalcitrant witnesses and other such contumacious persons are attached for contempt of court until that contempt is purged. The two malefactors when they were crucified suffered the due finite reward of finite deeds: the repentant thief hears the words "To-day shalt thou be with Me in Paradise" because he repents or changes his mind: he is no longer an enemy, while the other whose contumacy is obstinate hears no such words. Supposing, therefore, the will of the wicked to become finally fixed in contumacy at the time of death, the doom of that soul must be final and future restoration impossible, not because God will never have him but because he will never have God. This further dissolves the objection to the probation ending at death, or to a change of sides being forbidden after it. This life may well be sufficient, short as it is, for every man to take sides finally for or against the light that is given him, and if so probation ends with this life, for probation ends when the final choice is made.

As regards the word *αἰώνιος*, not necessarily meaning everlasting. It has already been said that we cannot conceive of eternity, the best attempt of which we are capable is to think of it as endless time, and therefore it is impossible to find a word

adequately to express the idea whether in Greek or in English, and *αἰώνιος* may be used of things which come to an end, just as we say "for ever" of that to which we know there must be an end some day. As Dr. Farrar himself says, we cannot conceive of Eternity in which a thousand years are as one day and *vice versa*. The word "æon" or *αἰών* is, however, used to express this Eternity. Philo, the Jewish Philosopher says, "'æon' is the life of God, and is not time but the archetype of time, and in it there is neither past, present nor future." In the strict sense of "everlasting," that is the sense of unending time, the words "*αἰώνιος*" and "eternal" do not mean "everlasting," but it does not follow that *αἰώνιος* must mean an age capable of coming to an end. The absurdity of such reasoning is seen if the line of argument be briefly stated. Eternity (*ὁ αἰών*) does not mean endless time because it designates a condition which is not time at all, therefore it may be thought of as an era of time which may come to an end!

The truth is that all our language is framed to express ideas derived from what we know. All that we know is under the conditions of time and space. We can have no word, therefore, to express an order which is not under conditions of time and space, and so must use words to try to express the situation which are tainted by association with time and space. It follows, therefore that in sentences where such words occur the use of the word must be determined by the general sense of the sentence and not the sense of the sentence by the word.

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But to proceed to the essential idea of Universalism which is that those who do not turn to God of their own free-will will be ultimately compelled to do so. This means that there is for man no such thing as final and irrevocable failure. Modern Universalism says nothing in criticism of the received idea that when once man has attained to "heaven" he is in no danger of forfeiting its delights, it seems tacitly to assume its truth. Taking the two together the doctrine is that man has a destiny; if he attain to it he has attained to his rest, there is no fear of forfeiture, but that failure to attain that destiny always opens the way to a fresh attempt, and that those who will not make an attempt will attain their destiny eventually without effort.

Such a doctrine seems contrary to the whole scheme of the laws of life and motion. It is as if one should say, "When the pitcher is taken to the fountain and returns unbroken it will never break, but if broken it can always be mended," whereas the lesson of daily life is that failure may be irrevocable and destroy all hope of success, while success is no guarantee against future failure. This up to a point is true. The man who is caught on the beach by the rising-tide must scale the cliff. Every sure step that he makes is a step gained, but it is no guarantee against the next step being a false one, and by one false step he may so fall that any further idea of climbing is out of the question: but if the man make no false step he will ultimately reach the level turf

at the cliff's summit and be safe. So does life presents to us a movement which tends to finality of ultimate and secure success with the risk of irrevocable failure at any point on the road.

Origen, the brilliant head of the great school of Christian philosophy at Alexandria, held a kind of Universalism, but his universalism was fair. He held that hope was never closed to the wicked, there was no fall beyond hope of recovery, but also there was no hope of final security; if the way of entrance to God was always open to the sinner the way of exit was also always open to the saint, there was no finality. Man, in this view, is climbing a cliff in which there is no danger of an irrevocable fall but also no level ground at the top: life on this view is, in fact, a treadmill. Can Universalists hold that the entrance to God is always open and that the exit is closed? <sup>1</sup> and if they cannot, is the endless treadmill of Origenism a tolerable system? <sup>2</sup>

But there is yet another difficulty. If all sin be disobedience, it is at bottom an over-assertion of the dignity of the will, a claim of the will to go its own way: is the idea of the obstinate being

<sup>1</sup> The openness of the entrance really means the possibility of the will turning to God, or turning from God. The real question is, therefore, whether the will becomes ultimately fixed and inconvertible. Can we think of the will as capable of fixation, that is, of final self-determination on one side and not on the other?

<sup>2</sup> It is not we who demand a tolerable system. It is the Universalists who denounce an intolerable one, and so bind themselves in offering an alternative to offer one that is tolerable.

driven into heaven one which would be endurable to the obstinate? Also, if the obstinate be driven into heaven, must it not mean that either heaven is merely a place of delights which the obstinate are admitted to enjoy in spite of their animosity to the Lord of that place, or that the obstinate become men of goodwill against their will? Is either of these ideas free from absurdity? <sup>1</sup>

There is another side to this difficulty. Can God use such compulsion? Having given man free-will and a destiny to be willingly attained, can God alter the fundamental nature of man without denying Himself? To alter man's fundamental nature in order to admit man to beatitude, would be to make man's original constitution a blunder.

The same objection holds good against the theory of conditional immortality. If the very basis of the relationship of man to God be the permanence of every man's existence, the act of causing man to cease to exist would be to alter man's essential constitution.

These are the difficulties inherent in the theories of conditional immortality. We have yet to consider the testimony of Christ as regards the future state of mankind as recorded in the Gospels and formally taught by His Holy Catholic Church which is responsible for the authoritative publication of those Gospels as the record of His life and doctrine.

<sup>1</sup> The things of eternity are beyond our comprehension, but they must not *contradict* reason.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE TESTIMONY OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST TO THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN

TESTIMONY of Our Lord from the Synoptists and from St. John taken Separately—Parables teaching the Finality of Judgment—and the need of Redemption—Our Lord uses the stories of Noah and of Lot to the same end—Further Parables and other sayings attesting the finality of rejection—The need of seizing the present Opportunity, and of Effort—The discourse with Nicodemus—With the Woman of Samaria—and with the Jews—and in the Allegory of the Vine, teach the same lesson—Inevitable Perdition except in Christ.

IN considering this subject it is perhaps desirable to take separately the testimony recorded in the Synoptists, that is, the first three evangelists whose narratives are based on a common synopsis of events, and the Fourth Gospel which, to a large extent, relates other matters. There are also some who consider that the first three Gospels are more historically accurate than that of St. John, that they preserve more literally the actual words of Christ, so we will take them first.

In dealing with our Lord's testimony in this matter, the difficulty is not merely to arrange and group the testimony scattered broadcast among the Gospels, but to make a selection, for there is so much of it that it is impossible to present the whole of it in one short chapter. We are, however, helped to some extent by the fact that all the parables are contained in the synoptists, it will be convenient therefore to begin with the parables.

## PARABLES OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD

N.B.—These parables are presented in a way which is not intended to be taken literally, but are not to be taken as allegories.

There are three parables which are presented before us in the Gospel. They are the Parable of the Wheat and the Tares, the Parable of the Dragnet, and the Parable of the Sheep and the Goats. In each there is the gathering of the good and the casting out of the bad. The wheat is gathered into the barn, the good and the angels are saved, and in the sheep, in the goats, in the useless stubs and swine, in the bad and the useless stubs and swine, in the goats, in the allegory are assigned to the gathering the prepared for the Devil and his angels. It is a revelation that in each of these parables there is a meaning expressive of a place prepared for the good, but not for the bad. The place to which the good are sent is not prepared for them, but only for the devil and his angels. The idea of judgment here presented is not so much that of reward and punishment as of acceptance and rejection. The essential note of all these parables is however, that of *finality*, acceptance and rejection are alike *permanent*.

<sup>1</sup> This fact is manifest and has nothing to do with nice questions about the exact meaning of the word *aidos*, on which so much stress has been laid.

The same idea of the finality of judgment is contained in the informal parables of the two men sleeping in one bed and the two women grinding at the mill, in each case "one shall be taken and the other left."<sup>1</sup> Also in the parable of the King who went into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom and to return, who then called for those of his subjects who would not that he should reign over them, saying: "bring hither and slay them before me."<sup>2</sup>

The eleventh chapter of St. Luke has another very significant series of parables, namely, the Lost Sheep, the Lost Piece of Silver and the Prodigal Son. Each of these presents to us man as lost, the position of the lost sheep and of the piece of silver is hopeless apart from the owner who comes to seek and to save that which is lost. The situation is the same in the case of the prodigal son, but this parable is fuller, for the hopeless state of the prodigal is shown to be his own fault and, to use the language of the Catechism of Sir Oliver Lodge, it shows "the root sin to be selfishness," . . . which "when fully developed involves moral suicide." It also shows that for restoration the prodigal must turn again and humble himself, if he would be restored; but the prodigal does not restore himself, it is his father who comes out to seek and to save him and to bring him into his house.

The same teaching is to be found in the stories

<sup>1</sup> St. Luke xvii, v. 34 and 35.

<sup>2</sup> St. Luke xix, v. 27.

of Noah and of Lot, which our Lord quotes and uses as parables. There again, man is lost, but it is not merely the individual that is lost, but the race. Mankind in solidarity is on the broad road that leads to destruction, deliverance from destruction is for those who will reach up to the rescuing hand of God. Noah and his family, and the clean and unclean animals (Jews and Gentiles?) could not have escaped but by the ark of God's appointment, neither could Lot and his family have escaped from the cities of the plain had they not been fetched out by the angel. Those in each case who were so engrossed in the affairs of the moment as not even to realize that there was danger were lost, and the loss was final and irreparable. So also was the loss of Lot's wife who looked back. Our Lord specially warns us to "Remember Lot's wife."<sup>1</sup>

Again the finality of the rejection of those whom God came to seek and to save and who abuse His gifts of grace and "look back," is unmistakably taught in the parables of the Great Supper, and of the Marriage of the King's Son. In the former<sup>2</sup> the invited guests begin to make excuse, they plead previous engagements; so the master of the house is angry and sends both to the streets and lanes of the city and also to the highways and hedges to fill his house, for not one of those men who were bidden should taste of his supper. Those also who made light of their invitation to the

<sup>1</sup> St. Luke xvii, v. 32.

<sup>2</sup> St. Luke xiv, v. 15-24.

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marriage of the king's son,<sup>1</sup> and maltreated his vassals, bring irretrievable ruin upon themselves, for the King sends forth his armies and destroys those murderers and burns up their cities. But to this parable is added a sequel concerning the man who had not on a wedding garment, a dress which, according to the usage of those days, the king himself provided; this man accepts the good things of the king's hospitality, but neglects the decencies demanded of him: he is cast into "the outer darkness where is weeping and gnashing of teeth."<sup>2</sup>

The same is the teaching of the parables of the Talents.<sup>3</sup> Those who use them enter into the joy of their Lord, while he who does not is cast into the outer darkness where is weeping and gnashing of teeth. The servant again who owes his Lord the impossible sum of ten thousand talents on humbly seeking pardon is graciously forgiven, till he refuses forgiveness for the trivial debt of a fellow-servant; his forgiveness is then cancelled, and he is cast into prison until he shall pay the debt.<sup>4</sup>

The parable of the man who, having a good harvest, had no thought beyond pulling down

<sup>1</sup> St. Matthew xxii, v. 1-14.

<sup>2</sup> St. Matthew xxv, v. 14-30.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Farrar urges this parable as in favour of Universalism, he insists strongly on the parable teaching that the debt is not paid, but he may hope for release if the debt be paid. It seems incredible that he should fail to note the impossible magnitude of the debt or the terrible irony of the word "until." But so it is.

his barns and building greater,<sup>1</sup> and that of the Ten Virgins,<sup>2</sup> present life as affording an opportunity of preparation for judgment. The man who built the barns was a fool, for on that night his soul was required of him. The five foolish virgins who took no reserve of oil to replenish their lamps had to go and buy in a hurry at the last moment, and when they got back the door was shut, and when they called "Lord, Lord, open to us," all knowledge of them was denied.

This concludes our review of the parables and might be considered as in itself sufficient. They do not present Hell<sup>3</sup> as a place for the arbitrary torment inflicted by an arbitrary God on the breakers of arbitrary rules, whether such torment be considered as endless and vindictive, or as remedial and tending in the last resort to compulsory salvation, but as the condition of final and miserable failure. Hell is not the torture chamber so much as the scrap-heap of the Universe.

The teaching of our Lord contained in short sayings is to the same effect. The time is not yet, but must inevitably come when the door will be shut and the notice hung outside, "Too late! Too late! ye cannot enter now!"

"Salt again is good, but if the salt have lost its savour wherewith shall it be seasoned? It is

<sup>1</sup> St. Luke xii, v. 18.

<sup>2</sup> St. Matthew xxv, v. 1-13.

<sup>3</sup> "Hell" has not always the same meaning, it is used here as the last state of the lost.

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neither fit for the land nor yet for the dunghill : but men *cast it out.*"<sup>1</sup>

Again many will say unto Me in that day, " Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in Thy name ? and in Thy name have cast out devils ? and in Thy name have done many good works ? " and then will I profess unto them, " I never knew you : *depart from Me* ye that work iniquity." <sup>2</sup>

On the neglect of proffered salvation, " Agree with thine adversary quickly while thou art in the way with him, lest at any time thine adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer and thou be cast into the prison. Verily, I say unto thee, thou shalt by no means come out thence until thou hast paid the uttermost farthing." <sup>3</sup>

All three evangelists record that sin against light, wilful resistance of the Spirit of God, hath " never forgiveness " <sup>4</sup> neither in this world nor in the world to come." <sup>5</sup>

Again, the need of mortifying the affections which distract from God. " If thine eye offend thee, pluck it out. If thine hand offend thee, cut it off. It is better for thee to enter into life maimed or blind than to be cast into hell fire, where their worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched."

<sup>1</sup> St. Luke xiv, v. 35.

<sup>2</sup> St. Matthew vii, v. 22.

<sup>3</sup> St. Matthew v, v. 25.

<sup>4</sup> Not because a particular deed is unpardonable, but because the attitude of the sinner is fixed in enmity to God. There is in him the fire of hatred which is not quenched.

<sup>5</sup> St. Matthew xii, v. 31 ; St. Mark iii, v. 29 ; St. Luke xii, v. 10.

"For what is a man advantaged if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"<sup>1</sup>

Again, effort is needed for attainment:—

Strive to enter in at the strait gate.<sup>2</sup>

"Strait is the gate and narrow is the way that leadeth to eternal life, but wide the gate and broad the way that leadeth to destruction."

But the striving is no scrupulous and selfish performance of the arbitrary work of the law, but a self-denying, even quixotic, personal allegiance and service, the adventure of faith. "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it, but whosoever shall lose his life for My sake shall find it."<sup>3</sup>

The prophets, the Baptist and the apostles add nothing to this, but they sum it up.

"See, I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil."<sup>4</sup>

The disobedience of man in the fall is the failure of the race: the Tree of Life is made inaccessible and, as the children are born in exile, death passes on all. But a hope is held out of a bruising of the serpent's head by "the Seed of the Woman,"<sup>5</sup> and so, those who were baptized confessing their sins, when they heard from John that the kingdom of heaven was at hand, "fled from the wrath to come," for "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."

<sup>1</sup> St. Matthew xvi, v. 26; St. Mark viii, v. 36; St. Luke ix, v. 25.

<sup>2</sup> St. Matthew vii, v. 13; St. Luke xiii, v. 24.

<sup>3</sup> St. Matthew x, v. 38, and xvi, v. 24; St. Mark viii, v. 34, and xiv, v. 27; St. Luke ix, v. 23.

<sup>4</sup> Deuteronomy xxx, v. 15.

<sup>5</sup> Genesis iii, v. 15.

"How, then, can we escape if we neglect so great salvation?"<sup>1</sup>

We turn now to the teaching of Christ as exhibited in the Fourth Gospel.

Our Lord teaches Nicodemus<sup>2</sup> the necessity of a new birth because "that which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit," so that "except a man be born of water and of the Spirit he cannot enter the Kingdom of God." And "as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness," i.e. in order that those bitten by the serpents—whose death by reason of that inoculation was in the natural order inevitable—might live: "even so" (i.e. with analogous intention under analogous conditions) must the Son of Man be lifted up; that whosoever believeth on Him *should not perish*, but have eternal life. For God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish but have everlasting life." And dependent on this offer is a warning, "He that believeth is not condemned, but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the Name of the Only Begotten Son of God."

The same teaching of the gift of life is given to the woman of Samaria.<sup>3</sup> "Whoso drinketh of this water shall thirst again: but whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst, but the water that I shall give

<sup>1</sup> Hebrews ii, v. 3.

<sup>2</sup> St. John iii, v. 1-21.

<sup>3</sup> St. John iv, v. 1-26.

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him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life."

Again, in addressing the Jews<sup>1</sup> especially the passages, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, the hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live," and "the hour is coming in which all that are in the graves shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto *the resurrection of damnation.*"

Again, in the discourse on the Bread of Life in Chapter vi. "The Bread of God is He which cometh down from heaven and giveth life unto the world."<sup>2</sup> "I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this Bread he shall live for ever, and the bread that I will give is My flesh which I will give for the life of the world."<sup>3</sup> Also, "Except ye eat the Flesh of the Son of Man and drink His Blood ye *have no life in you.*"

Also, in controversy with the Jews, "If ye believe not that I am He, ye shall die in your sins."<sup>4</sup>

And in the allegory of the Vine in Chapter xiv. "I am the Vine and ye are the branches, every branch in Me that beareth not fruit He *taketh away.*" As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine: no more can ye except ye abide in Me." . . . "If a man abide not in Me, he is *cast forth as a branch and is withered; and*

<sup>1</sup> St. John v, v. 23 and 24.

<sup>2</sup> " vi. v. 51.

<sup>3</sup> St. John vi, v. 33.

" viii, v. 24.

men gather thorns and cast them into the fire and they are burned ;”<sup>1</sup> and at the end of Chapter xvi, “These things have I spoken unto you that in Me ye might have peace. In the world ye shall have tribulation : but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world !”

This teaching is the same as that in the other Gospels. The insistence is stronger on Christ’s gift of life, but the other side of this truth, that *except* in Him we have no such life, is made clear by that very insistence, as well as by direct statement : and the final and irrevocable failure of those who will not receive life at His hands is plain, they will *die in their sins*. A sharp distinction is drawn between the purgation of those who bear fruit, that they may bring forth more fruit, and the casting out and withering of those who bear none. The finality of rejection is quite plain and unmistakable : “For judgment am I come into the world,”<sup>2</sup> and this judgment lies in that our Lord has brought us life : those who accept it at His hands shall live : those who reject Him shall die in their sins. That the offer of beatitude is the crisis of life is further seen in that the Apostolic Ministry, which is to hand on that life to man, is a work involving the retention as well as the remission of sins.<sup>3</sup> Here, as before, the state of the lost is one of

<sup>1</sup> St. John xv, v. 1-11.

<sup>2</sup> „ ix, v. 39.

<sup>3</sup> „ xx, v. 23.

rejection rather than of arbitrary and vindictive torture.

As we saw that the teaching of Christ, as presented in the Synoptists was summed up in the teaching of the Prophets and Apostles, so the same identical teaching as presented in St. John is summed up in St. John's General Epistle when he says, "This is the record. That God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. He that hath the Son hath life, and he that hath not the Son hath not life."<sup>1</sup>

Such is the testimony of Jesus Christ concerning the future life of man. If we receive not His testimony, to whom shall we go?

<sup>1</sup> 1 St. John v, v. 12.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCERNING BEATITUDE AND ITS ATTAINMENT

**MAN's** love of Visiting—At the bottom of most journeys not undertaken for breadwinning—Merely sensual pleasure unsatisfying—Companionship necessary—But not all - satisfying—"Beatitude" is represented as all - satisfying—S. Thomas Aquinas' Analysis of Beatitude—Beatitude not in any possession such as Money or Power—nor in Self—nor any Creature—but in the Creator—Beatitude the Vision of God—In which is found the perfect response to self which man seeks to satisfy by visiting—Beatitude attainable by Man—But not in this life—Cannot be forfeited—Nor attainable without Divine Aid—Good - will (*rectitudo voluntatis*) also necessary—Its difference from the Idea of Arbitrary Rewards and Punishments—"Damnation" is exclusion from the Vision—Works and "Charity"—The Pain involved in final rejection may vary with individual circumstances—Conclusion.

It would be interesting to know how much money is spent every year on visiting. The knowledge of this would be no idle and profitless item of "Tit-Bits" statistics, it would draw attention to a remarkable fact of human nature. The systematic theologians, or "School Men," of the Middle Ages defined man, as we have seen, as "a rational animal;" a modern variation on it defines him as "a visiting animal"! This definition may seem to some frivolous or even flippant, but it is in fact a flash of real insight.

The statistics of visiting and of the money spent on it are not forthcoming; but no one can have gone about the world with his eyes open and yet have failed to notice how many of his fellow-passengers

are going on journeys simply to see somebody. Should he reflect on the trouble and expense which such going to see people involves, he would be brought to realize that in the general judgment of mankind to go and see other people is something supremely worth doing. This fact is worthy of analysis.

Let us continue our observation of our fellow-travellers. There are first of all those who are manifestly travelling on business. There is the vast army of season ticket-holders and of those who use workmen's trains to go to and fro between the place where they live and the place where they work. There are also boys going to school, commercial travellers, and cattle dealers. All such are either learning or labouring (we hope truly) to get their own livings, the profit or wage which goes to pay rent, rates, taxes and insurance premiums, and to settle butchers', bakers', tailors', and doctors' bills. And when all these claims are settled every man looks to have a margin left over to spend on pleasure or "delectation."

The simplest kind of delectation is derived from being well and enjoying the fact and functions of life, that is of eating and drinking, of walking, leaping and all bodily exercise, of rest and sleep, and of sex. Every one of these "delectations" is attainable for every individual man by himself alone except the last, for this last involves relationship.<sup>1</sup> It is here, in marriage, that the foundation

<sup>1</sup> We are, of course, speaking here only of such pleasure as is to be derived from the lawful and reasonable satisfaction of the appetites.

is laid of the mutual society, help and comfort that exist not *in* human beings but *between* them. It is a fact that no human being can do without the higher or social form of delectation.<sup>1</sup>

But even for the simplest bodily pleasures such as eating and drinking we seek companionship, and we certainly seek it in our sports. We see amongst our fellow-travellers those who are evidently going somewhere for, say, shooting or golf. You may overhear the man with gun cases tell some acquaintance on the platform that he is going to such a place to shoot *with So-and-So*. The golfer, in conversation will discourse to you of the delectable sensation of making a clean full drive or a neatly judged approach, and will tell you that it is in this that the essential pleasure of his sport is found, but if you asked him he would tell you that "going round by oneself is a bore."

The truth of this can be seen in two quite modern sports, cycling and motoring. When the cycle was sufficiently developed to make it easy and comfortable to ride, bicycling became a society craze; there was a delightful novelty in this new kind of locomotion. But the bicycle is a mere machine, and when the novelty wore off the bicycle sank to a merely utilitarian position, it has become simply an improved means of getting about. The same future awaits the motor car.

<sup>1</sup> The religious solitary forsakes the changing and transitory associations of one man with another only that he may be in undisturbed communion with his God. The morose, miserly and sensual solitary is regarded as barely sane and certainly depraved.

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It is a newer and speedier means of locomotion, more powerful, more comfortable and with a greater range than the bicycle ; there is, moreover, an engine to understand and control. But once the mechanism is mastered the motor car must cease to be a pleasure in itself and must become merely a means of locomotion. If it is slower in finding its level than the bicycle it will be because it carries more than one person.

As we have said, at the bottom of all human pleasure lies companionship. We work to eat, and we eat to live, and we live to visit, the "end" of life being to find in others a response to self. The reason for the comings and goings of human life is that every human being is limited, in any single individual we find only a partial response to self. The bore is the unresponsive person, and there are limits beyond which every human being, even our nearest and dearest, must be a bore ; we must therefore have variety of companionship and therefore coming and going. But even so we cannot attain to final and complete satisfaction ; human society involves endless and restless change.

"Going to Heaven" on the other hand is presented to us under many different forms, but under all forms it is presented as a final and completely satisfying delight, which is what is meant by the term "Beatitude," or the state of final absolute unalterable blessedness. What might this blessedness be ? The answer to this question is perhaps best brought out by the careful analytical treatment of St. Thomas Aquinas, of which I

will give the briefest possible summary. He says<sup>1</sup> that:—

The human will cannot at one and the same time aim at two diverse ends or goals of life (we cannot serve God *and* Mammon) for the reason that as every several being aims at its own perfection, so therefore every several person desires as his ultimate end his own completion in goodness, which is essentially a unity. Men are not all agreed as to what their goal or destiny is, but the actions of every man are consciously or unconsciously directed to some unified conception of ultimate good or beatitude. Our consideration of beatitude must therefore be directed to three questions:—

- (1) In what does it consist?
- (2) What is it? and:—
- (3) In what way can we attain to it?

Question I. In what does it consist?

(a) In riches? No this is impossible. Riches consist in meat, drink, clothes, means of locomotion, dwelling places and such like, and the means for purchasing them. They cannot be the end or goal of life because they are only the means for carrying it on.

(b) In honour, glory or fame? No. Honour is paid on account of excellence; it bears testimony to that excellence. Excellence may result in fame or celebrity: but it is the excellence which, if perfect, is nearer the perfection of human good or beatitude, rather than the resulting honour.

<sup>1</sup> *Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae Quæstio I et seq.*

(c) In power? No. Because power is a means for attaining ends: also as a means it can be used for good or for evil.

(d) In any bodily good? No. For the body is comparable to a ship, whose preservation is aimed at not for itself but in the interests of the business of navigation. The ship is a means, and so is the body (*i.e.* it is the instrument of the soul). The well-being of an instrument cannot be an end in itself.

(e) Nor is it in bodily pleasure (*voluptas*), that is in delectation arising out of bodily good. Even when perfection is attained the delight in the fact is merely an incidental emotion and mere bodily good cannot be perfect good.

(f) Is it in any good of the soul? No; because if beatitude was in the soul the soul would be its own end. Beatitude is something external to the soul but belonging to it.

The practical meaning of this is that beatitude does not consist in the mere fact of existence even in a state of perfection; man is not complete in himself, but in a *relationship* of his soul or person to something outside himself. It is here after many questions with negative answers that we at last arrive at something positive.

St. Thomas next shows that this something cannot be any created being, for beatitude is that perfect good which must absolutely satisfy desire (*quod totaliter quietat appetitum*) so that there can be nothing left to desire beyond it, and the only final

object of desire is universal good, that is God. Beatitude lies in a relation of the individual to God.<sup>1</sup>

The next question, therefore, "What is beatitude?" amounts to the question, What is that relationship of the soul to God which absolutely satisfies desire? The relationship is that of seeing God, the vision being an act (*operatio*) affording full scope for the exercise of the memory, the understanding and the will.

If we now turn back to the definition of man as a "visiting animal" we shall see how much there is in the definition. In this life man is continually going to see people that he may find in them a response to himself, though in no human being does he find a response which totally satisfies desire, for each man is but a partial and limited image of God. But God is the infinite prototype of all these images. Therefore when man, the visiting animal, goes to see God he will be paying the final all-satisfying "visit" in which he finds the complete response to himself. There can never be any limit to God's response, and therefore (I say it in all reverence) man cannot arrive at a point beyond which God would bore him: in the vision of God he has attained beatitude.

This is the beatitude looked forward to by the poet prophet in Job, when he says, "I know that my Redeemer liveth and that He shall stand at the latter day upon the earth. And though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh

<sup>1</sup> God is beatitude in Himself. His blessedness is not in relationship to any external thing.

shall I *see* God: Whom I shall see for myself and mine eyes shall behold and not another."<sup>1</sup> This is the essence of eternal life which is to "know God, and Jesus Christ whom He hath sent."<sup>2</sup> This knowledge to be perfect involves two things (1) vision of the Object of Knowledge; and (2) perfection in those that behold Him, that is that holiness without which no man shall *see the Lord*."<sup>3</sup> This vision is the beatitude of the "pure in heart, for they shall *see God*." "When He shall appear we shall be like Him, for we shall *see Him* as He is".<sup>4</sup>

This brings us to the third question, "How can we attain Beatitude?" We have the qualifications already declared to us when we are told that it is the pure in heart who shall see God, and that without this holiness no man shall see Him. We will continue our summary of St. Thomas in the form of questions and answers which he himself uses.

(1) Can man attain to Beatitude? Yes. Because beatitude consists in attaining to the highest good (*summum bonum*); therefore whosoever is capable of attaining the highest good, can attain beatitude. But man is seen to be capable of this perfection because he can conceive of this perfect good and can desire it.

(2) Can one man have greater Beatitude than another? As regards the Highest Good which

<sup>1</sup> Job xix, v. 25.

<sup>2</sup> St. John xvii, v. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Hebrews xii, v. 14.

<sup>4</sup> I St. John iii, v. 2.

is the cause and "object" of beatitude, No : because that "object" is God. As regards fruition or delectation, Yes : according to the diverse capacities of the diverse persons for delight in the vision.

(3) Is Beatitude possible in this life ? A certain participation in beatitude (or "foretaste of heaven") is possible in this life. But true and perfect beatitude is not, because that consists in the vision of God, to which man cannot, in this life, attain.

(4) Can Beatitude once attained be forfeited ? The imperfect beatitude of this life can be forfeited, but not perfect or final beatitude. In the former distractions are possible, because some transitory pleasure may seem better to us than the highest good when the latter is feebly apprehended and but dimly and partially seen : but when once one has attained perfect beatitude, which sets all desire at rest, such distraction ceases to be possible, so that the contrary teaching of Origen and some of the Platonists is manifestly false.

(5) Can man by his own natural ability (*per sua naturalia*) attain Beatitude ? This is the question of vital importance, and the answer is, No. For perfect beatitude is to see God as He is : and this exceeds the natural capacities not merely of man but of every creature. For the creature is finite and his conception of things is therefore finite, and in consequence falls short of the vision of God Who is infinite.

(6) Can man attain Beatitude by the help of any creature of a higher order ? (i.e. by the help of

angels). No, for if no creature, even of the highest, can himself attain to the Divine vision he obviously cannot help another. The vision is the direct and immediate gift of God Himself, being supernatural (*supra naturam*) it must come direct from God, as does the power whereby the dead are raised up and the blind<sup>1</sup> receive their sight.

But there is yet another question. Beatitude is the vision of God. It is a condition or position to which man cannot naturally attain, it is God's gift. But to whom will He give it? We therefore continue:—Are good works required from man in order that he may gain Beatitude from God? What is required is not good works but goodwill, a conformity of the human to the Divine will (*rectitudo voluntatis*).<sup>2</sup> This goodwill is however in itself a work, or at least an activity (*operatio*), in that it is the desire by which one aims at beatitude (*per quam tendit ad beatitudinem*).

This leaves a final question. Does every man desire Beatitude? In a sense yes. All men seek

<sup>1</sup> N.B.—There is a remarkable and seemingly undesigned coincidence between this and Matthew xi, 5. The blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, and the *poor* have the Gospel preached to them. Especially if we realize that we are *all* "poor" in that we do not possess the means for attaining to the beatific vision, and the Gospel or good news is that the means will be given us.

<sup>2</sup> Good works follow necessarily from a good will when there is work to be done, such good works are, however, as it were a by-product, or a mere expression or symptom of goodwill, they do not come into the direct line of cause and effect.

the satisfaction of desire. All therefore desire some sort of final blessedness. But all do not consider in what beatitude really consists: they may seek it in wrong ends. They may desire riches or honour or power. Such do not desire the vision of God which is the true, final and perfect beatitude. Neither have they the goodwill (*rectitudo voluntatis*) which is necessary to its attainment.

It seems to me that this doctrine of beatitude is something different from the crude and shallow conception of an arbitrary, and we must say finite, God, Who issues to man arbitrary commands and prohibitions, and Who will reward those who conform to His rules by placing them in an agreeable environment for an unending time, and will inflict torments enduring through the same unending period on those who do not.

Beatitude is no arbitrary reward, it is the destiny of life. It is not that which can be coveted as the result of arbitrary actions, but the result of conformity to the Divine will. Yet it is a gift. But the state of beatitude or the vision of God is not given directly but by giving to the creature that which by nature he cannot have, that is capacity for seeing the vision. From this it follows that both those who are incapable of the vision and those who are distracted from it to the search for the satisfaction of their desires in riches or honour or power or carnal delectation, must in the nature of things fail to attain to the vision. If therefore the vision be everlasting life, exclusion from it is "everlasting death" or "damnation" or "going to hell."

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The Vision of God is "Heaven": exclusion from that vision is "Hell." Those who have a good will and are in "the state of grace" which makes the vision possible, "go to heaven"; those who have perverted their wills, or are in the state of nature, do not. There is nothing arbitrary in this, and nothing cruel or vindictive. But it is a real division of sheep from goats or of wheat from tares. The decision is moreover that which our Lord presented to us as above all things *final*.

Those that enter into The Presence and see, enter in finally: it is the final all-satisfying "visit;" the vision is everlasting life. All who are excluded also are finally excluded, and in comparison with the life of the Vision, exclusion is everlasting death.

We are now in a position to consider the meaning of the penultimate clause of the Athanasian Creed.<sup>1</sup> "They that have done good," it says, "shall go into life everlasting, and they that have done evil into everlasting fire." This need not stand for the crude, arbitrary system so fiercely attacked by Dean Farrar. The doing of good is the necessary outward expression or symptom of goodness of will: no one with a good will can fail to do good works who has the opportunity of doing works at all. To bestow all one's goods to feed the poor and one's body to be burned are not good works unless they spring from goodwill or "charity"; they are works


<sup>1</sup> The teaching of this Creed on the connexion of right faith with salvation will be discussed in the chapter on the state of Probation. Page 329.

of hypocrisy. As therefore doing good is the symptom of goodwill so doing evil is the symptom of an evil will. But what is the "everlasting fire" into which such are to go?

It seems clear from the general tendency of our Lord's testimony that the final rejection of the wicked involves no arbitrary retributive torment. Damnation means the loss (*damnum*) of beatitude. The pain of loss may, however, be great; i.e. such as is symbolized in the words "weeping and gnashing of teeth." The remorse of having turned away from the desire of true beatitude or thirst for the living God<sup>1</sup> may be as the undying worm, the rage of inextinguishable hatred in those who have given place to the devil, an unquenchable fire. In this connexion it is lawful and reasonable to believe that as the joy of those who see God may vary (as St. Thomas says) with their capacity for delighting in the vision, so also may the "pain of loss" consequent on rejection and exclusion from the vision vary with the realization of the good thing past man's understanding<sup>2</sup> which have been lost. To wilful apostates the torment may be extreme, but not to those who have not known; to those that is to say, who die before the use of reason without having been made members of Christ, children of God and inheritors of the Kingdom of Heaven, and all who grow up merely as natural men, who have never been capable of the vision, the loss may involve no pain: such may even, though

<sup>1</sup> Ps. xlii, or xli in the Vulgate numbering.

I Cor. ii, v. 9.



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technically in "hell," be in a condition of natural beatitude proportionate to their natural capacities.

We may conclude therefore by saying that it is of the formal and authoritative Creed of Christendom that the severance of the last judgment is final and irrevocable but not arbitrary, and that this severance does no violence to the principles of justice.

We have yet to consider Probation and Purgatory, each of which will occupy a chapter.

## CHAPTER VIII

### PROBATION

CHRIST not only a Witness—He is a Saviour—Qualifications for Beatitude Recapitulated—Man is fallen and must be Regenerated as well as Converted—Baptism the instrument of Regeneration—On this follows a life of conflict with insubordinate appetites—Supported by Holy Communion—and a remedy for those who turn and repent after falling from Grace—The time of this life sufficient to determine the conflict—The relation of right Faith to Morality as asserted in the "Damnatory Clauses" of the Athanasian Creed—Not Arrogant—Are they True?—Not mere Intellectual Propositions but man's destiny—To reject testimony may be immoral on two grounds—Untruthfulness and Self-Conceit—No condemnation of honest intellectual distress—To accept or reject Light given, the Crucial Test of Probation.

IF the testimony of Christ has any meaning at all it is, as we have already seen, that life with all its doubts and hesitations none the less leads up to a *final* judgment at the Last Day.

But this is not all. Christ does not only present to us the state of salvation or beatitude and the state of damnation or loss of beatitude as final, He also presents to us that it is only through Himself that beatitude is attainable; His special work is the salvage of mankind. The general scheme of salvage has already been stated in Chapter vii of Part I and something of the principles underlying this plan have been given from the "Summa" of St. Thomas Aquinas in the last chapter. To repeat them shortly.

Beatitude is the final all-satisfying vision of God.

Man is not naturally capable of seeing God, for no created being is naturally capable of the vision. Capacity to see is the supernatural gift of God.

Besides capacity to see there must be desire, in which is involved conformity of the will to God (*rectitudo voluntatis*).

The Vision is therefore impossible to :—

(a) Those who are not endowed with the supernatural capacity to see.

(b) Those whose will is not in conformity with the Divine will.

These are broad general principles which we have to consider in relation to the actual conditions of human life.

Man in the beginning may have been very primitive and childish, but he had in him the potentialities of all that man has yet attained and ever will attain to. He was moreover in a state of "original righteousness," or in the state of grace, he was raised to the state in which if he continued his end would be beatitude. Also he knew God's will and had not disobeyed it, he was therefore also in the state of rectitude, or conformity to God's will. When he disobeyed he lost his rectitude, and was deprived of his supernatural capacities. Owing to the solidarity of humanity the whole race is involved in this fall.

This may be difficult to understand, but it is a fact of common knowledge that there is a fault or corruption in the nature of every man that naturally is engendered in the children of Adam. The alternative theory is that the "fall" consists in man becoming

conscious of the difference between right and wrong and being unable to attain to the standard which he knows, i.e., that the fall is really a stage in a progressive rise in the scale of existence: this is not in theory a fall, and does not fit the facts. It does not account for human perversity, nor for the failure, collapse and corruption which has ruined so many attempts at progress. Further: on such conditions the work of bringing man to beatitude ought not to involve cruel tortures and a shameful death, neither ought it to arouse the resentful hatred that led thereto. It seems impossible to regard the conduct of Pilate and of the soldiers, still less that of the multitude, and least of all that of the Chief Priests and the Scribes as the works of men who are merely "ascending the scale of existence," and yet their conduct is representative of average human nature, and the end of such a nature must inevitably be to fail to attain beatitude, the end for which man was created.

If man is to be saved he must therefore be converted and regenerated. Conversion means a turning of the will to conformity with the will of God, a return to rectitude; and regeneration means a new birth to the supernatural state whose goal is the beatific vision. Regeneration can come only through Christ, and therefore apart from Him beatitude is unattainable, "there is none other name under Heaven, given among men, whereby we may be saved."<sup>1</sup>

Next as to the means whereby conversion and

<sup>1</sup> Acts iv, v. 12.

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regeneration are effected. Conversion is the result of various impulses and suggestions, principally by example and preaching. It was thus that St. John Baptist "turned the hearts of the disobedient to the wisdom of the just." There still remained regeneration, the work of Christ, Who should baptize them with "the Holy Ghost and with fire."<sup>1</sup> This is effected through the Sacraments and primarily through Baptism. If regeneration be necessary to beatitude, it is important that a man should know whether he is regenerate or not, and therefore it is reasonable that this grace should be given under an outward visible sign which effectually confers the thing signified. By being baptized therefore man knows that he is regenerated and capable of the Beatific Vision. ¶

We are now in a position to consider certain moral difficulties. What of those who have not been baptized? Who have never had the opportunity? The true answer to this question is short and plain: we don't know! But this we can say. We know that God gives the gift of the new birth to all who are baptized, making them members of Christ, children of God, and inheritors of the Kingdom of Heaven, because God has then covenanted so to do: we know also that without the gift no man can come to see God: but we do not know that God will give the gift *only* in the covenanted manner. On the contrary we know that He can give His gifts as He will, and it is piously believed that those who desired baptism, especially those who in times of persecution have suffered death while preparing for baptism,

<sup>1</sup> St. Luke iii, v. 16.

received the grace of baptism. Of the rest we are told only that something of the Light of Christ "lighteth every man that cometh into the world," and "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?"<sup>1</sup> No doubt He will, but He is not bound to explain all His ways and to submit them to our approval. It is enough for us to know how God will deal with us. We know that if we believe and are baptized we shall be saved, and if we refuse the hand held out to us, that we cannot complain if we are lost. "Them that are without God judgeth,"<sup>2</sup> and we know that God is just and that should be enough. There is neither reason nor decency in demanding to inspect His methods.<sup>3</sup>

The real question however for each of us is our own salvation, severally as individuals and in the solidarity of the blood-tie of Baptism. Here are we and death is before us. What shall *we* do? If we are already baptized and started on the way to beatitude, we must fight to keep our rectitude, and if we have lost it we must regain it. The fight is not easy because the inclination to evil is not yet overcome, for we have as yet only an imperfect sort of beatitude. We only look forward to final satisfaction in the hereafter, and we may be distracted to transitory but more obvious goods—riches, honour, bodily comfort, and so on—and we are

<sup>1</sup> Genesis xviii, v. 25.

<sup>2</sup> I Cor. v, v. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Our ignorance of how God will deal with those who know not Christ is so great as compared with our knowledge as to how God deals with those who do know Him that it is incumbent upon us to do what we can to bring the knowledge of Christ to all.

especially tempted to this distraction because we are naturally inclined to yield. To overcome this enemy within we need to keep constantly attuning our wills to the will of God by the effort of prayer or the uplifting of the soul to God, and we have the grace of God to help us, we have His life in us. It was implanted in us in the Sacrament of Baptism and renewed in the Sacrament of the Altar in which the Body and Blood of Christ are verily and indeed taken for the strengthening and refreshing of the soul. Further, if we give way to distraction and lose our rectitude in grasping after transitory satisfaction, we forfeit beatitude *except we repent*, that is revert to God by being contrite and acknowledging our sins, and stedfastly purposing future rectitude, in which case God is "faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness,"<sup>1</sup> and lest we should doubt of His answer to our repentance He has "given power and commandment to His ministers to declare and pronounce to His people, being penitent, the absolution and remission of their sins:" the sins must be laid bare in a verbal confession and we must show signs of sorrow and purpose of amendment, and then the answer comes: "I absolve thee from all thy sins, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I St. John i, v. 9.

<sup>2</sup> This form occurs in the English Book of Common Prayer, to be used after a Special Confession (i.e. an acknowledgment of the *species* of sins). A form identical as regards the crucial words "I absolve thee" (*ego absolvo te*) is appointed for use by Latin priests in like case.

These are the conditions of the fight. When we are in the state of grace and rectitude we are in the state of salvation here and now. When we depart from rectitude and fall from grace, we are equally in the state of damnation here and now. When we turn and repent and confess and are absolved, we are restored to the state of rectitude and grace, and therefore of salvation, here and now. How long will this last?

I ask the reader this question in this way because protest has been raised against the teaching that after this life is over the time of probation is passed. It has been represented as intolerable that no further chance should be given, that a man's eternal state should depend on the use he makes of a few short years spent here perhaps in so corrupted environment that he has not a fair chance, and I want the reader to think, not whether such conditions of life are fair to others, but as to how the matter appears as applying to himself.

To the doubt and oscillation of this present life there must be some end: the pendulum must take its last swing some day. The swing is between the states of rectitude and rebellion. We are drawn away from rectitude every time we are tempted. Every time we yield makes it easier to yield next time and harder to repent: every time we resist makes it easier to resist next time, till the influence of temptation can hardly even attract our attention: the tendency is for the will to become fixed. Does any man want more than the time of this life in which to fix his will? Does any man

## THE UNREST OF PROBATION 11

want the unrest of probation to last longer than necessary? Can we not trust God not to condemn our souls until our will is fixed? And even if so fixed in evil what help would it be if there were a thousand doors of repentance were open? If none of them should we be willing to enter? Once our wills are established in evil, even if the doors of hell open none would be of any use. Such sayings as "work while it is day, for the night cometh when no man can work" point to "now being the accepted time, now the day of salvation."<sup>1</sup> As regards others, do we not trust God to give others also sufficient time and opportunity to take sides, and sufficient light for them to be responsible for the side which they take? And, "if there be first a willing mind it is accepted according to that a man wills and not according to that he hath not."<sup>2</sup>

Another difficulty of a moral kind arises in connexion with the attainment of immortality, that usually raised in the form of objection to the damnatory clauses of the "Athanasian" Creed. The difficulty is not however confined to that Creed, as it is not there alone that a right faith is asserted to be necessary to salvation.<sup>3</sup> However, the "damnatory clauses" of *Quicumque* Test will serve as a test of the principle as well as of anything else. Here is the text. —

<sup>1</sup> St. John 9. 4.

<sup>2</sup> II Cor. v. 10.

<sup>3</sup> II Cor. viii. 12.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Pt. II. Chap. v. page 54. F.

ENGLISH BOOK OF COMMON  
PRAYER*At Morning Prayer*

Whosoever will be saved :  
before all things it is neces-  
sary that he hold the Catho-  
lick faith.

Which faith except every  
one do keep whole and unde-  
filed : without doubt he  
shall perish everlastingly.

And the Catholick faith is  
this : that we worship one  
God in Trinity and Trinity  
in Unity.

\* \*

He therefore that will be  
saved must thus think of  
the Trinity.

Furthermore it is neces-  
sary to everlasting salvation:  
that he also believe rightly  
the Incarnation of Our Lord  
Jesus Christ.

\* \*

This is the Catholick faith :  
which except a man believe  
faithfully he cannot be saved.

## ROMAN BREVIARY

*Dominica ad Primam*

Quicumque vult salvus  
esse : ante omnia opus est ut  
teneat Catholicam fidem.

Quam nisi quisque inte-  
gram inviolatamque serva-  
verit : absque dubio in  
æternum peribit.

Fides autem Catholica hæc  
est : ut unum Deum in  
Trinitate et Trinitatem in  
Unitate veneremur.

\* \*

Qui vult ergo salvus esse :  
ita de Trinitate sentiat.

Sed et necessarium est  
ad æternam salutem : ut  
Incarnationem quoque  
Domini Nostri Jesu Christi  
fideliter credat.

\* \*

Hæc est fides Catholica :  
quam nisi quisque fideliter  
firmiterque crediderit, salvus  
esse non poterit.

Now I would ask the reader to dismiss from his  
mind all thought of the "arrogance" of such as  
propound to him a creed on these terms. I would  
also ask him not to think of him or anyone else  
who recites this confession of faith as taking pride  
in himself and concealing it, or holding themselves rig-  
ht.

always find ways of giving vent to their feelings : they may safely be let alone. The real question is whether the above propositions are true. If they be true it will be quite possible to recite the words, as it must have been quite possible to draw them up, without arrogance. Will the reader therefore regard these clauses as propounded to himself by those who honestly and simply believe them to be true, and himself as warning himself and not judging others by reciting them ? Only so can they be judged on their merits and without prejudice.

Let us consider first what this Creed or Hymn asserts. It proposes to us the Trinity in Unity whom we are to worship, here "through a glass darkly," hereafter "face to face." It proposes to us Christ as God *and* Man, and therefore as competent to open to us a way through the veil into The Presence. There is propounded to man here no mere string of intellectual propositions but his destiny ! The God who is the end of all things, the allegiance that he owes this God, and the Christ whose sufferings alone can effect his salvation, that is to say reconcile him to God, because that Christ is God and man. Whether therefore a man accepts or rejects such propositions cannot but be a matter of practical importance, his acceptance or rejection must affect his life.

Let us make a fresh start, by turning back to the principles of "pure agnosticism" and its relation to "free thought." The principle of pure agnosticism, is as we have seen, that there are no limits to knowledge, beyond which limits we can

find out nothing. In this sphere it is impossible for a man to learn anything except upon testimony. The man called free thought, which rejects testimony and claims to arrive at conclusions by its own unfettered speculation is therefore ridiculous, it has no man on which to speculate and therefore can come to no conclusion ; and in so far as it springs from self-conceit, which considers it beneath its dignity to depend on testimony, it is immoral. But for all that untruth is immoral, not only in the man who lies and keeps back the truth from others but also in the man who refuses to listen to that which others may have to tell him.

To pass from the general to the particular we have seen that God is unknowable. His existence can neither be demonstrated nor disproved by science : wherefore the existence of God is made manifest for testimony, as has been said before. Now if God bear witness to Himself, if He make His essence known to man, if He show man where his final beatitude lies, then the acceptance or rejection of His message must be *of the very essence of probation*, and if God's method be to send His Son in flesh as the Mediator between God and man then it cannot be but that those who reject His testimony must die in their sins. As He has said, " I believe not that I am He ye shall die in your sins."

Yet again consider the word " rectitude " which we have used as a single word to stand for conformity to the will of God which St. Thomas calls *rectitudo voluntatis*. can such rectitude

<sup>1</sup> St. John viii. 24.

regarded as independent of the acceptance of God's testimony to Himself? There can be no conscious uplifting of the soul to God, no effort of conformity to His will without belief; and it is to be remembered all through that it is rectitude, the motive of good works, and not the works, which is the necessary condition of beatitude, and therefore the essence of Probation. If therefore rectitude be essential to the state of salvation, and if it belong to rectitude to receive God's testimony, and if His testimony be that through Jesus Christ we must worship the Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity, then those who reject that testimony have departed from rectitude and are not in a state of salvation, for that departure is immoral.

It may be well at this point to insist that the warnings of the *Quicumque vult* are *not* directed against those who have not been taught the Gospel, nor against those who are in *bonâ fide* intellectual difficulties. The loyalty of such to truth and strict honesty with self, in spite of distress coupled with their charity and humility is of the very essence of "rectitude." The stern warnings are for those who do not *hold* the Catholick Faith, but let it go. This "holding" is something more than a mere intellectual assent—indeed so far as the understanding is concerned it is the submission of the intellect to the incomprehensible—for it calls forth the activity of the whole man: his affection is moved to devotion to good and his will to strive after rectitude; he has made the adventure of faith and has had spiritual experience, he has

tasted that the Lord is gracious.<sup>1</sup> If such an one turn away and break his faith, is there anything arbitrary and unjust in his perishing everlastingly from the presence of God, except he turn and repent? And if so is there any arrogance or lack of charity in warning a man of his danger?

If Christ be a "Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world," that Light must show the Universal Truth, and to every man is shown something of that Truth. Will he or will he not make the adventure of response to the Light given? If this be so, then presentment of that Faith and the response given are for every man the crucial test: they are the very essence of probation.

<sup>1</sup> I St. Peter ii, v. 3.

## CHAPTER IX

### PURGATORY

THE *Eternal Hope* shows Purgatory to be the real way out of the Moral difficulty—But Prejudice in the way—Supposed Rejection by the Church of England—A Truth cannot be denied because put to Base Uses—The Official Teaching of the Council of Trent—And of the Synod of Bethlehem—Anglican Articles condemn the *Doctrina Romanensium*.—But the Commendatory Prayer involves the doctrine of Trent—The English Article Earlier than the Tridentine Decree—Which also condemns Superstitious Abuses—Purgatory a Moral Necessity—Purgatorial Pain not inconsistent with Rest and Felicity—Purifying Fires in Scripture—Cannot be under conditions of Time—Prayer for the Departed a Common Usage of All Mankind, except Calvinists and Moslems—Its place in the English Service Books.

ANYONE who has read the *Eternal Hope* with even moderate attention must have been brought to see that the solution of most of the moral and sentimental difficulties concerning the finality of the judgment which is to separate the sheep from the goats would be found to lie in a sane and reasonable doctrine of Purgatory: also that the idea of Purgatory is seriously entangled by the weeds of prejudice.

The prejudice lies in the fact that the doctrine of Purgatory is regarded as "Romish," and that it was "swept away" by the Reformers because of the abuses which attached themselves to it. And whereas all those who have revolted against popular ideas of Hell and have sought a way of escape in the direction of Universalism are

Protestants,<sup>1</sup> therefore they feel bound by their instincts and traditions to a revolt against Protestant eschatology which must itself be Protestant. This lands them in serious difficulties, as it puts Purgatory out of bounds !

For example, Dean Farrar quotes with approval a statement about Purgatory from the Roman Catechism. If that were all there would be nothing, in his opinion, to say against the doctrine, and the Reformers would never have condemned it. It is, however, possible that that is all that the Roman Church does teach, and that none the less the Reformers did condemn it. If they did so on grounds of prejudice alone it would be greatly to their discredit. There must have been some misunderstanding !

Confusion is further complicated by the assumption that the English Church has formally repudiated the doctrine of Purgatory. The assumption is based on the fact that the Council of Trent says that "There is a Purgatory,"<sup>2</sup> and that the Twenty-second Article says that "The Romish doctrine concerning Purgatory . . . is a fond thing vainly invented."<sup>3</sup> Of this more hereafter. Our first business is to get rid of prejudice.

<sup>1</sup> The idea of hell in which they had been brought up and against which they have revolted, namely the crude and shallow idea of arbitrary felicity and arbitrary torment, conjoined with the supposition that the bulk of mankind are *foreordained* to the latter, is Protestant.

<sup>2</sup> Session xxv.

<sup>3</sup> Article xxii.

It would be well for the world if men never lost sight of the principle that the truth or falsehood of a thing has nothing to do with expediency. If the doctrine of Purgatory is true, it is true, and its truth is not affected by the fact that it has been used for the promotion of superstition in the interests of the covetous. It would be ridiculous and immoral for men to reject it on the ground that it is undesirable that it should be received. It is as if one should say, "It is no doubt true that two and two make four, but the truth has been abused by criminals who have used it in the falsification of accounts, therefore let us decree that two and two do not make four." This illustration should bring to our minds another important truth which is that things are what they are, whatever we may like them to be.

To consider, therefore, the doctrine of Purgatory on its merits. It would be possible to begin historically and trace the steps by which the belief about the state of souls between death and the general judgment have come to be defined, but the statement in the decree of the twenty-fifth session of the Council of Trent is so brief and simple that our best method seems to be to begin by giving that statement. "There is," it says, "a Purgatory, and the souls there detained are helped by the prayers of the faithful and most effectually by the acceptable Sacrifice of the Altar." It is not our business here to discuss the sacrificial character of the Eucharist. It will suffice to remind the reader that all Christian prayer is made "through Jesus Christ our Lord," that is to say, that all petitions

obtain a hearing on the ground of the sacrifice of Christ for us, that is on a sacrificial basis, and that in the Lord's Supper, or Mass, we show the Lord's death with praise and thanksgiving, humbly beseeching the Father that "we may have remission of our sins and all other benefits of His Passion." The Mass is therefore a specially solemn way of saying, "Through Jesus Christ our Lord," and in its celebration we may have any special "intention" or petition. We may therefore group "the prayers of the faithful" and "the acceptable Sacrifice of the Altar" as "intercession." The statement of the Council of Trent, therefore, is simply that souls that have departed this life can undergo purification, and that the intercessions of the faithful on earth are of assistance to them. Nothing is said of flames, or of the time spent in Purgatory,<sup>1</sup> nor is it suggested that the help afforded by intercession has the effect of shortening the time. On the contrary, the decree goes on to bid Bishops to see that "a sane and wholesome doctrine is taught to the people," and that subtle questions which do not tend to edification, things uncertain, and such as lead to curiosity and superstition and filthy lucre are to be excluded.

The Easterns avoid the word Purgatory, but the Synod of Bethlehem<sup>2</sup> says that "those who, having been defiled with mortal sins *but have repented while yet alive*, but having not brought forth any fruit

<sup>1</sup> Such ideas may be found in popular books, but popular books are not the authoritative teaching of the Church.

<sup>2</sup> I am indebted to Oxenham's *Catholic Eschatology* for this quotation from the decrees of the Synod of Bethlehem.

of repentance . . . we believe that the souls of these . . . depart to Hades, and there suffer the penalty of the sins they have committed: but that they have a consciousness of their deliverance and that they are delivered by the supreme goodness." Prayers and especially the unbloody sacrifice are said to avail for this deliverance. "Hades" is the term used instead of "Purgatory," but the substance of the teaching is the same as that of Trent.

We have yet to inquire whether the official Anglican teaching is in accord with the above if we are to have an unanimous consensus of Apostolic, or organized Episcopal Christendom. "The Romish doctrine concerning Purgatory (*Doctrina Romanensium de purgatorio*) . . . is a fond thing vainly invented." This sentence at first sight does seem most difficult.

The first criticism to be made on it is that this phrase rejects something as silly, the Latin version which calls it a *res futilis inaniter conficta* is most expressive. It does not say that it is contrary to Scripture but merely that Scripture gives it no support, and that it is out of harmony with the tone of Scripture. Next it must be realized that it is not all and every doctrine of Purgatory, and therefore certainly not the mere broad statement that "there is a Purgatory," but only the teaching of the *Romanenses* on the subject which is condemned.<sup>1</sup> To know, therefore,

<sup>1</sup> Some apology is necessary for repeating this hackneyed piece of reasoning. But as this book may be read by some to whom these questions are new it seems necessary to cover the ground again. I crave the patience of those who are already familiar with it.

what is condemned, it would be necessary to find out who the "Romanenses" were and what they taught: this, however, cannot be done with any certainty. This is, however, no great obstacle to a conclusion, because, though we may not know what that doctrine was, we may be certain that it cannot have been that which is positively taught in the English formularies, unless the English formularies contradict themselves.

There is in the English formularies no formal positive statement on this subject. But in the prayers of a Church information is often to be obtained as to the traditional belief of that Church. No prayer can be made except on the basis of some doctrine, and many of the collects contain an express statement of the doctrine on which their petitions are based, e.g. "O God, whose property is ever to have mercy and to forgive, receive, etc." Now there is in the English service books a "Commendatory Prayer for a sick person at the point of departure" which runs as follows:—<sup>1</sup>

"O Almighty God, with whom do rest the spirits of just men made perfect, after they are delivered from their earthly prisons: we humbly commend the soul of this Thy servant, our dear *brother*, into Thy hands, as into the hands of a faithful Creator, and most merciful Saviour, most humbly beseeching Thee that it may be precious in Thy sight. Wash it, we pray Thee, in the blood of that Immaculate

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* Office for the Visitation of the Sick in the Book of Common Prayer.

## THE COMMENDATORY PRAYER 341

Lamb that was slain to take away the sins of the world: that whatsoever defilements it may have contracted in the midst of this miserable and naughty world, through the lusts of the flesh, or the wiles of Satan being purged and done away, it may be presented pure and without spot before Thee."

Purgatory means the place or process of purging, which results in that which is submitted to it emerging pure and without spot. The above prayer asks that "it," that is the disembodied soul which is always implied by the use of the neuter pronoun, may have the defilements contracted in the midst of this miserable and naughty world *purged* and done away. Now if it be true that petitions can be made only on the basis of some doctrine, it is manifest that the only basis possible for this prayer is the doctrine that "there is a Purgatory," which in very terms is the doctrine of Trent. Yet further this prayer is a prayer for the soul in Purgatory,<sup>1</sup> and prayer for a soul in Purgatory can only be made on the basis that souls there detained are helped by the intercessions of the faithful. In fact, the doctrinal basis of this prayer is throughout the doctrine enunciated by the Council of Trent, except that the decree of Trent says nothing of the nature of Purgatory, while this prayer gives by implication rather more explicit teaching: for it teaches us that that Purgatory eradicates defilements

<sup>1</sup> That it is used before the point of departure and is therefore used in anticipation of Purgatory does not alter the fact, and the prayer can be used equally well immediately or even at any time after the point of departure.

contracted in the life of this earthly prison and that when these are removed the soul being pure and without spot is presented before God.

The "defilements" are what later systematic writers of the dogmatic theology call the *reliquiae peccatorum*, or remains of sin, and "presentation before God" is nothing but the universal belief of Christendom that those souls that are pure and without spot—i.e. "spirits of just men made perfect"—enjoy the Beatific Vision.

There is no logical need to say any more about the Roman Doctrine condemned by the twenty-second of the English Articles. But it is worthy of notice that the Article could not have been a rejection of the doctrine proclaimed at Trent, for the Article was drawn up in A.D. 1552 and verbally amended early in A.D. 1563, the Convocation of the Province of Canterbury entering on their work on January the 16th of that year, while the session of the Council of Trent which issued the decree on Purgatory did not occur till the December following. But this is not all.

Both Article XXII and Session XXV of the Council of Trent dealt with Invocation of Saints and with the veneration of images and relics, as well as with Purgatory. The Article says the doctrine of the "Romanenses" on these matters was fond and vain, and the Tridentine decrees say that if any abuses have crept into those salutary practices, of such "the holy synod vehemently deprecates, and utterly abolishes," and the following observance "that synod show that all and sundry"

invented," did exist. There were clearly abuses which both assemblies saw fit to condemn.

It is now possible to give a systematic statement of the Catholic doctrine of Purgatory—and its relation to probation. Life in this present world is sufficient for the former : we are given in this life Grace which makes us capable of the Divine vision, and if we keep our rectitude we shall finally be presented before God : so long as this life lasts it is possible for us to fall from grace given and to arise again and to amend our ways, but we tend more and more to take one side or the other until we are finally fixed, either in rectitude or rebellion : this life may well suffice for taking sides and we have no right to expect and need not desire an extended probation : " now is the day of salvation."

Now it is clear, if this is so, that, in a sense, judgment comes to a man at death, for it is then that the door is shut. Those that have taken sides against God and have fallen from grace are " set," they can turn no more, they are therefore finally excluded from beatitude : their life has been selfish, and now they are left to themselves. Those, on the other hand, who have finally persevered in grace, however many falls they may have had, are also " set" : their wills will never again consent to be deflected from rectitude, they are certain of ultimate beatitude. But it is difficult to think of many, it is difficult to think of one's self, as fit to pass straight to the Divine vision. God's side has been taken, ~~ins~~ have been repented of ~~and~~ their guilt remitted, \* the damage done by ~~the~~ remains, we still

need growth in holiness, and this is provided in Purgatory: and the English prayer for the Commendation of a Soul is that Purgatory may have its perfect work. Purgatory is a state of the *faithful* departed.

Now the state of the faithful departed is represented as one of joy and felicity, but Purgatory is represented as an all-searching fire. These are, however, quite compatible. The soul that can never be exposed to further temptation is certainly at rest, and the soul that is assured of ultimate beatitude is certainly in joy and felicity, whatever pain the process of Purgatory may involve.

As regards this "pain." We do not *know* anything about it, but we know that, if there be pain, the faithful soul must willingly undergo it, it can have no desire to shirk any discipline which may be necessary to the development of that perfect holiness without which no man shall see the Lord. Also the Scriptures constantly speak of all purifying work as of a "fire," as that "the fire shall try every man's work of what sort it is," and that the man "himself shall be saved, but so as by fire."<sup>1</sup> Also purgation *somewhere* is part of every righteous man's discipline, "Whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth,"<sup>2</sup> and "If a branch bear fruit He *purgeth* it, that it may bring forth more fruit."<sup>3</sup> All that we *know* is that for those who finally take God's side only at the close of life, and who are, so to speak, but deserters from

<sup>1</sup> I Cor. iii, v. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Hebrews xii, v. 6.

<sup>3</sup> St. John xv, v. 2.

the Devil at the last moment, and those who, though they have brought forth fruit have yet been so far "entangled in the cares and riches and pleasures of this life that they have brought no fruit to perfection," there must be some discipline whereby the indispensable holiness is attained. If such are conscious of the evil influence of their sin as still at work in the world, that is, if "their works do follow them," they cannot, now that their "hearts are fixed and they sing and give praise," well be free from pain, when they see the influence of their evil deeds still surviving.

This Purgatory which the Church teaches is no second chance for the wicked, nor is it a special discipline for a body of doubtful persons who have not taken sides. It is also necessary to remember that Purgatory belongs to the intermediate state of the disembodied soul, and therefore it is not under conditions of space nor probably under those of time, and that therefore we need not suppose that the intermediate state is of different duration for such as die at different points of this world's time, and to speak of "shortening the time" is, in all probability, meaningless, although it is beyond the power of our imagination to picture a condition which has a beginning and an end but no duration.

As regards prayer for the departed, that is in its beginnings instinctive. Mr. Oxenham in his *Catholic Eschatology* draws attention to the fact that Calvinism is the only system, with the very significant exception of Mohammedanism, without any recognized rite of sacrifice or practice of prayer

## CHAPTER X

### THE CONSUMMATION AND RESTITUTION OF ALL THINGS

THE Lame Man at the Beautiful Gate—Its Significance as an Allegory—In connection with the Symbolism of the Jewish Temple—St. Peter's Sermon to the Crowd—Are not the Resurrection of the Body and General Judgment Superfluous?—The paradoxical nature of the Resurrection Body—The General Judgment the final Appraisalment of the Universe—A Great and desired Triumph of the Faithful—Our deeds continue to bear fruit till then—The phrase Restitution of all Things can only be given an Universalist Gloss at the expense of other parts of Scripture—The Apocalypse, moreover, foretells this Consummation, and says who will then be excluded—The End.

WHEN Peter and John went up together to the Temple<sup>1</sup> at the hour of prayer they passed a lame man who sat and begged at the gate that was called "Beautiful." He begged of them, and in answer they commanded him in the Name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth to rise and walk. "And he leaping up stood, and walked, and entered with them into the temple, walking, and leaping, and praising God."

This, like many of the miracles of Our Lord and His Apostles, is also a parable or allegory.<sup>2</sup> The cripple sitting at the gate of the Temple, whose

<sup>1</sup> Acts iii.

<sup>2</sup> There is no reason why an event should not serve an allegorical or mystical purpose because it happens to be historically true.

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inmost chamber is that of God's unveiled Presence, to which the whole of the rest of the Temple is an approach made expressly that men may go in and worship, is representative of mankind; the man *cannot* go in because he is a cripple. To him enter the Apostles. They are no mere preachers and teachers, they possess the energizing power of Christ, Whose word is power, and Whose word of power is committed to them. As channels of this power, that is to say as Christian Priests, they pronounce the effectual word in such wise that "immediately his feet and ankle bones receive strength" and he goes in with them into the Temple.

The approaches to the Holy of Holies, into whose courts the lame man went with the Apostles, walking and leaping, and praising God, are in themselves an allegory. First there is the courtyard with the altar of burnt offering on which the sin offering and burnt offering of the great Day of Atonement were made: this altar stands for the Cross of Calvary. Beyond the altar of burnt offering lies the laver, representing Baptism, which must be passed before the first chamber or Holy Place is reached in which is the table of the "Shew" bread with the candlestick, and the Altar of incense, where the blood of the sin offering is sprinkled, the whole representing the Christian Mass which is the central act and ceremonial expression of the essentially sacrificial self-dedication of Christian worship, for it is "here," that is, at the Eucharist that "we (Christians) offer and present unto God ourselves, our souls and

bodies, to be a reasonable, holy and lively sacrifice " <sup>1</sup> to Him. Behind the Veil is the Holiest of all, Heaven itself, wherein is the Mercy Seat for the Glory of God, into which the High Priest Christ has entered, <sup>2</sup> once for all, with the Blood of His Great Atonement.

This brings us to another event of the deepest allegorical significance. When Jesus cried with a loud voice and gave up the Ghost, " the Veil of the Temple was rent in twain from the top to the bottom," <sup>3</sup> this signifying that the way is laid open for the lame man who is healed into the very Presence, " having boldness to enter into the Holiest by the Blood of Jesus, by a new and living way which He hath consecrated for us through the veil." <sup>4</sup> In Christ the veil of exclusion from the Beatific Vision is taken away.

These allegories present to us the spiritual life-history of man as he passes through probation and, if accepted, Purgatory also, to be presented pure and without spot before God. When the multitude who saw the lame man leaping and walking, ran together in amazement, Peter moved them to pass

<sup>1</sup> This expression is from the English Use of the Mass called the " Order of Administration of the Lord's Supper and Holy Communion " in the Book of Common Prayer. The same phrase occurs in the American Use.

<sup>2</sup> The ceremonies of the great day of Atonement are given in Leviticus xvi, and the mystical or allegorical meaning of them is the theme of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

<sup>3</sup> St. Matthew xxvii, v. 51 ; St. Mark xv, v. 38 : St. Luke xxiii, v. 45.

<sup>4</sup> Hebrews x, v. 19.

through these same stages of approach. "Repent ye," he says, "and be converted that your sins may be blotted out when the time of refreshing should come from the presence of the Lord; and He shall send Jesus Christ, Which before was preached unto you: Whom the heaven must receive until the times of the restitution of all things"<sup>1</sup> In this, St. Peter not only carries his hearers through the stage of probation, in which there is opportunity for conversion, and, after God's side has been taken, "refreshment" or rest from temptation, but leads them on to the expectation of the return of Christ and "the restitution of all things," the last great judgment when many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, "some to everlasting life, and some to everlasting shame and contempt. And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever."<sup>2</sup>

A question may be asked as to whether the resurrection of the body and the final General Judgment are not superfluities. If the soul has been delivered from its earthly prison and has had the defilements contracted in the midst of this miserable and naughty world purged and done away, why should it be called out of Heaven for a second judgment? Moreover, the resurrection body when closely thought about seems to be a meaningless idea, a "spiritual body," a contradiction in terms.

<sup>1</sup> Acts iii, v. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Daniel xii, v. 2.

Our conception of the resurrection body is in course paradoxical, but rightly so. We think of the natural body as the means whereby we keep contact with the world around us, but we think of its limitations as essential attributes of the body: a body cannot vanish from sight, for example, or pass through closed doors. At death we are "unclothed," and at the resurrection we are told that we shall not be "unclothed" but "clothed upon."<sup>1</sup> Now existence in an eternal spiritual condition without the limits of time and space is so far beyond our imagination that it is difficult to see any difference between a disembodied personality and a personality in a "body" limited by conditions of time and space, because the limitations seem to us essential though negative properties of a "body." We can, however, *believe* there is some real privation in being "unclothed" at death, and that that state is very different from that wherein we shall be "clothed upon" in the resurrection body.

The teaching of St. Thomas on this point perhaps helps us to see how there may be a difference. The Beatitude he says is all-satisfying, and once the soul has been admitted to the Divine Vision its joys can be intensified. But the embodiment of the soul extends its capacity for felicity by reason of the means of contact with environment which a body affords. This of course only helps us to see dimly, and no doubt St. Thomas also only saw dimly himself: but this teaching does help us,

<sup>1</sup> II Cor. v, v. 1-4.

if only dimly, to see that to rise again with our bodies is not altogether superfluous and meaningless.

But why bring the soul that has already passed the ordeal of judgment at death up again? In the first place we must bear in mind that all descriptions of detail and method as regards the last judgment are figurative, such for example as present to us the physical arrangements of a law court with the sitting of judgment and opening of books. In the next that if every man's salvation were simply a private matter between that man and God, then a second general judgment might perhaps be superfluous, but that is not the case: we are on the contrary all members one of another. Indeed, the whole universe is a thing that is at unity in itself, and tends to a unified end, and when that end is attained there must be a final appraisalment. This appraisalment is not an event which the faithful are to fear, but a great triumph and vindication which is earnestly to be desired. "If," as I said at the beginning of this book, "goodness consists in being willing to fulfil our part in a universe in which all the parts work together to a common end, then it is only in the end that we can find the happiness of achievement in having played that part, and secured our place in that final consummation."<sup>1</sup>

Further, when we have taken sides and die we can be judged for what we are, but our works are not yet ripe for judgment: as the Lama said to Kim,<sup>2</sup> "Thou hast loosed an act into the world, and as a stone

<sup>1</sup> Part I, chapter i, page 12.

<sup>2</sup> *Kim* by Rudyard Kipling, chapter xii.

thrown into a pool so spread the consequences, thou canst not tell how far." The chain of causes and effects in the conduct of human affairs must penetrate we know not how far, whether for good or for evil, they must indeed make themselves felt in the world till the end, and so it is not till then that every man can "have praise of God."<sup>1</sup> Well therefore may we pray for the living in this life of probation and the departed in Purgatory, and even for the Saints who though they see God are not yet clothed upon, that God will "shortly accomplish the number of His elect, and hasten His Kingdom, that we with all those who are departed in the true faith of God's Holy Name may have our perfect consummation and bliss both in body and soul."

It is a pity that controversy should have to be introduced here, but the idea of "the restitution of all things" has been claimed as teaching the principle of Universalism, and is maintained to mean that every creature will be ultimately restored to the end or place for which he was created. The principal objection to this, as we have already seen, is that if it is inevitable that every creature *must* ultimately attain its destiny then there can be no free-will; the whole universe must be at bottom "mechanical." This is the same conclusion as that arrived at by a different route by those who assert that life is nothing but matter in motion, and that the future motions of all matter are already determined as they are the necessary chain of consequences of the now existing disposition of matter and energy, and the **Mechanical**.

<sup>1</sup> I Corinthians iv, v. 5.

theory, however arrived at, is altogether fatal to the Religious Explanation of the Universe. For if we have no future life, or if the place which we are to occupy in it is foreordained and inevitable, then there is no call for the effort of prayer and the desire of rectitude, the mortification of evil desire and the diligent use of the means of grace which make up the practice of religion.

It might be well to add that those who accept the authority and testimony of Scripture must agree that one place of Scripture cannot be so expounded as to be repugnant to another,<sup>1</sup> and the testimony of Scripture to the *finality* of the judgment which shall separate the sheep from the goats is unquestionable and is therefore contrary to the Universalist interpretation of "The Restitution of all Things."

The Apocalypse is a mystical account of the motion of the Universe towards a final consummation in which "the Earth is reaped." This final consummation is represented as the Marriage Supper of the Lamb, which recalls the parable of the ten Virgins, also as the New Heavens and the New Earth, and the New Jerusalem the perfect city that is at unity in itself. But this unity is not presented to us as attained by compelling obstinate rebels to come in, but by finally shutting them out: there shall "in no wise enter into it anything that defileth, neither worketh abomination, or maketh a lie, but they that are written in the Lamb's book of life:"<sup>2</sup> and the exclusion covers not only sorcerers, whoremongers, and liars, but also the fearful and unbelieving.

<sup>1</sup> Article xx.    <sup>2</sup> Revelation xxi, v. 47.

"How therefore shall we escape if we neglect great salvation?"<sup>1</sup> And the great salvation is that we are given this life with reason by which to discern right from wrong, and free-will to choose what we will do: we have "the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world," and that moves the disobedient to conversion to "the wisdom of the just": we have the Grace of the Holy Ghost working through the Sacraments to raise us from the death of inherited and actual sin to the life of real and not merely "imputed" righteousness and to ultimate beatitude<sup>2</sup>: we have time in which to make the adventure of faith and take God's strength and grace to persevere: we have the care of Christ at our deathbeds lest we should suffer ourselves in the last hour in the pain of death to turn from Him. For the Christian priest is to be called for, and when he comes he has power, for if we confess our sins he is faithful and just in remitting our sins in the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. He has also the Bread of God which is He that came down from heaven to give life to the World as the *Viaticum*, or food, for the journey through the Valley of the Shadow, and he will also "pray over the sick and should" anoint him with oil in the name of the Lord, and the prayer of faith shall save the Sick, and

<sup>1</sup> Hebrews ii, v. 3.

<sup>2</sup> He can also reach those who cannot reach the Sacraments.

<sup>3</sup> Will any reader who does not know it go carefully through the Order for the Visitation of the Sick in the Book of Common Prayer?

the Lord shall raise Him up"<sup>1</sup>: and when this life is over we have a Purgatory in which there is rest from temptation and the felicity of Assurance of the Divine Vision when "the defilements contracted in the midst of this miserable and naughty world have been purged and done away," and at last a joyful Resurrection, in which we shall be clothed upon with a spiritual body, and when every man shall have praise of God.


But we must not forget the Communion of saints and the law of brotherly Charity, nor the assistance which we can give to those whose defilements, contracted in this miserable and naughty world are now being purged and done away, by our intercession, both in our private prayers and in the great public intercession at the Church's Altar: nor the Great Cloud of Martyrs by whom we are compassed about,<sup>2</sup> and that "wonder in Heaven," "the Woman Clothed with the Sun and the Moon under her feet and on her head the Crown of twelve stars, who brought forth the Man-child,"<sup>3</sup> and who is the mother of all whose names are written in the Lamb's book of life: whom we desire that they may all "pray for us sinners now and in the hour of our death."

Man is made a little lower than the Angels: to be crowned with Glory and Worship.

<sup>1</sup> St. James v.

<sup>2</sup> Hebrews xii, v. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Revelation xii.





## An Appendix on Pragmatism — and Books

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### I. PRAGMATISM

ACCORDING to the original plan of this book, it was intended to provide an appendix for the help of such as were actually distressed by difficulties of faith. Much of the matter which such an appendix should contain has been used up in the book, and many of the other suggestions that might have been offered are really best made *visû voce* by an understanding friend who knows the individual circumstances of the case of distress before him : but this much may now be said. Mere argument may not be of much use in such cases, it may even do harm : it is not disputation but work which restores a man's touch with the stubborn paradox of real life. But a friend who was looking over the proofs of this book has drawn my attention to a new work by Professor William James, of Harvard, U.S.A., author of "The Varieties of Religious Experience," called "Pragmatism." My friend's kindness has had the double result of restoring the original idea of an appendix, and providing the appendix ready made for such as will procure Pragmatism and read it. Professor James is a learned psychologist and Pragmatism is a thoroughly unprincipled system of philosophy ! I find, moreover, that without knowing it, I have in the course of this book been frequently guilty of pragmatism !

The essence of Pragmatism is that it is practical : nothing, according to this school, matters which has no "cash value," which has, that is to say, no bearing on the actual business of living one's life ; on the other hand, it maintains that nothing has so high a "cash value," nothing affects the conduct of a man's life, so much as his philosophy, even though it be only a "more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means." The philosophy which matters is that of which Mr. G. K. Chesterton speaks in his Introductory remarks on the Importance of Orthodoxy, in the volume called "Heretics."

There are other exponents of the truth that there is a philosophy that matters, of whom I will suggest three : "The Preacher," Mr. Rudyard Kipling, and the Catholic Church. People are often troubled by the problem why the dismal pessimism of The Preacher, the burden of whose dirge is that

"all is vanity and vexation of spirit," should stand part of the Word of God. The reason seems to be that it presents the dismalness of life without a philosophy. Mr. Rudyard Kipling's exposition is to be found principally in his book "*Kim*," and in cognate short stories such as "*The Miracle of Purun Bhagat*:"<sup>1</sup> in these he gives pictures of native life in India, which is essentially a religious and therefore a hopeful life, even though the religion of fakirs, yogis, Jain monks and Lamas be dressed up in absurdities and sometimes, *teste* Mr. J. C. Oman, who writes of "*The Brahmans, Theists and Muslims of India*," in obscenities. The Catholic Church offers, as I myself have endeavoured to show, and as the lives of the martyrs demonstrate beyond question, a "blessed hope of everlasting life" which makes this life not only supremely worth living, but worth living strenuously. The school (of Haeckel, for example) that proclaims that the methods of natural science are the only methods, would rob us of all and every philosophy of life; but the resulting vanity and vexation of spirit would be so intolerable that even practical Englishmen would find it better to drink the sacred waters of "*Mother Gunga*" (the Ganges) and die of typhoid! I suggest here the reading of another story of Mr. Kipling's, "*The Conversion of Aurelian McGoggin*":<sup>2</sup> its author calls it a tract, and a very good tract it is! The only men who would find an unexplained universe tolerable are those who are wholly absorbed in the objects around them, such as the scientist, who is fascinated by the special field of his research, like the German, who, on his deathbed, regretted that he had dissipated his energies on too wide a field (he had, I believe, taken into his view a whole group of insects); or such a man of the world as Mr. Samuel Pepys, who was fully occupied with the often trivial matters which fill the pages of his immortal diary!

But to return to Professor James: he is, as I have said, a psychologist, and he points out what few philosophers have the courage to own, even if they are aware of it, *viz.*, that difference of temperament is a chief cause of difference of philosophy: on the one side are the "Rationalists," whose passion is for abstract truth and the inherent unity and consistency of the universe, and who insist on going by principles, and on the other the "Empiricists" who care only for "facts." The Pragmatist finds a "cash value" in both the rationalist ideal, which I have called faith in unity, and in facts, and is not deterred from compounding from the two a working philosophy of life by the fact that it involves a certain amount of unexplained paradox.

Mr. James's book suggests, though he does not say so, that the Scholastic Philosophy is at bottom pragmatist, especially as

<sup>1</sup> *Vide The Second Jungle Book.*

<sup>2</sup> *Plain Tales from the Hills.*



pragmatism is, as he says, but "a new name for some old ways of thinking." The Scholastic Philosophy is "Monist" (in the generic, not the specialised Haeckelian sense of the word), in that it assumes the unity of Being, and "Pluralist" in that it accepts as a matter of course its visible diversities; it is also pragmatist in that "substance" and "accidents" do not really constitute a doctrine, but are an analysis of the ordinary man's way of thinking about things. It is for this reason that some of us, in spite of a contrary opinion on the part of some of the Modernists, find the "Angelic Doctor," St. Thomas Aquinas refreshingly modern, and believe that his *Summa Theologiae* "doth contain," provided it be read with discrimination (for his conclusions are not always *de fide*!) "a godly and wholesome doctrine, and necessary for these times."<sup>1</sup>

It is also evident to those, who think, that the Catholic Church is a pragmatist institution. She is not a philosophy or body of doctrine, but "a congregation of faithful men"<sup>2</sup> united in the allegiance of the blood-tie to God: she is, therefore, anti-doctrinaire! Men of the rational type may think and theologize, but she will not let them explain away her facts in the interest of consistency, and when they try to do so she gives formal expression to her facts in terms of paradox. All "heresy" comes from the endeavour to be consistent! But the Church's pragmatism does not end here. She also is pragmatist in looking not backwards on abstract truth, but forwards to a great and triumphant result. She is monist in looking to that result as a thing that is "at unity in itself," and pluralist in asserting the "ten thousand times ten thousand and thousands of thousands" which will then attain to unity.

This brings us to the relation of Pragmatism to the second part of my book, which deals with Universalism. The real basis of Universalism is not sentimental aversion from thinking of the lost, but the rationalist temper of unity and consistency. But Pragmatism is "meliorist," it can look to the future thing that has unity in itself, and yet accept the idea of that unity not being attained without wastage and loss, and indeed shows meliorism to be the more tolerable and practical philosophy of life. Professor James's treatment of the subject is a philosophic expression of the hope which the Church has always offered, a hope which necessitates a "chaste conversation coupled with fear." "There is" he says in his last lecture, and he, by the way, is a psychologist, "a healthy minded buoyancy in most of us which such a (perilous) universe would exactly fit." Universalism, or, as he calls it, absolutism, is afraid of the life of adventure, and he does not hesitate to call it "sick-minded."

<sup>1</sup> Cf Article xxxv, "Of Homilies."

<sup>2</sup> Article xix.

It cuts, as we have seen, the foundations from under practical Christianity.

I will add that I have only touched on the first and last of eight lectures, which are anything but dull reading; how can lectures be dull when the professor in the first few words tells his audience that "whatever universe a professor believes in, it must at any rate be a universe that lends itself to lengthy discourse!"

## II. BOOKS

It is time, however, to offer some suggestions about books of a more technical kind. These may be divided for our purpose into three classes.

The first class are purely didactic, they are cupboards full of information; in this class all that we want is that the cupboard shall be full and the contents tidy. Information may be wanted on the creed of Christendom, on the received tenets of modern Natural Science, and on the text and history of the Scriptures.

As regards the Creed of Christendom, there are the "King's Book," "The Catechism of the Council of Trent," which are Anglican and Roman respectively and are authoritative, and Bishop Pearson's classic "On the Creed." Besides these there are the Rev. T. A. Lacey's "Elements of Christian Doctrine," Dr. Mortimer's "Catholic Faith and Practice," and an "Instruction in Christian Doctrine"; the last is Roman. The only Greek book I can name is a little popular Catechism called "The Mother and Mistress of all Churches."

For natural science, the best quite modern book for the general reader is Professor Ray Lankester's "Kingdom of Man," as it covers a wide field and contains wholesome observations on the relation of natural science to the general conception of human life. A more advanced book with a narrower scope is Mr. Locke's "Studies in Heredity, Development and Evolution." M. Felix le Dantec's book is a good exposition of the mechanical theory of life, and a shrewd criticism of Weismannism. Keane's "Ethnology" is also useful as an account of mankind from the zoological standpoint, and Wilson is a standard authority on the Cell and its development.

For a knowledge of Scripture Criticism there is Hastings' "New Dictionary of the Bible," and, for a general introduction to Old Testament History, the Rev. F. J. Foakes Jackson's "Biblical History of the Hebrews;" and in the New Testament such books as Westcott's "Introduction to the Study of the Gospels," and Salmon's "Introduction to the Study of the New Testament." Among books which come to closer grip with difficulties, Professor Stanton's "The Gospels as Historic Documents," and above all Sir W. M. Ramsay's books, "Paul, the Traveller and Roman Citizen," and "Christ Born at Bethlehem."

A classic which deals with both the first and third divisions of this class is Liddon's Bampton Lectures on "The Divinity of our Lord," and a broad general presentment of our Lord's life and work is Sir John Seeley's "*Ecce Homo*."

A second class of books are those which afford not information, but mental gymnastics, whose object is to train the reader in correct thinking. They deal with what are called the Moral Sciences. The field of choice here is wider and more varied. Readers cannot be asked to begin again at the beginning with the verbal arguments of Euclid, and such like training in the rudiments of grammar, or to read text-books of formal logic such as Welton's, or a smaller book by Rylands; but if they care to try and learn something of the Scholastic Philosophy they will find that the Manuals of Catholic Philosophy in the Stonyhurst Series are good and sound though rather tough books, and there is no need to be frightened at them because they are written by Jesuits: the volumes of the series which serve the purpose are those on "General Metaphysics" and "First Principles of Knowledge." Two useful books are, for the general reader, a new book called the "Certainty of Religion," which is a really good though rather dry little treatise on Certitude by F. Storrs Turner, and for such as have a trained knowledge of science, Foster's "Physiology," not, of course, for the subject matter, which is now to some extent out of date by reason of new discoveries, but because it is one of the best examples of the handling of evidence which we possess; the section which deals with the brain may help the reader to realize the seemingly insoluble character of the problem of the relation of mind to matter.

Psychology, or the study of human nature, is really a branch of modern science, and ethics may be taken with it. The general reader will not probably care to go deeply into this matter, but for those who do there are volumes in the Stonyhurst Series, one on "Psychology," and the other on "Moral Philosophy," and there are two books on "Psychology," a shorter and a longer, by Prof. William James. But much of human nature is to be learned from more general reading, taking such books as The Psalms, Ecclesiastes, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus, Shakespeare's plays, really good fiction, biographies, such as the "Life and Letters of G. J. Romanes," and such heterogeneous books as Mr. Chesterton's "Heretics" and "Pepys' Diary."

The third class deals more directly with apologetics, and here the reader must face books with which he will disagree. There are two sets for us: first, apologetics against the oppositions (falsely so called) of science, and second, those against Universalism.

Seeing the extent to which the difficulties with which we have had to do have turned on human nature, a difficult but most important work is Mr. J. R. Illingworth's "Personality, Human and Divine." Also Mr. Romanes' "Mind, Motion and

Monism." The works which express Haeckel's views are the "Riddle of the Universe," and the "Wonders of Life," and a shorter treatise called "Monism." His attitude that mind is but a function of the brain, that is, nothing else than matter in motion, seems sufficiently refuted by himself every time he uses the pronoun "I." The views of various men of science from Sir Oliver Lodge to Father Waggett and Mr. Wilfrid Ward can be learned from the "Ideals of Science and Faith," edited by Mr. J. E. Hands. In this connection should be read so much of Mr. Herbert Spencer's "First Principles" as deals with the Unknowable, and with it Bishop Pearson on Credibility and Testimony in the beginning of his treatise on the Creed, and Mr. Romanes' "Thoughts on Religion." Father Waggett's "Science and Religion" is a good introduction to apologetic study, and it provides an extensive bibliography.


In the sphere of Eschatology, besides the "Eternal Hope," there is Oxenham's "Catholic Eschatology," and Dr. Pusey's answer to the "Eternal Hope," in which will be found many references to other works. Dante's "*Divina Commedia*" should not be forgotten, and those who do not care to read St. Thomas on Beatitude in the original, will find his doctrine well presented in Elmendorf's "Elements of Moral Theology."

This closes my list of books, except that a list of those of which I could ascertain the publisher's name and the price is given below, the authors' names being in alphabetical order.

I would add to such as are in difficulties the advice, "Do the work and thou shalt know of the doctrine." Keep in contact with the Person of Christ through the exercises of religion and the doing of His will first, and then with patience knowledge of the doctrine will follow.

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- CHESTERTON, G. K. "Heretics." *Lane*. 5s. net.  
 DANTE. "The Divine Comedy." 3 vols. *Pitman's*. 2s. 6d. each.  
 DANTEC, FELIX, LE. "The Nature and Origin of Life." *Hodder and Stoughton*.  
 ELMENDORF, J. G. "Elements of Moral Theology." *J. Post, New York*.  
 FARRAR, F. W., D.D. "Eternal Hope." *Macmillan & Co. Ltd*.  
 FOAKES-JACKSON, REV. F. J. "Biblical History of the Hebrews." *Heffers, Cambridge*.  
 FOSTER, SIR MICHAEL. "A Text - Book of Physiology." *Macmillan*.  
 HAECKEL, PROF. ERNEST. "The Riddle of the Universe," and "The Wonders of Life." *Watts*. 6s. each and 6d. each.  
 HANDS, J. E., "Ideals of Science and Faith." *Geo. Allen*. 5s. net.

- ILLINGWORTH, J. R., "Personality, Human and Divine." *Macmillan*. 6d. Edition.
- "Instruction in Christian Doctrine." *Cath. Truth Soc.* 6s.
- JAMES, PROF. WM., "Pragmatism." *Longmans*. 4s. 6d.
- "Psychology." *Macmillan*.
- KEANE, A. H., "Ethnology." *Cambridge University Press*.
- "King's Book" out of print.
- KIPLING, R., "Kim," etc. 6s. each.
- LACEY, REV. T. A., "Elements of Christian Doctrine." *Rivingtons*. 5s.
- LANKESTER, PROF. RAY, "The Kingdom of Man." *Constable and Co.* 3s. 6d. net.
- LIDDON, H. P. "The Divinity of our Lord." *Rivingtons*.
- LOCK, R. H., "Studies in Heredity, Development and Evolution." *Murray*. 5s. net.
- LODGE, SIR O. "The Substance of Faith Allied with Science." *Methuen*. 2s. net.
- "Manuals of Catholic Philosophy." *Longmans*. 6s. each.
- MELLONE, PROFESSOR S. H., and MARGARET DRUMMOND. "Elements of Psychology." *Blackwood*. 5s. net.
- MORTIMER, DR. ALFRED G., "Catholic Faith and Practice." 2 vols. *Longmans*. 7s. 6d. and 9s.
- OXENHAM, H. N. "Catholic Eschatology." *Allen*.
- PEARSON. "On the Creed." *G. Bell & Sons*. 5s.
- RAMSAY, SIR W. M., "Christ Born at Bethlehem." 5s.; and "Paul the Traveller and Roman Citizen." 10s. 6d. *Hodder & Stoughton*.
- ROMANES, G. J., "Mind, Motion and Monism." 4s. 6d.
- "Thoughts on Religion," 4s. 6d. and 6d. "Life and Letters." 5s. net. *Longmans*.
- RYLAND, F., "Logic." *G. Bell & Sons*. 3s. 6d.
- SALMON, PROF. "Introduction to the Study of the New Testament." *Murray*. 9s.
- SEELEY, SIR JOHN. "Ecce Homo." *Macmillan*. 4s. and 6d.
- SPENCER, HERBERT, "First Principles." *Williams & Norgate*. 7s. 6d.
- STANTON, PROF. V. H. "The Gospels as Historic Documents." *Cambridge University Press*. 7s. 6d. net.
- TURNER, F. STORRS. "The Certainty of Religion." *Swan and Sonnenschein*. 2s. net.
- WAGGETT, FR. P. N., "Science and Religion." *Longmans*. 2s. 6d. net.
- WESTCOTT, BISHOP, "Introduction to Study of the Gospels." *Macmillan*. 6s.
- WELTON, J., "Manual of Logic." *W. B. Clive*. 2 vols. 15s.
- WILSON, E. B., "The Cell in Development and Inheritance." *Macmillan*. 14s.



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
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
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





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